Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal最新文献

Returns to Specialization, Transaction Costs and the Dynamics of Industry Evolution 专业化回报、交易成本与产业演进动态

Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 2006-03-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4191

A. Arora, Farasat A. S. Bokhari

{"title":"Returns to Specialization, Transaction Costs and the Dynamics of Industry Evolution","authors":"A. Arora, Farasat A. S. Bokhari","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.4191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4191","url":null,"abstract":"When more than one component or activity is needed to produce the final product, a firm may use proprietary standards or adopt a common standard to integrate these components. We call these closed and open firms respectively, and develop a model of industry evolution to study the process by which type of firm comes to dominate the industry. Our simulations show that an industry may diverge from its long run equilibrium configuration for sustained periods of time. Typically, the industry is dominated by closed firms in the early history and by open firms later on. Entry and exit dynamics create transient biases in favor of open firms. First, a closed entrant can capture multiple profits whereas an open entrant faces a lower entry barrier. However, while the odds of closed entry (relative to open entry) are initially greater than one, they decrease with price and eventually open entry becomes more likely than closed entry. Second, though initially closed firms can offset losses in one component with profits from another and thereby have better survival as compared to open firms, when prices fall below a threshold level, a closed firm is more likely to exit than a comparable pair of open firms. Finally, entry by an open firm improves the relative odds of entry by a complementary open firm, especially when the two complementary sectors differ in size or efficiency.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133079305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Strategic Commitments and the Principle of Reciprocity in Interconnection Pricing 战略承诺与互联定价中的互惠原则

Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 2005-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1736

N. Economides, Giuseppe Lopomo, Glenn Woroch

{"title":"Strategic Commitments and the Principle of Reciprocity in Interconnection Pricing","authors":"N. Economides, Giuseppe Lopomo, Glenn Woroch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1736","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1736","url":null,"abstract":"We discuss the effects of strategic commitments and of network size in the process of setting interconnection fees across competing networks. We also discuss the importance of the principles of reciprocity and imputation of interconnection charges on market equilibria. Reciprocity means that both networks charge the same for interconnection. Imputation means that a network charges its customers as much as it charges customers of the other network for the same service. Assuming that each consumer cannot subscribe to more than one network, we begin by analyzing a game of strategic symmetry where the two networks choose all prices simultaneously. Second, we allow a dominant network to set the interconnection fee before the opponent network can set its prices. This results in a price-squeeze on the rival network. Third, we show that the imposition of a reciprocity rule eliminates the strategic power of the first mover. Under reciprocity, one network sets the common interconnection fee at cost, and the equilibrium prices for final services are lower than in the two previous games without reciprocity. Moreover, prices under reciprocity obey the principle of imputation. In the long run, consumers subscribe to one of the two networks. Typically, there is a multiplicity of equilibria, including corner equilibria, where all consumers subscribe to the same network. However, under reciprocity, there are no corner equilibria.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"112 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115586875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 45

Strong Time-Consistency in the Cartel-Versus-Fringe Model 卡特尔-边缘模型的强时间一致性

Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 2003-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1552

A. de Zeeuw, F. Groot, C. Withagen

引用次数: 80

Financial Constraints and Product Market Competition: Ex-Ante vs. Ex-Post Incentives 财务约束与产品市场竞争:事前激励与事后激励

Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 2003-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.246992

Paul Povel, Michael Raith

引用次数: 79

Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics 最优借贷契约与企业动态

Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 2002-09-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.273255

R. Albuquerque, Hugo Hopenhayn

引用次数: 590

Firm's R&D Behavior Under Rational Expectations 理性预期下的企业研发行为

Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 2002-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.41100

Lakshmi K. Raut

引用次数: 1

Imperfect Contract Enforcement 合同执行不完善

Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 2002-03-01 DOI: 10.3386/W8847

James E. Anderson, L. Young

引用次数: 19

Capital Structure and Product Markets Interactions: Evidence from Business Cycles 资本结构与产品市场互动:来自商业周期的证据

Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 2001-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.198228

Murillo Campello

{"title":"Capital Structure and Product Markets Interactions: Evidence from Business Cycles","authors":"Murillo Campello","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.198228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.198228","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides firm- and industry-level evidence on the effects of capital structure on product market outcomes for a large cross-section of industries. The analysis uses shocks to aggregate demand as surrogates for exogenous changes in the product market environment, dealing with concerns about the endogenous nature of the relation between financial structure and competitive performance. I find that debt financing has a negative impact on firm (relative-to-industry) sales growth in industries where rivals are relatively unlevered during recessions, but not during booms. In contrast, no such effects are observed for firms competing in high-debt industries. At the industry level, I find that markups are more countercyclical when industry debt is high. The cyclical dynamics I find for firm sales growth and for industry markups are consistent with Chevalier and Scharfstein's (1996) prediction that firms that rely more heavily on external financing are more prone to boost short-term profits at the expense of future sales in response to negative shocks to demand, and that the competitive outcomes resulting from such actions depend on the financial structures of their industry rivals.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"160 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122502725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 362

Regulating Interchange Fees in Payment Systems 规管支付系统的交换费

Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 2001-10-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.286535

J. Gans, Stephen P. King

{"title":"Regulating Interchange Fees in Payment Systems","authors":"J. Gans, Stephen P. King","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.286535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.286535","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a simple model of 'four party' payment systems designed to consider recent moves to regulate interchange fees and other rules of credit card associations. In contrast to recent formal analyses emphasising the role of network effects in the decisions of customer and merchants to use credit cards, we provide a model without such effects. In so doing, we identify the key role played by customers who determine the choice of payment instrument and hence, impose costs and benefits on other parties to a payment system. This model yields new insights regarding the role played by card association rules as well as confirming results derived elsewhere. In particular, we demonstrate that 'no surcharge' rules can encourage transaction efficiency by eliminating payment instrument choice as a means of price discrimination. We also demonstrate that, even in the absence of network effects, a desire for balance drives both the socially optimal and privately profit maximising choice of interchange fees. The role of the interchange fee is to ensure that the customer internalises the impact of its decisions on other participants to a payment system rather than from a need to account for network effects alone. Thus, the presence or otherwise of network effects should not be the focus of regulatory attention.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133136156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

The Choice of Private Versus Public Capital Markets: Evidence from Privatizations 私人资本市场与公共资本市场的选择:来自私有化的证据

Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 2001-10-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.289882

R. Nash, Jeffry Netter, W. Megginson, A. Poulsen

引用次数: 235