{"title":"Marx-Biased Technical Change and Income Distribution: A Panel Data Analysis","authors":"Travis Campbell, Daniele Tavani","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3196104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3196104","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a further empirical evaluation of the Neoclassical theory of distribution as opposed to Marx-biased technical change (MBTC) by applying the theoretical and empirical framework developed by Foley and Michl (1999), Michl (1999, 2009) and Basu (2010) to a panel of countries. Basu (2010) developed a test based on cross-sectional data: we argue that a panel data analysis is instrumental in increasing the efficiency and validity of the test. Our results generalize Basu’s findings in providing support for MBTC and against the Neoclassical theory of income distribution.","PeriodicalId":129015,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Marxian; Sraffian; Institutional; Evolutionary (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125716046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Capitalism After Satoshi: Blockchains, Dehierarchicalisation, Innovation Policy and the Regulatory State","authors":"C. Berg, S. Davidson, J. Potts","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3299734","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3299734","url":null,"abstract":"What are the long-run economic and policy consequences of wide-spread blockchain technology adoption? We examine the structural economic effects of this institutional innovation as disintermediation in markets, dehierarchicalisation of organisations, and growing private provision of economic infrastructure for exchange, contracting and coordination. We predict that these institutional economic dynamics undercut the historical rationale for much modern economic policy, originally formulated to enable capitalism to cope with market power, to control hierarchy, and to furnish public infrastructure for trust. We argue that capitalism built on distributed ledger technology requires different economic policy settings to industrial capitalism, based on centralized ledger technology. We formulate the institutional logic of this dynamic co-evolutionary model, and discuss policy settings for an economy coordinated with blockchain infrastructure and associated distributed digital technologies for economic coordination (Web3, Industry 4.0). We find that much modern economic policy will be differently instantiated (e.g. hard-coded in platforms) or variously no longer necessary (because of new institutional solutions to problems of trust and coordination). We argue that the institutional innovation of blockchain engenders a new post-industrial economic era that requires new policy rules. This paper seeks to explain why this change will occur, and to explore a new framework for economic policy adapted to economic infrastructure built on distributed ledgers.","PeriodicalId":129015,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Marxian; Sraffian; Institutional; Evolutionary (Topic)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127567545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Computing the Economic Problem: Two Logical and Evolutionary Models of the Market Process","authors":"H. Searles","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3213520","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3213520","url":null,"abstract":"This is an essay about the evolution of wealth and the computations that economies, as complex adaptive systems, must execute if they are to successfully enable its evolution. Economies become wealthy when they accumulate multiplicities of knowledge and know how that are well adapted for solving consumers' most urgent problems of economic life. Although creative entrepreneurs consistently imagine novel bits of knowledge and know how, the factors of production that those bits can be encoded upon are scarce. All economies must therefore compute a peculiar decision problem, which economists have styled \"the economic problem,\" of deciding which bits of knowledge and know how that are best adapted for solving the most urgent problems of economic life. I argue that the \"market process\" computes the economic problem by selecting the most valuable business-model designs within an ecosystem of competing business models. I offer a logical model that specifies the sequence of events by which an economy computes a given economic problem and selects the knowledge and know how well-adapted for solving it. I then model an economy's accumulation of well-adapted knowledge and know how, that is wealth, as the adaptive flow up a population of business models up a profitability landscape.","PeriodicalId":129015,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Marxian; Sraffian; Institutional; Evolutionary (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125548924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Quantitative Empirical Research in Marxist Political Economy: A Selective Review","authors":"D. Basu","doi":"10.1111/joes.12218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12218","url":null,"abstract":"This paper surveys quantitative empirical research in some key areas of Marxist political economy. Following an introductory section on the value controversy, the paper surveys quantitative empirical research on the following topics: (a) Marxist national accounts, (b) classical†Marxist theory of relative prices, (c) probabilistic political economy, (d) profitability analysis and (e) classical†Marxian theories of growth and technical change. I end by highlighting two important puzzles in the extant literature.","PeriodicalId":129015,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Marxian; Sraffian; Institutional; Evolutionary (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124991175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"La società dinamica e il contributo di Paolo Leon (The Dynamic Society and Paolo Leon’s Contribution)","authors":"Roberto Romano, Anna Maria Grazia Variato","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3140374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3140374","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Italian Abstract:</b> L'articolo richiama i principali contributi di Paolo Leon all'economia e alla politica economica con un'enfasi specifica sui libri da lui pubblicati. Gli autori si concentrano sull'interpretazione di Leon della legge di Engel e delle sue implicazioni macroeconomiche, nonché sulle relazioni tra sviluppo capitalistico, domanda effettiva e cambiamento strutturale. <b>English Abstract:</b> The article recalls Paolo Leon's major contributions to economics and economic policy with a specific emphasis on the books he published. The authors focus on Leon's interpretation of Engel's Law and its macroeconomic implications, as well as on the relations between capitalist development, effective demand and structural change.","PeriodicalId":129015,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Marxian; Sraffian; Institutional; Evolutionary (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134212950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A New Methodological Approach to the Study of the Institutional Structure of Corporations","authors":"D. Pletnev","doi":"10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n5s2p571","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n5s2p571","url":null,"abstract":"This paper deals with a new approach to the study of a corporation. The approach is based on understanding corporations as institutional systems. The article determines the subsystems and elements of corporations’ institutional structure and introduces their characteristics. It grounds the necessity to observe the proportionality principle in corporations’ institutional structure and the dysfunctional character of the hypertrophy of any institution. The article also hypothesizes and introduces theoretical grounds with regard to the inversion of corporations’ subjects and institutional structure. The suggested approach allows introducing methodological grounds of the necessity to observe the proportionality of corporations’ institutions, which is essential for designing a corporation of the future, a corporation that would represent a combination of purposefulness, solidarity, and personal commitment.This article suggests a new approach to explaining the institutional nature of what modern material production is based on, which is corporations. We have concluded that corporations can be considered as an economic category that means the institutionally autonomous forms of organizing material production in their entire diversity, irrespective of specific historical or legal forms.","PeriodicalId":129015,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Marxian; Sraffian; Institutional; Evolutionary (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124364054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sylos Labini Su Marx: Implicazioni Per La Politica Economica (Sylos Labini on Marx: Implications for Economic Policy)","authors":"M. Cingolani","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3146863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3146863","url":null,"abstract":"This article considers Sylos Labini’s works on Marx (Sylos Labini, 1991; 1994). It places the Italian economist’s assessment of Marx in the context of the former’s wider economic production (both previous and subsequent to the 1991 article) and the debate that followed his “Carlo Marx: e tempo di un bilancio”. Such article, written right after the fall of Berlin’s Wall, attempted at developing a fair assessment of Marx’s thought, seen as one of the most important Classical economists and, from many points of view, a precursor of Keynes. Sylos Labini criticised Marx’s political position and what Sylos perceived as his “unethical behaviour”. On the contrary, he held Marx the economist in great regard. JEL Codes: B24, B51, P50","PeriodicalId":129015,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Marxian; Sraffian; Institutional; Evolutionary (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130619536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Il Capitale Monopolistico Di Baran E Sweezy E La Teoria Marxiana Del Valore (The Monopolistic Capital of Baran and Sweezy and the Marxian Theory of Value)","authors":"Claudio Napoleoni","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3146830","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3146830","url":null,"abstract":"The text is the transcript of a lecture given on 12 May 1973 by Claudio Napoleoni, as part of a course on Economic and financial policy at the University of Turin. The lecture, edited by Riccardo Bellofiore, concerns Baran and Sweezy’s Monopoly Capital and its relation to Marx’s theory of value. JEL classification: B24, B14, D43 Parole chiave: Claudio Napoleoni, capitale monopolistico, Baran, Sweezy","PeriodicalId":129015,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Marxian; Sraffian; Institutional; Evolutionary (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122302973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Income Distribution and a Simple Labor Theory of Value: Empirical Results from Comprehensive International Data","authors":"R. Vienneau","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2519466","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2519466","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents the results of an empirical exploration of data from countries worldwide. Income distribution, as associated with the system of prices of production, fails to describe many economies. Economies in most countries or regions lie near their wage-rate of profits frontier, when the frontier is drawn with a numeraire in proportions of observed final demands. Labor values predict market prices better than prices of production do. Labor values also predict market prices better than they predict prices of production. A simple labor theory of value is a surprisingly accurate price theory for economies around the world.","PeriodicalId":129015,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Marxian; Sraffian; Institutional; Evolutionary (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131060790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Evolutionary Economic Explanation of the SEC's Delay in Issuing Crowd Funding Rules","authors":"Laurie Thomas Vass","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2263257","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2263257","url":null,"abstract":"Why Would The SEC Delay Doing What Congress Told Them To Do About Implementing Crowd Funding?Most of the traditional economic equilibrium theory would have a hard time explaining why the SEC has not moved forward with rules for crowd funding, under Title II and III of the JOBS Act of 2012.To summarize this delay, the Congress passed the JOBS Act in April of 2012, and gave the SEC 9 months to come up with rules on certain provisions of the law, so that small firms could benefit by raising capital with the new method of crowd funding.Traditional economic theory would attempt to explain this delay by describing quantity and price adjustments, in very small increments, that would lead the economy to a point of equilibrium. Constitutional economic theory would extend traditional theory by suggesting that the agents who control the SEC may have their own internal goals that they are trying to maximize. James Buchanan called this behavior of both elected and appointed officials “rent seeking,” and his explanation is a big improvement over traditional theory in explaining the behavior of the SEC.","PeriodicalId":129015,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Marxian; Sraffian; Institutional; Evolutionary (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125711476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}