Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal最新文献_第10页

An Experimental Evaluation of Strategic Preemption 战略先发制人的实验评价

Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 1998-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.92594

C. Mason, Owen R. Phillips

引用次数: 9

Price Uncertainty and Vertical Integration: An Empirical Examination of Petrochemical Firms 价格不确定性与垂直整合:石化企业的实证检验

Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 1998-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.80468

Joseph P. H. Fan

{"title":"Price Uncertainty and Vertical Integration: An Empirical Examination of Petrochemical Firms","authors":"Joseph P. H. Fan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.80468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.80468","url":null,"abstract":"Input transactions in the petrochemical industry are subject to temporal specificity. That is, non-performance in quantity, such as delaying delivery, is highly costly to producers and can be an effective holdup strategy. Buyers and sellers of petrochemical inputs have been averse to frequent price changes. The aversion to haggling over prices reflects the desire of maintaining stable input supplies critical to production efficiency. In the 1970s, two oil price shocks induced high price volatility in the industry. The price volatility created immense pressures for price adjustments in contracts. The traditional agreements of inflexible prices were destabilized, resulting in widespread disputes and renegotiation. The industry and the time period together create a natural opportunity for examining how governance structures of transactions adapt to price uncertainty. This paper examines in particular the effects of input price uncertainty on vertical integration. Based on plant-level data for U.S. producers of 49 petrochemical products, this study finds that the producers' extents of vertical integration, measured by their degrees of input self-sufficiency, were positively related to input price volatility during the period of the oil price shocks. The positive reaction of vertical integration to input price volatility is attributed to the producers who had the highest expecting costs of supply disruption.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134432470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Why are Process Monitoring Technologies Valuable? The Use of On-Board Information Technology in the Trucking Industry 为什么过程监控技术很有价值?车载信息技术在卡车运输业中的应用

Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 1998-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.157152

T. Hubbard

引用次数: 24

Mergers Among Asymmetric Bidders: A Logit Second-Price Auction Model 非对称竞标者之间的合并:一个Logit第二价格拍卖模型

Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 1998-02-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.69415

Luke M. Froeb, S. Tschantz, P. Crooke

引用次数: 24

Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers 共同基金经理的职业关注

Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 1998-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.130990

J. Chevalier, Glenn Ellison

{"title":"Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers","authors":"J. Chevalier, Glenn Ellison","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.130990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.130990","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the labor market for mutual fund managers and managers' responses to the implicit incentives created by their career concerns. We find that managerial turnover is sensitie to a fund's recent performance. Consistent with the hypothesis that fund companies are learning about managers' abilities, managerial turnover is more performance-sensitive for younger fund managers. Interpreting the separation-performance relationship as an incentive scheme, several of our results suggest that a desire to avoid separation may induce managers at different stages of their careers to behave differently. Younger fund managers appear to be given less discretion in the management of their funds; i.e. they are more likely to lose their jobs if their fund's beta or unsystematic risk level deviates from the mean for their fund's objective group. We also show that the shape of the job separation-performance relationship may provide an incentive for young mutual fund managers to be risk averse in selecting their fund's portfolio. Consistent with these implicit labor market incentives, younger fund managers do take on lower unsystematic risk and deviate less from typical behavior than their older counterparts. Finally, additional results on the flow of investments into mutual funds suggest that rather than just being due to a screening process, firing decisions may also be influenced by a desire to stimulate inflows of investment into the fund.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114205319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1118

Division of Labor, Market for Technology and Investment 劳动分工、技术市场与投资

Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 1998-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.150349

Andrea Fosfuri, A. Arora, A. Gambardella

引用次数: 2

New Models of Foreclosure: Should Antitrust Authorities Be Concerned? 止赎新模式:反垄断当局应该关注吗?

Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 1998-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.55775

H. Ergas, E. Ralph

{"title":"New Models of Foreclosure: Should Antitrust Authorities Be Concerned?","authors":"H. Ergas, E. Ralph","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.55775","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.55775","url":null,"abstract":"Recent models which claim to provide examples of profitable foreclosure--when a firm weakens competition by reducing its access to customers or inputs--have led to calls for more aggressive antitrust activity by courts and regulators. However, we show that the alleged anticompetitive behavior of these models is either typical of competition or simply implausible. In addition, even if foreclosure occurs, it is almost always confined to the short run, and its efficiency consequences are commonly ambiguous. As a result, the new literature on foreclosure provides little impetus for intervention by poorly informed regulators. In most of the models examined, the \"foreclosing\" firm earns profits equal to its cost advantage as is typical of Bertrand competition, or makes profits because it was an early investor/innovator. Such profits can hardly be considered anticompetitive, and in any case can rarely be maintained beyond the short run. In addition, in many of these models vertical coordination increases efficiency, so even if foreclosure occurs, overall efficiency could improve. In the remaining models foreclosure obtains because the incumbent, but not entrants, can coordinate buyers. Only allowing incumbents this privilege is implausible, except perhaps in the short term.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132146240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

The International Dimension of Regulatory Reform with Applications to Egypt 监管改革的国际维度及其在埃及的应用

Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 1998-01-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.55085

R. Noll

引用次数: 2

The Diagnostic Imaging Equipment Industry: What Prognosis for Good Jobs? 诊断成像设备行业:好工作的预后如何?

Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 1998-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.125772

Chris Tilly, M. Handel

引用次数: 4

Trade, Multinationals, and Transfer Pricing Regulations 贸易、跨国公司和转让定价法规

Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 1998-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.74708

Guttorm Schjelderup, Alfons J. Weichenrieder

引用次数: 47