采购监控以监控您的采购:供应链审核员管理先令和逃避的策略

Ashley Palmarozzo, Jodi L. Short, M. Toffel
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引用次数: 1

摘要

跨国公司(MNCs)雇用审计员来评估业务合作伙伴对质量、工作条件和环境标准的遵守情况。人们普遍认为,独立的第三方审计师比跨国公司雇用的、因而受其控制的第二方审计师表现更好。然而,将审计外包给第三方会产生代理问题,同样会损害审计人员的绩效。综合有关审计师独立性、代理理论和外包的文献,我们比较了四种外包策略:内包、外包、并行外包和轮转外包对审计师绩效的影响。使用来自全球服装品牌的专有数据,我们发现内包的第二方审核员优于外包的第三方审核员,并且当跨国公司同时使用第二方和第三方审核员时,第三方审核员的绩效得到改善。我们还表明,当跨国公司轮换审计公司时,两种类型的审计师都表现得更好。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Sourcing Monitors to Monitor Your Sourcing: Strategies to Manage Shilling and Shirking by Supply Chain Auditors
Multinational corporations (MNCs) hire auditors to assess business partners’ compliance with quality, working conditions, and environmental standards. Independent third-party auditors are widely assumed to outperform second-party auditors employed and thus controlled by MNCs. However, outsourcing audits to third parties creates agency problems that can likewise undermine auditor performance. Synthesizing literatures on auditor independence, agency theory, and sourcing, we compare the implications for auditor performance of four sourcing strategies: insourcing, outsourcing, concurrent sourcing, and rotational sourcing. Using proprietary data from a global apparel brand, we find that insourced second-party auditors outperform outsourced third-party auditors and that third-party auditors’ performance improves when MNCs concurrently source audits, using both second- and third-party auditors. We also show that both types of auditors perform better when MNCs rotate auditing firms.
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