Supply Chain Management eJournal最新文献

{"title":"An Action-dependent Commitment in Vertical Collaborations of New Product Development","authors":"Zehui Ge, Q. Hu, Rui Zhao, Kai Song","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3504035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3504035","url":null,"abstract":"Uncertainty is essential in collaborative investment in R&D, especially for new production development (NPD). So, commitments (either formal contracts or informal communications) among members in an R&D alliance are often presented to deal with uncertainty. But after uncertainty is realized, firms may deviate their commitments (called firms’ opportunistic behavior). Then, penalty is further presented to punish firms’ opportunistic behavior. Whether commitment can diminish uncertainty, and is profitable or not for firms? Whether penalty can prohibit opportunity behavior? We attempt to answer these questions by investigating an action-dependent commitment in the context of vertical collaborations of a supplier and a manufacturer for NPD. We show that commitment can diminish the effects of the uncertainties (variances), and increase both firms’ investments and profits compared with no commitment. Moreover, any firm must deviate after uncertainty (its private information) is realized, i.e., opportunity behavior must occur. Thus, we use/present the maximal punishment rule, under which a firm will deviate only if its private information is over a threshold. Finally, we show that the supplier invests more and gets higher profit than the manufacturer from commitment.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129677380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Price Coordination in Closed-Loop Data Supply Chain","authors":"Xinming Li, Huaqing Wang, Lei Wen, Yu Nie","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3152732","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3152732","url":null,"abstract":"By focusing on new features of data products and, based on game theoretical models, we study three pricing mechanisms' performance and their effects on the participants in the data industry from the data supply chain perspective. A win-win pricing strategy for the players in the data supply chain is proposed. We obtain analytical solutions in each pricing mechanism, including the decentralised and centralised pricing, Nash bargaining pricing, and revenue sharing mechanism. Our findings show that: 1) the decentralised pricing has the lowest performance; 2) although Nash bargaining pricing can achieve the centralised channel performance, the upstream data provider and downstream application provider can only equally divide the total channel profit; 3) revenue sharing mechanism, in which the data provider subsidises the application provider, can achieve the first best performance and divide the maximum profit arbitrarily. Accordingly, end-users benefit mostly from the bargaining pricing and revenue sharing.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122194644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Better to Bend than to Break: Sharing Supply Risk Using the Supply-Flexibility Contract","authors":"M. H. Farahani, Milind Dawande, H. Gurnani, G. Janakiraman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3143238","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3143238","url":null,"abstract":"Problem definition: We analyze a contract in which a supplier who is exposed to disruption risk offers a supply-flexibility contract comprising of a wholesale price and a minimum-delivery fraction (“flexibility” fraction) to a buyer facing random demand. The supplier is allowed to deviate below the order quantity by at most the flexibility fraction. The supplier’s regular production is subject to random disruption, but she has access to a reliable expedited supply source at a higher marginal cost. Academic/practical relevance: Despite the prevalence of supply-flexibility contracts in practice, to the best of our knowledge, there is no previous academic literature examining the optimal design of supply-flexibility contracts. As such, the level of flexibility in practice is usually set on an ad-hoc basis, with buyers typically reluctant to share risk with suppliers. Our analysis of supply-flexibility contracts informs practice in two ways: First, using analytically supported arguments, it educates managers on the effects of their decisions on the economic outcomes. Second, it shows that the supply-flexibility contract benefits both the supplier and the buyer, regardless of which player chooses how supply risk is allocated in the supply chain. Methodology: Non-cooperative game theory, non-convex optimization. Results: We derive the supplier-led optimal contract and show that supply chain efficiency improves relative to the price-only contract. More interestingly, even though the buyer lets the supplier decide how the two share supply risk, profits of both the players increase by the introduction of flexibility into the contract. Further, supply flexibility may be even more valuable for the buyer compared with the supplier. Interestingly, the flexibility fraction is not monotone in supplier reliability and a more reliable supplier may even prefer to transfer more risk to the buyer. The robustness of these findings is established on two extensions: one where we study a buyer-led contract (i.e., the buyer chooses the flexibility fraction) and the other where the expedited supply option is available to both the supplier and the buyer. Managerial implications: The supply-flexibility contract is mutually beneficial for both players and yet retains all the advantages of the price-only contract—it is easy to implement, it requires minimal operational and administrative burden, and there is evidence of the use of such contracts in practice. While our focus is not on supply chain coordination, we note that the combination of two mechanisms—the supply-flexibility contract derived in this paper to share supply risk and a buyback contract to share demand risk—yields a coordinating contract.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125596910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How do Consumers Choose Between Multiple Product Generations and Conditions? An Empirical Study of iPad Sales on eBay","authors":"Erin C. McKie, Mark E. Ferguson, Michael R. Galbreth, S. Venkataraman","doi":"10.1111/POMS.12884","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/POMS.12884","url":null,"abstract":"Many companies are reluctant to enter the remanufacturing market because of concern with cannibalization of new sales, competition from current remanufacturers, and the willingness of consumers to purchase remanufactured products. What is often missing, however, is an in‐depth understanding of how consumers make complex purchase decisions involving remanufactured items among numerous other options. This study examines how consumers evaluate remanufactured products when there are multiple conditions and generations of the item available, and evaluates the risk that remanufactured products pose to new product sales. We leverage transaction data of iPad sales from eBay and structural estimation techniques developed in the industrial organization literature to conduct our analysis. We find that product generation, condition, and seller attributes are all highly influential in shaping consumers’ purchasing decisions and that the relationship between new and remanufactured products is much more nuanced and context‐specific than previously shown. Counter to industry intuition, we find that remanufactured products pose the same amount of threat to new‐condition goods as do used goods. Through these and other findings, we provide insights on how CLSC participants and those exploring entry into the remanufacturing business may achieve more profitable remanufacturing strategies.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132115968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Dynamics of Electronic Supply Chains and Enterprise Resource Planning Systems: The New Business Challenge","authors":"Prof. Jean Clement Essila","doi":"10.4018/IJCCP.2018010104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4018/IJCCP.2018010104","url":null,"abstract":"Businesses around the world experience many challenges to acquire raw materials, parts, subassemblies, and the other necessary inputs to their production systems. As businesses are all moving into the e-commerce platform to gain market shares, they realize that electronic supply chain management (e-SCM) powered by enterprise resource planning systems (ERPs) are the new norms and no business organization can operate without both in the new world of e-commerce. Little attention has been devoted to e-SCM dynamic with ERP and the challenges they pose to organizations. In the e-commerce environment, e-SCM is among the most important factors to organizational success. Effective e-SCM can enhance competitiveness and increase market share leading a higher profitability. Nevertheless, the new e-SCM professionals and other actors must understand the factors that undergird e-SCM performance, their drivers, and the necessity of fully functional ERPs for an effective e-SCM.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"195 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127319791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Healthcare Supply Chain","authors":"Soo-Haeng Cho, Hui Zhao","doi":"10.1002/9781119300977.CH8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119300977.CH8","url":null,"abstract":"Rising supply chain costs are one of the major factors that have caused rapid growth in overall healthcare spending. Supply chains in the healthcare industry are difficult to manage particularly due to their complexity and the uncertainties involved. This chapter starts with an overview of the unique challenges in healthcare supply chains, followed by an extensive review of past research in this area. We then demonstrate how inefficiency in healthcare supply chains can be improved through contract redesign, using two specific research examples: one for generic injectable drugs and the other for influenza vaccines. The chapter concludes with discussions of future research opportunities and directions.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126569769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Measuring the Performance of Logistics Industry in the Context of Karachi.","authors":"Ifrah Quais, D. Siddiqui","doi":"10.22610/IMBR.V9I5.1960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22610/IMBR.V9I5.1960","url":null,"abstract":"The Freight Forwarding and Logistics industry play a vital role in the overall economy of Pakistan. The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of the dynamic capabilities, services, capabilities, competitive advantage, and information sharing capabilities on organizational performance in the logistics industry in Karachi, Pakistan. Dynamic capabilities, services, capabilities, competitive advantage, and information sharing capabilities hypothesized as positively impacting on organizational performance. An online survey was conducted and the data were obtained from a sample size of 100 full time and part time employees from the logistics industry in Karachi. We performed multiple regression analysis to indicate all factors significant impact on organizational performance. The reliability test was also performed which showed that our study is significant. Conducting the research in a city with low literacy rate and low employee growth rate resulted in a small sample size because many people tend not to respond to online surveys.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132636086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Innovation and Technology Diffusion in Competitive Supply Chains","authors":"Ayhan Aydin, Rodney P. Parker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3030205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3030205","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Innovations in consumer products frequently rely on technological advances across multiple tiers in a supply chain. Considering the consumer market demand and downstream investment conditions as input, we model a game in a two-tier supply chain where downstream firms choose to adopt different levels of an upstream technology and an upstream technology leader determines its pricing policy. We identify two necessary but distinct elements for the successful development, adoption, and diffusion of upstream technologies that are sold to lower tiers as components within final products. (1) The level of technology demanded by the market: We develop a measure, Technological Potential, which describes the highest level of an upstream technology demanded by consumer markets. (2) A sufficiently rich return to an upstream innovator, as a function of different levels of technology. From these two elements, we show that the relative magnitudes of two competing sets of consumer market factors determine the Technological Potential whereas the overall magnitude of the factors in both sets determines the return to the upstream developer. We discuss how this difference in consumer market factors’ influence on these two elements may determine how different technologies fare in the supply chain. Our results have managerial implications for: investors in research and development project selection in identifying profitable technologies that are also demanded at higher capability levels; and for governments in defining more targeted public policies – for example in choosing the right tier of a supply chain to provide subsidies – to encourage market support for certain technologies.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129481245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Selling Discretionary Services to Strategic Customers with Peripheral Consumption","authors":"Xiaofang Wang, Qi Wu, Guoming Lai, Alan Scheller-Wolf","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3025199","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3025199","url":null,"abstract":"Discretionary service industries are those in which customers prefer not to wait in line, but also derive more value from a longer service time; this is common in healthcare interactions or repair settings. In such settings, the service provider often can obtain not only a fixed fee for the service but also a proportion of the price the customer pays for tests and materials consumed in the service process. As the prices customers pay for such peripherals (e.g. medical imaging and drugs in healthcare, spare parts in repairs) are often externally determined (by insurance, government, or third-party providers), their contribution to the service provider's income complicates the typical speed-quality trade-off decision. We investigate this setting, revealing new insights based on a strategic queueing framework in which the service provider decides the service fee and service rate, an exogenous entity determines the price the customers pay for peripherals, and the customers choose whether to patronize the service by comparing the service value and total costs. We find that if the price of the peripherals increases, the service provider reduces the service fee and increases the service time to improve the service quality, but the equilibrium demand rate still deceases. This effect is more profound if the service provider's share of the peripheral revenues is smaller. We also find that in the presence of peripheral consumption, when the customers become more sensitive to service quality, counter-intuitively, the service provider might speed up the service, which lowers the service quality. In addition, we find that social welfare loss can arise due to the peripheral price or the revenue sharing ratio being strategically determined by an external party (e.g., a peripheral supplier). This loss increases in the peripheral price or the external party's share of the revenue, and it is often most severe when the customers' quality sensitivity is either low or high. Finally, we explore the situation in which a longer service time can reduce peripheral consumption (as can occur in healthcare and repair settings), examining highly debated regulation policies that set price ceilings on the service fee. We find that although such policies can lead to more customers being served, they can also result in both poorer service quality and more peripheral consumption per customer, which reduces social welfare, especially when customers are sensitive to the service quality.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"118 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126695210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Optimal Procurement Mechanisms for Assembly","authors":"B. Hu, Anyan Qi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2635069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2635069","url":null,"abstract":"We consider an OEM’s contracting mechanism to procure multiple inputs from different suppliers to be assembled into its product under simultaneous and sequential contracting. We derive optimal mechanisms under both contracting scenarios, and show that they can be implemented by simple tiered-pricing contracts which are widely used in industry assembly settings. We find that optimal simultaneous and sequential procurement mechanisms for assembly are revenue-equivalent for all parties, despite them having different asymmetric information structures. All results are extended to general convex costs and concave revenues, confirming that the results capture fundamental properties of optimal procurement mechanisms for assembly.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133069514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}