Supply Chain Management eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Sourcing Monitors to Monitor Your Sourcing: Strategies to Manage Shilling and Shirking by Supply Chain Auditors","authors":"Ashley Palmarozzo, Jodi L. Short, M. Toffel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3758992","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3758992","url":null,"abstract":"Multinational corporations (MNCs) hire auditors to assess business partners’ compliance with quality, working conditions, and environmental standards. Independent third-party auditors are widely assumed to outperform second-party auditors employed and thus controlled by MNCs. However, outsourcing audits to third parties creates agency problems that can likewise undermine auditor performance. Synthesizing literatures on auditor independence, agency theory, and sourcing, we compare the implications for auditor performance of four sourcing strategies: insourcing, outsourcing, concurrent sourcing, and rotational sourcing. Using proprietary data from a global apparel brand, we find that insourced second-party auditors outperform outsourced third-party auditors and that third-party auditors’ performance improves when MNCs concurrently source audits, using both second- and third-party auditors. We also show that both types of auditors perform better when MNCs rotate auditing firms.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122583894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Antecedents of a Firm's Supply Chain Agility: The Roles of a Transactive Memory System and Supply Network Flexibility","authors":"Marisel Fernandez-Giordano, M. Stevenson, L. Gutierrez, F. Lloréns-Montes","doi":"10.1108/SCM-08-2020-0379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/SCM-08-2020-0379","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Purpose\u0000The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to evaluate the roles of a transactive memory system and the supply network flexibility (SNF) of the firm as antecedents of a firm’s supply chain agility (FSCA), also incorporating the moderating role of the transactive memory system; and, second, to evaluate the relationship between FSCA and operations performance (OP).\u0000\u0000\u0000Design/methodology/approach\u0000Four hypothesized relationships are tested with survey data from 190 high-tech firms using structural equation models.\u0000\u0000\u0000Findings\u0000FSCA can be enhanced through the transactive memory system and SNF, although a higher degree of transactive memory system weakens the positive relationship between SNF and FSCA. A positive relationship is identified between FSCA and OP, while FSCA mediates the relationship between SNF and OP.\u0000\u0000\u0000Practical implications\u0000Managers can increase FSCA and improve OP by developing both the transactive memory system and SNF. Given that firms have limited resources, investment in internal capabilities should be prioritized as this appears to be more effective at developing FSCA.\u0000\u0000\u0000Originality/value\u0000The findings expand the literature by exploring two antecedents of FSCA and by analyzing the impact of FSCA on different measures of OP. Few prior studies have highlighted the importance of the transactive memory system to the operations function.\u0000","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132391264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Mitigating Role of Blockchain-Enabled Supply Chains During the COVID-19 Pandemic","authors":"Yangchun Xiong, Hugo K. S. Lam, Ajay Kumar, E. Ngai, Chunyu Xiu, Xinyue Wang","doi":"10.1108/ijopm-12-2020-0901","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/ijopm-12-2020-0901","url":null,"abstract":"PurposeAlthough there have been considerable discussions on the business value of adopting blockchain in supply chains, it is unclear whether such blockchain-enabled supply chains (BESCs) can help firms mitigate the negative impact resulting from the recent COVID-19 pandemic. This study aims to answer this important question.Design/methodology/approachThe authors conduct an event study to quantify the financial effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and compare the differences in such effects between treatment firms that have adopted BESCs and matched control firms that have not adopted BESCs. The authors also perform a regression analysis to examine how the role of BESCs in mitigating COVID-19's negative impact varies across firms with different levels of supply chain leanness and complexity. The analysis is based on 88 treatment firms and 88 matched control firms, all of which are publicly listed on the US stock markets.FindingsThe test results suggest that although both the treatment and control firms are negatively affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, the effect is less negative for the treatment firms compared to the control firms, demonstrating the role of BESCs in mitigating the negative impact caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, the mitigating role of BESCs is more pronounced for firms with lean and complex supply chains.Originality/valueThis study is among the first to provide empirical evidence on the mitigating role of BESCs during the COVID-19 pandemic, highlighting the importance of adopting blockchain in supply chains with high uncertainties and disruption risks.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122897435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Blockchain for Supply chain Solutions","authors":"M. Panneerselvam","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3853438","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3853438","url":null,"abstract":"Supply Chain Management continue to evolve and improving the efficiency from the 1990 with the help of enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems. However, visibility remains a challenge in large supply chains involving complex transactions. Specially in pharmaceutical and food industries. It is facing lot of challenges from product tracing, demand visibility at all level in the value chain. Organizations are working hard to use latest technologies to improves the efficiency of the entire process. Blockchain is playing important role to eliminate the hassles in supply chain management.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114191262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"When to Lock the Volatile Input Price? Procurement of Commodity Components under Different Pricing Schemes","authors":"Shi Chen, Junfei Lei, K. Moinzadeh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3484516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3484516","url":null,"abstract":"Problem definition: We study a two-stage supply chain, where the supplier procures a key component to manufacture a product and the buyer orders from the supplier to meet a price-sensitive demand. As the input price is volatile, the two parties enter into either a standard contract, where the buyer orders just before the supplier starts production, or a time-flexible contract, where the buyer can lock a wholesale price in advance. Moreover, we consider three selling-price schemes: Market Driven, Cost Plus, and Profit Max. Academic/practical relevance: This problem is motivated by real practices in the cloud industry. Our model and optimization approach can address similar problems in other industries as well. Methodology: We assume that the input price follows a geometric Brownian motion. To determine the optimal ordering time, we propose an optimization approach that is different from the classic approach by Dixit et al. ( 1994 ) and Li and Kouvelis ( 1999 ). Our approach leads to deeper analytical results and more transparent ordering policy. Through a numerical experimentation, we compare profitability of different parties under different contracts, pricing schemes, and market conditions. Results: The buyer’s ordering policy is determined by a threshold policy based on the current time and input price; the optimal threshold depends on not only the drift and volatility of the input price but also, their relative magnitude. The supplier’s optimal procurement time should be determined by analyzing a trade-off between the holding cost of storing the components and the future input-price movement. Managerial implications: Under the Profit-Max and the Cost-Plus pricing schemes, the time-flexible contract is a Pareto improvement compared with the standard contract, whereas under the Market-Driven pricing scheme, the supplier may be better off under the standard contract. Moreover, although the most favorable scenario for the buyer is under the Profit-Max pricing scheme, the most favorable scenario for the supplier oftentimes is under the Cost-Plus pricing scheme. Furthermore, this study provides valuable insights into impacts of various characteristics of the component market, such as the trend and volatility of the input price, on the expected profit of the supply chain and its split between the two parties.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121412622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Implementing Environmental and Social Responsibility Programs in Supply Networks through Multi-Unit Bilateral Negotiation","authors":"Q. Feng, Chengzhang Li, Mengshi Lu, J. Shanthikumar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3309518","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3309518","url":null,"abstract":"Involving suppliers deep in the supply chain is critical for the success of environmental and social responsibility (ESR) initiatives. Administering ESR programs throughout a complex supply network, however, is challenging. In this paper, we apply a multi-unit bilateral bargaining framework to coordinate ESR investments in a general supply network and analyze to what extent an ESR initiator should directly engage the higher-tier suppliers, as opposed to delegating that responsibility to the first-tier suppliers. Our bargaining framework not only generalizes the conventional Shapley value approach by allowing the flexibility of modeling imbalanced power distribution among the firms, but also provides an explicit way of implementing the resulting gain sharing among the firms through negotiated contract terms. We show that the eventual structure of ESR negotiation relationships can be derived by finding a shortest path tree in the supply network with the arc cost defined as the logarithm of the negotiating parties' relative bargaining power. These developments allow us to analyze ESR implementation in generally extended supply networks. We find that the ESR initiator tends to delegate ESR negotiations to a supplier that is strong in negotiations with higher-tier suppliers. When the supply network is complex (i.e., wide and deep), directly engaging all suppliers can lead to a larger gain by the initiator than fully delegating the negotiations with higher-tier suppliers to the first-tier ones. However, as the network gets increasingly complex, the ESR initiator tends to directly engage a reduced percentage of higher-tier suppliers. We further extend our analysis to situations where the ESR relationships are sequentially formed in a decentralized manner, where the benefit of ESR depends on the collective choice of the firms' investment levels, where multiple ESR programs are implemented in the network, and where ESR investments depend on the negotiation relationships.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132317682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Enhancing Customer-Supplier Coordination Through Inventory Decision Rights Transfer","authors":"Shi Chen, Morris A. Cohen, Hau L. Lee, T. Mönch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3724077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3724077","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes alternative customer-supplier relationships based on agreements governing material flow and ordering decision rights, as well as the sharing of inventory and shortage costs. Material flow in a supply chain typically is determined by the orders placed by a \"customer\" to its immediate upstream \"supplier.\" The consequences of poor customer service and high inventory costs, however, affect both parties involved; thus, there are many cases where nonstandard customer-supplier arrangements have been adopted. <br><br>We introduce a model that captures both decentralized and centralized ordering, as well as variants based on the allocation of decision rights to either the upstream supplier, i.e., supplier-managed inventory (SMI), or to the downstream customer, i.e., customer-managed inventory (CMI). We develop optimal inventory stocking polices for both parties involved and derive necessary and sufficient conditions for adopting one of the relationships. Our model includes parameters that capture modifications to the incentive structure based on cost sharing mechanisms, which impact the ultimate relationship choice. <br><br>We then apply the model to analyze four well-known industry examples, Barilla, Saturn, Boeing, and Hewlett Packard, where either SMI or CMI was adopted. The parameterization of the model can capture the different aspects of each company’s supply chain in a realistic manner. We illustrate how the modified incentive structure can generate benefits for the customer, the supplier, and the end consumers (i.e., \"win-win-win\"), and determine the gap for achieving the first-best performance. This paper concludes with a discussion of managerial implications and opportunities for incorporating additional consequences of the relationship choice.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133520380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Optimal Replenishment and Clearance Policy for a Perishable Product with LIFO Issuing Policy and Age-Dependent Demand","authors":"A. Goyal, A. Sapra","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3668613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3668613","url":null,"abstract":"We study joint replenishment and clearance policy for a perishable product with a general, finite lifetime using a periodic review model over a finite horizon such that the inventory is sold in a last-in, first-out (LIFO) manner. Further, the demand for inventory may depend on its age since customers may choose to walk away if the freshest available inventory is too old for them. The model seeks to optimize two decisions every period: how much of fresh inventory to order and how much of existing inventory to clear. The key objective of the model is to understand the effect of age-dependence of demand on the optimal replenishment and clearance policy.<br><br>We find that the optimal policy when demand depends on age may diverge substantially from the optimal policy when demand is independent of age, though there exists a sufficient condition under which the structure of the optimal policy becomes identical in both scenarios for all units newer than a threshold age. Further, we show that the structure of the optimal policy for the inventory with one-period remaining lifetime may both simplify and complicate in terms of the number of indexes compared to when demand is independent of age. For the same set of results, we streamline a few arguments for the existing results that are derived assuming demand is independent of age. Finally, we briefly discuss an extension in which clearance is not possible.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132416054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Economics of Trade Credit: Risk and Power","authors":"Kayla Freeman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3235838","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3235838","url":null,"abstract":"Trade credit is differentiated from other lending channels by the underlying sales relationship. Using a unique hand-collected dataset of customer-supplier-matched trade credit, I examine how the importance of a customer’s sales to its supplier affects trade credit decisions. Contrary to predictions of customers using bargaining power to extract trade credit concessions, I find an inverse relationship between a supplier’s sales dependence on a customer and trade credit. Evidence points to bank monitoring causing suppliers to avoid customer credit concentrations. Results only hold for suppliers with a major banking relationship, and are stronger with more intense bank monitoring.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"97 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116523722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Blockchain Collaboration with Competing Firms in a Shared Supply Chain: Benefits and Challenges","authors":"Yao Cui, V. Gaur, Jingchen Liu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3626028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3626028","url":null,"abstract":"Field research has shown that companies are investing in blockchain technology for their supply chains in order to benefit from enhanced visibility, but face challenges in creating partnerships with other firms in their supply chain, some of whom could be competitors, under uncertainty about where the cost and benefit of blockchain enabled network visibility will fall. On the one hand, visibility over actions of supply chain partners can improve operational decisions, but on the other hand, sharing own data on a blockchain creates opposing forces. In this paper, we investigate these questions theoretically by studying the impact of network visibility in a specific two-tier supply chain setting that consists of an upstream supplier and two competing downstream manufacturers. The supplier’s capacity is limited so that the manufacturers compete on both the supply side and the demand side. Network visibility enables the manufacturers to know each other’s existence. By comparing the cases with and without network visibility, we study how the network visibility affects the supplier, the manufacturers, and the entire supply chain. We find that the manufacturers can benefit from network visibility when the supplier’s capacity is sufficiently small or sufficiently large, but the underlying reasons are different. When the supplier is highly capacitated, network visibility creates value to the manufacturers by mitigating their over-order incentive. When the supplier’s capacity is sufficient, network visibility creates value to the manufacturers by mitigating their under-order incentive. Moreover, network visibility can help improve the supplier’s profit when her capacity is not too small because in this case, the supplier can sell more with network visibility. Finally, from the perspective of the entire supply chain, we find that network visibility can help alleviate double marginalization and improve the total supply chain profit if and only if the supplier’s capacity is sufficiently large. Furthermore, as long as network visibility is beneficial to the entire supply chain, it is also beneficial to both the supplier and the manufacturers at the same time, hence blockchain can be naturally initiated by any firm in the supply chain network. Our model particularly addresses the question whether competing firms would join a shared blockchain.","PeriodicalId":129698,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Management eJournal","volume":"132 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123176479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}