{"title":"Crossfunctional Relationships and the Quality of Communication: Coordinating the Airline Departure Process","authors":"J. H. Gittell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.115168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.115168","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that coordination of highly interdependent work processes is best achieved by designing organizations with consistent attention to crossfunctional relationships and the quality of communication. I look deeply into crossfunctional coordination by studying it in the context of one highly interdependent process--airline departures. As in many other service settings, the functional groups which must interact are divided by status and expertise, increasing the challenge of coordination. Using field, archival and survey data which I collected from nine airport sites, spanning four major airlines, I identify features of organization design which improve performance through their effect on crossfunctional relationships and the quality of communication.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133764495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Multinational Enterprises and Emergence of Markets and Networks in Transition Economies","authors":"K. Meyer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.103132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.103132","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the impact that foreign investors in the transition economies have on the evolution of market relationships. Starting points are the role of networks and the process of enterprise transformation in economic transition. On this basis, the evolution of the supplier network of VW-Skoda is explored and related to world-wide trends in the car industry. Relationships within the network are growing increasingly complex and thus create mutual dependencies and pose particular challenges for managing market relationships. The paper concludes that network relationships have a pivotal role in business-to-business markets and, therefore, have to be taken into account when analyzing enterprise transformation in transition economies. Economic policy also has to consider the pivotal role of the flagship firm and its interdependence with local businesses.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131773534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ownership and Growth","authors":"Thorvaldur Gylfason, T. T. Herbertsson, G. Zoega","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.137208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.137208","url":null,"abstract":"This article suggests how state enterprises can be incorporated into the theoretical and empirical growth literature. Specifically, it shows that if state enterprises are less efficient than private firms, invest less, employ less skilled labor, and are less eager to adopt new technology, then a large state enterprise sector tends to be associated with slow economic growth, all else remaining the same. The empirical evidence for 1978-92 indicates that, through a mixture of these channels, an increase in the share of state enterprises in employment by one standard deviation could reduce per capita growth by one to two percentage points a year from one country to another.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"198 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134071060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Policy Shocks, Market Intermediaries, and Corporate Strategy: 'The Evolution of Business Groups in Chile and India'","authors":"T. Khanna, K. Palepu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.97809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.97809","url":null,"abstract":"Numerous countries have undergone rapid transitions in their economic environments. Yet, little is known about firms' responses to such transitions. We use field-collected data to study the evolution of eighteen large and diversified business groups in Chile (1987-1997) and India (1990-1997). The chosen periods correspond to significant deregulation in the primary markets in both countries. Conventional wisdom suggests that the intermediation roles played by business groups ought to decrease during these periods. However, we find an increase in group scope, an increase in the strength of the social and economic ties that bind together group firms, an increase in self-reported intermediation attempts by the groups, and some evidence that these actions are associated with improvements in accounting and stock-market performance of the group affiliates. We suggest that the slow development of market intermediaries, in a manner suggested by institutional economics, and the attendant lack of reduction in transaction costs in primary markets, can explain these findings. Copyright (c) 1999 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123768060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Value of a Transmission Congestion Contract","authors":"Jung-Hwan Seo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.128255","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.128255","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the individual agent's incentive for setting Transmission Congestion Contract (TCC) magnitudes and its consequences in a POOLCO model of electric power market. TCCs do not completely solve the externality problem in an electric power market. Specifically, a TCC can have a negative value. The owner of a negative-valued TCC will set the TCC magnitude equal to zero, which affects other agents' TCC settings and the incentive for grid modification. After disappearance of the negative-valued TCCs, not all TCCs match the actual dispatch because of the feasibility constraint. And hence, an agent may have an incentive for a detrimental grid modification. We present one such example. We suggest that for the allocation of transmission congestion rents in a POOLCO model, POOLCO's role need include the allocation of true congestion rents, i.e., solving the externality problem in an electric power market.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"138 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114339111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strategic R&D Cooperatives","authors":"J. Hinloopen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.129769","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.129769","url":null,"abstract":"Allowing firms to cooperate in their R&D is an industrial policy which has received much attention in recent economics literature. Many of these contributions are based on the seminal analysis of d?Aspremont and Jacquemin [1988]. We provide a general version of their model which encompasses several recent contributions in the literature. With this general model we then examine the main arguments against and in favor of sustaining R&D cooperatives.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122127890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Restructuring and Measurement of Efficiency in Firms in Transition","authors":"V. Benáček, D. Shemetilo, A. Petrov","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.98688","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.98688","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we try to explain some restructuring patterns of Czech textile and clothing industries from a microeconomic point of view. We introduce two measures of production efficiency (the technical and the allocative efficiency) and look at changes in the behaviour of enterprises. In 1994, after the chaos during the culmination of transition (1991-92), firms’ profits showed the first signs of dependency on efficiency. This fact can be taken as evidence of the creation of a competitive environment and a signal that long-term restructuring has led to economic patterns characteristic for standard market economies.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128302594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Uncertainty, Information Sharing and Tacit Collusion in Laboratory Duopoly Markets","authors":"T. Cason, C. Mason","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.128253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.128253","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reports 45 laboratory duopoly markets that examine the importance of information sharing in facilitating tacit collusion under conditions of demand uncertainty. Sellers in these repeated laboratory markets generally shared information when possible to reduce their demand uncertainty, which led to output reductions in some demand states. Risk aversion is a likely explanation for this sharing, but some sellers also appeared to employ a strategy of information concealment to punish non-colluding rivals. Nevertheless, output choices were similar in control treatments that forced sellers to share or conceal information, so the information sharing itself did not substantially increase tacit collusion.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"239 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116058875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Responsiveness: Emotion and Information Dynamics in Service Interactions","authors":"Lorna Doucet","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.145306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.145306","url":null,"abstract":"This research poses the following basic research question: What is the value of emotional and informational responsiveness in service interactions and what are their antecedents? Through a cross-sectional study of 250 service interactions, this dissertation provides evidence regarding individual and environmental differences in emotional and informational responsiveness in service interactions. The research design is multi-method and field-based. The data include transcribed and coded audio recordings of the service interactions, as well as surveys and standardized tests of individual service representatives. In addition to the recordings, organizational and customer evaluations of the interactions are used to answer the research questions. Participant observation and focus groups are used to get a richer sense of the nature of the work in general, and of the emotional and informational labor performed. In preliminary analyses, tests of the models of the antecedents and outcomes of emotional and informational responsiveness explain between 18% and 48% of the variance in service quality and duration of the interaction. Interesting differences between antecedents of customer rated quality and organization rated quality are identified.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126468468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Research Add Value for Undergraduates?","authors":"V. Smith, John K. Horowitz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.147611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.147611","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses a hedonic model for pricing decisions in non-competitive markets to model the relationship between undergraduate tuition and the characteristics of private universities. The model includes measures of externally funded research, the influence of student aid policies, college and university characteristics, attributes of the student body, and the quality of the faculty. The overall conclusions is that externally funded research reduces tuition after account for faculty quality. The findings should be treated as suggestive because they are based on one year and a small sample.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"110 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132759783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}