IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.最新文献_第9页

Reduction of the secret key length in the perfect cipher by data compression and randomisation 通过数据压缩和随机化来减少完美密码中的密钥长度

IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Pub Date : 2023-07-19 DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2307.09735

B. Ryabko

引用次数: 0

Single-tiered hybrid PoW consensus protocol to encourage decentralization in bitcoin 单层混合PoW共识协议，鼓励比特币去中心化

IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Pub Date : 2023-07-15 DOI: 10.1155/2023/6169933

Gyu-Chol Kim

引用次数: 0

Upper bounding the number of bent functions using 2-row bent rectangles 使用两行弯曲矩形的弯曲函数数目的上限

IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Pub Date : 2023-07-06 DOI: 10.29235/1561-2430-2023-59-2-130-135

S. Agievich

引用次数: 1

An Algorithm for Persistent Homology Computation Using Homomorphic Encryption 一种基于同态加密的持久同态计算算法

IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Pub Date : 2023-07-04 DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2307.01923

Dominic Gold, Koray Karabina, Francis C. Motta

引用次数: 0

A Practical-Quantum Differential Attack on Block Ciphers 分组密码的实用量子差分攻击

IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1007/s12095-023-00650-6

T. Yadav, M. Kumar, Ajay Kumar, S. Pal

引用次数: 1

Frequency-revealing attacks against Frequency-hiding Order-preserving Encryption 频率暴露攻击与频率隐藏保序加密

IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.14778/3611479.3611513

Xinle Cao, Jian Liu, Yongsheng Shen, Xiaohua Ye, Kui Ren

{"title":"Frequency-revealing attacks against Frequency-hiding Order-preserving Encryption","authors":"Xinle Cao, Jian Liu, Yongsheng Shen, Xiaohua Ye, Kui Ren","doi":"10.14778/3611479.3611513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14778/3611479.3611513","url":null,"abstract":"Order-preserving encryption (OPE) allows efficient comparison operations over encrypted data and thus is popular in encrypted databases. However, most existing OPE schemes are vulnerable to inference attacks as they leak plaintext frequency. To this end, some\u0000 frequency-hiding\u0000 order-preserving encryption (FH-OPE) schemes are proposed and claim to prevent the leakage of frequency. FH-OPE schemes are considered an important step towards mitigating inference attacks.\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 Unfortunately, there are still vulnerabilities in all existing FH-OPE schemes. In this work, we revisit the security of all existing FH-OPE schemes. We are the first to demonstrate that plaintext frequency hidden by them is recoverable. We present three ciphertext-only attacks named\u0000 frequency-revealing attacks\u0000 to recover plaintext frequency. We evaluate our attacks in three real-world datasets. They recover over 90% of plaintext frequency hidden by any existing FH-OPE scheme. With frequency revealed, we also show the potentiality to apply inference attacks on existing FH-OPE schemes.\u0000 \u0000 Our findings highlight the limitations of current FH-OPE schemes. Our attacks demonstrate that achieving frequency-hiding requires addressing the leakages of both non-uniform ciphertext distribution and insertion orders of ciphertexts, even though the leakage of insertion orders is always ignored in OPE.","PeriodicalId":13158,"journal":{"name":"IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.","volume":"32 1","pages":"1122"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87423039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

On the Two-sided Permutation Inversion Problem 关于双侧置换反演问题

IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Pub Date : 2023-06-23 DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2306.13729

G. Alagic, Chen-Ming Bai, Alexander Poremba, Kaiyan Shi

引用次数: 0

Privacy-preserving Federated Singular Value Decomposition 保持隐私的联邦奇异值分解

IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Pub Date : 2023-06-21 DOI: 10.3390/app13137373

Bowen Liu, Qiang Tang

引用次数: 0

Accelerated Encrypted Execution of General-Purpose Applications 通用应用程序的加速加密执行

IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Pub Date : 2023-06-19 DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2306.11006

Charles Gouert, Vinu Joseph, Steven Dalton, C. Augonnet, M. Garland, N. G. Tsoutsos

{"title":"Accelerated Encrypted Execution of General-Purpose Applications","authors":"Charles Gouert, Vinu Joseph, Steven Dalton, C. Augonnet, M. Garland, N. G. Tsoutsos","doi":"10.48550/arXiv.2306.11006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2306.11006","url":null,"abstract":"Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is a cryptographic method that guarantees the privacy and security of user data during computation. FHE algorithms can perform unlimited arithmetic computations directly on encrypted data without decrypting it. Thus, even when processed by untrusted systems, confidential data is never exposed. In this work, we develop new techniques for accelerated encrypted execution and demonstrate the significant performance advantages of our approach. Our current focus is the Fully Homomorphic Encryption over the Torus (CGGI) scheme, which is a current state-of-the-art method for evaluating arbitrary functions in the encrypted domain. CGGI represents a computation as a graph of homomorphic logic gates and each individual bit of the plaintext is transformed into a polynomial in the encrypted domain. Arithmetic on such data becomes very expensive: operations on bits become operations on entire polynomials. Therefore, evaluating even relatively simple nonlinear functions, such as a sigmoid, can take thousands of seconds on a single CPU thread. Using our novel framework for end-to-end accelerated encrypted execution called ArctyrEX, developers with no knowledge of complex FHE libraries can simply describe their computation as a C program that is evaluated over $40times$ faster on an NVIDIA DGX A100 and $6times$ faster with a single A100 relative to a 256-threaded CPU baseline.","PeriodicalId":13158,"journal":{"name":"IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.","volume":"40 1","pages":"641"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72924406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

A new approach based on quadratic forms to attack the McEliece cryptosystem 一种基于二次型的攻击McEliece密码系统的新方法

IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Pub Date : 2023-06-17 DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2306.10294

Alain Couvreur, Rocco Mora, J. Tillich

{"title":"A new approach based on quadratic forms to attack the McEliece cryptosystem","authors":"Alain Couvreur, Rocco Mora, J. Tillich","doi":"10.48550/arXiv.2306.10294","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2306.10294","url":null,"abstract":"We bring in here a novel algebraic approach for attacking the McEliece cryptosystem. It consists in introducing a subspace of matrices representing quadratic forms. Those are associated with quadratic relationships for the component-wise product in the dual of the code used in the cryptosystem. Depending on the characteristic of the code field, this space of matrices consists only of symmetric matrices or skew-symmetric matrices. This matrix space is shown to contain unusually low-rank matrices (rank $2$ or $3$ depending on the characteristic) which reveal the secret polynomial structure of the code. Finding such matrices can then be used to recover the secret key of the scheme. We devise a dedicated approach in characteristic $2$ consisting in using a Gr\"obner basis modeling that a skew-symmetric matrix is of rank $2$. This allows to analyze the complexity of solving the corresponding algebraic system with Gr\"obner bases techniques. This computation behaves differently when applied to the skew-symmetric matrix space associated with a random code rather than with a Goppa or an alternant code. This gives a distinguisher of the latter code family. We give a bound on its complexity which turns out to interpolate nicely between polynomial and exponential depending on the code parameters. A distinguisher for alternant/Goppa codes was already known [FGO+11]. It is of polynomial complexity but works only in a narrow parameter regime. This new distinguisher is also polynomial for the parameter regime necessary for [FGO+11] but contrarily to the previous one is able to operate for virtually all code parameters relevant to cryptography. Moreover, we use this matrix space to find a polynomial time attack of the McEliece cryptosystem provided that the Goppa code is distinguishable by the method of [FGO+11] and its degree is less than $q-1$, where $q$ is the alphabet size of the code.","PeriodicalId":13158,"journal":{"name":"IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.","volume":"63 1","pages":"950"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81383352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2