{"title":"IEEE Patent Policy Revisions: An Empirical Examination of Impact","authors":"K. Gupta, Georgios Effraimidis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3173799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3173799","url":null,"abstract":"In February 2015, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers-Standards Association (IEEE-SA) -- one of the largest Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) -- adopted highly controversial changes to its intellectual property rights (IPR) policy. Specifically, the IEEE-SA introduced a specific definition of Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) licensing terms. The updated policy rules and the position of the Department of Justice (DoJ) -- stated in a Business Review Letter (BRL) -- have attracted much discussion from academic scholars and industry practitioners. \u0000The aim of this paper is to explore how the new patent policy has impacted different aspects of standards development within IEEE. Particularly, our analysis focuses on the IEEE 802 LAN/MAN Standards Committee (IEEE 802 LMSC), whose Working Groups (WGs) have been responsible for the design and development of widely used wireless technologies such as Wi-Fi and Ethernet. The first part of the analysis examines the submission pattern of Letters of Assurances (LoA), i.e., documents outlining the declaration of patents potentially essential to the standard (commonly referred to as Standard Essential Patents (SEPs)) and terms under which the submitter is willing to license its SEPs. We examine LoA submissions before and after the implementation of the new policy within the 802.11 WG, which covers the Wi-Fi technology. Next, we analyze how the comment resolution process (CRP), that is, the process of resolving comments made by 802.11 voters has changed after the policy update. More specifically, we investigate whether there is a delay in the approval process of 802.11 standards. Finally, we examine how the number of submitted Project Authorization Requests (PARs), or documents that trigger the development or revision of a standard by defining the scope and requirements for a new technical project across all IEEE 802 WGs, has changed after the policy update. PARs can be used as a proxy of new activity related to the development of standards. \u0000The empirical findings suggest a decline in LoAs with several SEP holders reluctant to license under the new IPR policy terms. More importantly, uncertainty on implementers’ side has increased, as new standards have been approved under the presence of negative and/or missing LoAs, and other standards are being developed under this “mixed bag” of LoAs. The CRP analysis reveals that the first two rounds of the process last on average longer after the policy change. Such a finding implies that the 802.11 balloting process has become more time consuming, which in turn results in a (potential) delay of approval/publication of standards. We also find that the number of new projects initiated (or PARs) in the IP-intensive IEEE standards (namely the 802 WGs) have decreased, suggesting a potential slowdon of the growth rate of innovation after the policy change.","PeriodicalId":125544,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121797828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Self-Insured Health Plans: Recent Trends by Firm Size, 1996‒2016","authors":"P. Fronstin","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3160036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3160036","url":null,"abstract":"This Issue Brief examines 1996‒2016 trends in the availability of and enrollment in self-insured health plans among private-sector establishments offering health plans and their covered workers, with a particular focus on 2013 to 2016, so as to assess whether the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) might have affected these trends. The data come from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Insurance Component (MEPS-IC). \u0000Here are the key findings: \u0000• The percentage of all private-sector establishments offering health plans at least one of which is self-insured has continued an increase that started in 2000. \u0000o In 2016, 40.7 percent of private-sector establishments reported that they self-insured at least one of their health plans, up from 39 percent in 2015. \u0000• Between 2013 and 2016, the percentages of small and midsized establishments offering at least one self-insured plan both increased. \u0000o For small establishments, the percentage increased from 13.3 percent to 17.4 percent (a 31 percent increase), with most of the increase occurring in 2016. \u0000o For midsized establishments, the percentage increased from 25.3 percent to 29.2 percent (a 15.4 percent increase). (In 2016, the percentage of midsized establishments offering a self-insured plan fell from 30.1 percent to 29.2 percent.) \u0000• Between 2013 and 2016, the self-insurance trend for large establishments continued to decline, falling from 83.9 percent to 78.5 percent. \u0000• Because many more employees work for large establishments, the increase in self-insurance among small establishments (and their workers) was not large enough to offset the decline among large establishments (and their workers), resulting in a decrease in the percentage of covered workers enrolled in self-insured plans. \u0000o Between 2015 and 2016, the percentage of enrollees in self-insured plans fell from 60 percent to 57.8 percent.","PeriodicalId":125544,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115321206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Trade Secrets Protection and Corporate Tax Avoidance","authors":"Hamid Sakaki, Karn Thapar","doi":"10.33423/jaf.v18i4.429","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33423/jaf.v18i4.429","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the relationship between an increase in legislative trade secrets protection and its effect on tax avoidance by large companies. We do this by examining the state-staggered implementation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, a state-level trade secrets law. First, we show that the adoption of the UTSA, by itself, does not have any effect on tax avoidance activities by firms located in UTSA states. However, our research demonstrates a negative association between large firms located in UTSA states and the accompanying tax avoidance by these firms. Additionally, we document the differences in tax avoidance activities by companies in different industries. Namely, we find that large high-technology companies engage in less tax avoidance as compared to companies in other industries. Overall, our results are consistent with stronger trade secrets protection leading to less tax avoidance activities by large firms.","PeriodicalId":125544,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124840898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Digitising the Public Domain: Non Original Photographs in Comparative EU Copyright Law","authors":"T. Margoni","doi":"10.1007/978-3-319-95690-9_8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95690-9_8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":125544,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114758177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Crowdsourcing Distribution on Software Market","authors":"Fan Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3089013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3089013","url":null,"abstract":"Software producers may choose to deliver products through a community of external institutions or individuals rather than paid employees. In the model, a computer game producer with a developed “game 1” may [a] sell game 1 allowing modifications (i.e., an external community develops game 2 based on game 1), [b] develop game 2 internally and sell it separately, or [c] develop game 2 internally and sell it as an optional addon to game 1. The firm’s profit and social welfare under each option is explored. An app-storelike market structure (in which the community is allowed to sell game 2) is also considered.","PeriodicalId":125544,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126572724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Emergence of Tools Suppliers in the Semiconductor Industry","authors":"Unni Pillai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3091894","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3091894","url":null,"abstract":"While the R&D intensive semiconductor tools industry has become pivotal to the advancement of technology and the growth of the downstream semiconductor chip manufacturing industry, this was not always the case. In the early stages of the industry, the chip manufacturers made their own tools in-house. Using data at the initial stages of the industry and a wealth of publicly available information from interviews with industry pioneers conducted as part of oral history projects, I examine how (i) market size (ii) intellectual property protection (iii) geographic proximity to downstream firms, influenced the process of emergence of the tools suppliers.","PeriodicalId":125544,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130597459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why the ETSI IPR Policy Does Not and Has Never Required Compulsory ‘License to All’: A Rebuttal to Karl Heinz Rosenbrock","authors":"Bertram Huber","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3038447","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3038447","url":null,"abstract":"Bertram Huber is a legal expert who personally participated in elaborating and drafting the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Policy adopted by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). In this paper, he explains the history and reasoning for his view that the obligation to license under the ETSI IPR Policy, once a commitment is given to license at fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions, does not necessarily extend to chipsets and other electronic components of standards-compliant end-devices. He further explains why, in his view, the ETSI IPR Policy does not compel an “essential” IPR holder to grant a license to every company that requests one, without consideration of where the license-seeking company operates in the chain of production or of whether that license would be duplicative of licenses granted to others. As explained by the author, his views are consistent with, and supported by, ETSI’s objectives and intent at the time it adopted its current IPR Policy, the express Policy language, and the long-standing practice of the telecommunications industry. In particular, he highlights how, in adopting its IPR Policy, ETSI intended to safeguard access to the cellular standards without changing the prevailing industry practice of manufacturers of complete end-devices concluding licenses to the standard essential patents practiced in those end-devices. Huber’s views on these issues rebut the positions taken by ETSI’s former Director-General, Karl Heinz Rosenbrock, in his recent paper titled Why the ETSI IPR Policy Requires Licensing to All.","PeriodicalId":125544,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"175 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131641056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Patent Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Semiconductor Industry","authors":"Alberto Galasso, Rosemarie H. Ziedonis","doi":"10.4337/9781789903997.00062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781789903997.00062","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter describes empirical findings from studies that examine the relationship between patent rights and innovative activity in the U.S. semiconductor industry. How important are patent rights as a stimulus to innovation investment in this sector? What strategies do firms adopt to navigate the patent landscape and access technologies? To what extent, if at all, do patent rights deter follow-on innovations?","PeriodicalId":125544,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128241365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Theory of Joint Authorship for Free and Open Source Software Projects","authors":"Pamela S. Chestek","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2999185","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2999185","url":null,"abstract":"It is commonly believed that every contributor to a free and open source software project owns copyright in their incremental contribution to the project, and owns it solely. It is also commonly believed that one must avoid a legal conclusion that the project code is jointly authored—and therefore jointly owned—even though the legal concept of joint authorship is strongly consistent with the social construct of free software. This view is based on a belief that the application of the existing copyright law of joint authorship will undermine the intended operation of the free software license and thus fail to support the goals of the free software movement. \u0000This article takes the position that, under U.S. law, joint authorship is a legal framework for copyright ownership in a free and open source software project that presents no greater risk than those risks inherent in the concept of sequential ownership and may even be superior, providing some benefits that are not available under the current commonly-accepted theory of ownership.","PeriodicalId":125544,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124145838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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