{"title":"Creative Industries Value Chain: The Value Chain Logic in Supply Chain Relationships","authors":"Emilia Madudova","doi":"10.33844/MBR.2017.60236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33844/MBR.2017.60236","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to provide a deeper look into value chain logic in supply chain relationships in a creative industries value chains. In recent years, value has been recognized as a key factor in better understanding of consumer behavior and gaining a competitive advantage. In a value chain, added value should be defined at every step of the chain. There should be defined activity which adds value as well as the activity that subtracts any value. The total value can be then calculated as the sum of the total value built up all throughout the value chain. Paper mostly analyses creative industries of advertising, architecture, and design. The presented model describes and analyzes the industry participants, value chain processes, support and related environment, and evaluates the relationship of stakeholders. The paper also takes into account the creation of value chain approach that describes the vertical and horizontal linkages. The chain of values represents the coordinated set of kinds of activity which create value for the enterprise, beginning from initial sources of raw materials for suppliers of this enterprise up to the finished goods delivered to the end user including service of the consumer. The value chain conception is important for the identification and development of the enterprise. The value creation activities can be a core competitive advantage which center on fostering relationships with key actors who can derive benefits from each other’s value chain.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124293520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does the Bullwhip Matter Economically? A Cross-Sectional Firm-Level Analysis","authors":"Opher Baron, Jeffrey L. Callen, D. Segal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2856510","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2856510","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates whether the bullwhip has economic consequences at the firm level. In particular, we examine the relation between the bullwhip and various accounting/financial performance measures including equity returns, cash flows, earnings, and earnings attributes such as earnings quality and earnings persistence, using a large panel of cross-sectional firm-level data. Performance is measured both in terms of first-moment mean effects and second-moment volatility effects. Contrary to the maintained assumption of economics and operations management scholars, our analysis yields results that are inconsistent with the notion that the bullwhip has significant negative economic consequences at the firm level. In particular, we find almost no significant statistical/economic relations between accounting/financial measures of profitability and the bullwhip, both with and without covariate controls.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"94 7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129046131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Information Sharing, Advice Provision or Delegation: What Leads to Higher Trust and Trustworthiness?","authors":"Ö. Özer, Upender Subramanian, Yu Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2565577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2565577","url":null,"abstract":"In many market settings, a customer often obtains assistance from a supplier (or service provider) in order to make better-informed decisions regarding the supplier's product (or service). Because the two parties often have conflicting pecuniary incentives, customer trust and supplier trustworthiness play important roles in the success of these interactions. We investigate whether and how the process through which assistance is provided can foster trust and trustworthiness and facilitate better cooperation. We compare three prevalent assistance processes: information sharing, advice provision, and delegation. We propose that, even if the pecuniary incentives of both parties do not vary from one assistance process to another, the assistance process itself impacts the customer's and supplier's non-pecuniary motives that give rise to trust and trustworthiness. Consequently, the assistance process affects the level of cooperation and payoffs. We test our behavioral predictions through laboratory experiments based on a retail distribution setting. We quantify the impact of different assistance processes on trust, trustworthiness and channel performance, and identify the underlying drivers of those impacts. Our results offer insight into the role of the assistance process in managing supplier assistance effectively, and why certain assistance processes may lead to more successful outcomes than others even if the pecuniary incentives remain unaltered.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117186557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Comment on 'Strategic Information Management Under Leakage in a Supply Chain'","authors":"Lin Tian, Baojun Jiang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2835835","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2835835","url":null,"abstract":"Anand and Goyal (2009) propose a horizontal differentiation model to study information leakage and demand signaling in a supply chain. The authors present a composite equilibrium consisting of separating and pooling outcomes in different parameter regions and claim that it satisfies the Intuitive Criterion. We show that their analysis for the pooling equilibrium has errors and also that all pooling outcomes are actually eliminated by the Intuitive Criterion. The positive note is that if the undefeated equilibrium or lexicographical maximum sequential equilibrium (LMSE) refinement is adopted, a similar composite equilibrium will be achieved, which will lead to qualitatively the same results as in the original paper.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"GE-24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126565755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Generous, Spiteful, or Profit Maximizing Suppliers in the Wholesale Price Contract: A Behavioral Study","authors":"Julie A. Niederhoff, P. Kouvelis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2173555","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2173555","url":null,"abstract":"Prior experimental research shows that, in aggregate, decision makers acting as suppliers to a newsvendor do not set the wholesale price to maximize supplier profits. However, these deviations from optimal have rarely been examined at an individual level. In this study, presented with scenarios that differ in terms of how profit is shared between retailer and supplier, suppliers set wholesale price contracts which deviate from profit-maximization in ways that are either generous or spiteful. On an individual basis, these deviations were found to be consistent with how the profit-maximizing contract compares to the subject's idea of a fair contract. Suppliers moved nearer to self-reported ideal allocations when they indicated a high degree of concern for fairness, consistent with previously proposed fairness models, and were found to be more likely to act upon generous inclinations than spiteful ones.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121811003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contracting for On-Time Delivery in the U.S. Influenza Vaccine Supply Chain","authors":"Tinglong Dai, Soo-Haeng Cho, Fuqiang Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2178157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2178157","url":null,"abstract":"Although influenza vaccine shortage is often attributed to low supply, it has been observed that even with abundant supply, a major shortage can still occur because of late delivery. In this paper, motivated by the influenza vaccine industry, we study a supply chain contracting problem in the presence of uncertainties surrounding design, delivery, and demand of the influenza vaccine. In this supply chain, a manufacturer has insufficient incentive to initiate at-risk early production prior to the design freeze because it is a retailer who reaps the most benefits from selling more vaccines delivered on time. Anticipating that late delivery will lead to potential loss in demand, the retailer tends to reduce the order size, which further discourages the manufacturer from making an effort to improve its delivery performance. To break this negative feedback loop, a supply contract needs to achieve two objectives: incentivize at-risk early production and eliminate double marginalization. We find that two commonly observed supply contracts in practice, the delivery-time-dependent quantity flexibility (D-QF) contract and the late-rebate (LR) contract, may fail to coordinate the supply chain because of the tension between these two objectives. To resolve such a tension, we construct a buyback-and-late-rebate (BLR) contract and show that a properly designed BLR contract can not only coordinate the supply chain but also can provide full flexibility of profit division between members of the supply chain. Numerical experiments further demonstrate that the BLR contract significantly improves supply chain efficiency compared to the contracts used in the industry.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131138938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Limit to Outsourcing Complexity: Coordination vs. Cooperation in the Airbus A350 Program","authors":"O. Baumann, Markus C. Becker, I. Dörfler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2690164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2690164","url":null,"abstract":"Designing complex product systems across firms poses significant organizational challenges. While much research has focused on how interdependencies between system components can hamper the integration of collective efforts, the fact that complex systems consist of multiple hierarchic levels has received less attention. A basic decision that firms face, however, is how much complexity to outsource. The hierarchic nature of complex systems can guide this decision – which system levels to design in-house, and which to contract out? In this paper, we use an in-depth study of the aircraft manufacturer Airbus’ A350 program to understand the organizational consequences of this decision. We find that allocating higher-level design tasks to suppliers entails a tradeoff: on the one hand, it shifts the locus of dealing with complexity and reduces the outsourcing firm’s “coordination load” – its share in ensuring the alignment of actions; on the other hand, it can deteriorate cooperation within the supplier network and thus increase the firm’s “cooperation load” – its burden of aligning interests. Outsourcing higher-level design tasks, we argue, can backfire by creating conditions that are toxic to dealing effectively with complexity: (a) the supply network becomes more stratified, requiring competitors to cooperate while changing bargaining positions in adverse ways; (b) suppliers have to absorb the uncertainty of unstable design requirements, which reinforces the negative implications of (a). If organizing effectively implies reconciling specialization with coordination and cooperation, this tradeoff may impose a limit to the interfirm collaboration in complex systems design.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129799382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Supply Chain Systems Architecture and Engineering Design: Green-Field Supply Chain Integration","authors":"P. Radanliev","doi":"10.31387/oscm0230158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31387/oscm0230158","url":null,"abstract":"This paper developed a new theory for supply chain architecture, and engineering design that enables integration of the business and supply chain strategies. The architecture starts with individual supply chain participants and derives insights into the complex and abstract concept of green-field integration design. The paper presented a conceptual system for depicting the interactions between business and supply chain strategy engineering. The system examines the decisions made when engineering the business strategy, with regards to the supply chain design. The system derived with a new understanding of how strategies are integrated, and what are the implications for engineering successful strategies. The study revealed that supply chain design is not considered in great detail before architecting the business strategies. Thus, companies consequentially experience supply chain problems that are likely to be detrimental to the growth potentials. The paper also derived with the findings that proactive and pre-emptive involvement of supply chain participants in the strategy engineering process, would lead to a more robust strategic design.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"218 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121256621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Service Failure Recovery and Prevention: Managing Stockouts in Distribution Channels","authors":"Yan Dong, Kefeng Xu, T. Cui, Yuliang Yao","doi":"10.1287/mksc.2015.0924","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2015.0924","url":null,"abstract":"In managing service failures such as stockouts, most research has emphasized preventive mechanisms, whereas stockout recovery mechanisms have been largely ignored. We propose and examine a failure-recovery mechanism i.e., contractual stockout recovery in the presence of demand uncertainty and compare it with failure-prevention mechanisms in a dyadic distribution channel. \u0000 \u0000We find that stockout recovery mechanisms can improve channel profitability under certain conditions. More importantly, we find that stockout recovery may outperform stockout prevention mechanisms such as return policy and vendor managed inventory in improving manufacturer and channel profitability. This is because stockout recovery reduces channel-wide stockout risks and allows benefits from the reduced risks to be shared between the manufacturer and the retailer, helping alleviate double marginalization. Although return policy also reduces stockout risks, it does so by increasing inventory risks in the channel without reducing channel exposure to demand uncertainty. Thus, our research suggests that stockout recovery can be an effective alternative in managing stockouts to those common methods of stockout prevention mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129829132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strategic Grading in the Product Acquisition Process of a Reverse Supply Chain","authors":"Stefan Hahler, M. Fleischmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2636729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2636729","url":null,"abstract":"Most recommerce providers have moved to a quality-dependent process for the acquisition of used products. They acquire the products via websites at which product holders submit upfront quality statements and receive quality-dependent acquisition prices for their used devices. \u0000 \u0000Motivated by this development of reverse logistics practice, the aim of this paper is to analyse the product assessment process of a recommerce provider in detail. To this end, we first propose a sequential bargaining model with complete information which captures the individual behaviour of the recommerce provider and the product holder. We determine the optimal strategies of the product holder and the recommerce provider in this game. We find that the resulting strategies lead to an efficient allocation, although the recommerce provider can absorb most of the bargaining potential due to his last mover advantage. \u0000 \u0000In a second step, we relax the assumption of complete information and include uncertainty about the product holder's residual product value. We show the trade-off underlying the recommerce provider's optimal counteroffer decision and analyse the optimal strategy, using a logistic regression approach on a real-life data set of nearly 60,000 product submissions. The results reveal a significant improvement potential, compared to the currently applied strategy.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"198 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115657636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}