Governance with Poor Investor Protection: Evidence from Top Executive Turnover

Abstract

This paper analyzes executive turnover and firm valuation in Italy, a country that features all the characteristics of the most common governance structure around the world, as described by La Porta, et al. (1999): low legal protection for investors, firms with large controlling shareholders and pyramidal groups. The main findings are that turnover is significantly lower and unaffected by performance when the controlling shareholder of the firm is also a top executive in the firm, while it is more sensitive to performance when control is, to some extent, contestable and when the controlling shareholder owns a larger fraction of the firm's cash-flow rights. The results on valuation are the mirror image of those on turnover: the firm's Q is lower for companies with the controlling shareholder as a top executive, larger when a voting syndicate controls the firm, and increases with the fraction of cash-flow rights owned by the controlling shareholder.