{"title":"Adverse Selection and Re-Trade","authors":"Nicolae Gârleanu, L. Pedersen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.302025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.302025","url":null,"abstract":"Many securities are traded repeatedly by asymmetrically informed investors. We study how current and future adverse selection affect the required return. We find that the bid-ask spread generated by adverse selection is not a cost, on average, for agents who trade, and hence the bid-ask spread does not directly influence the required return. Adverse selection leads to trading-decision distortions, however, implying allocation costs, which affect the required return. We derive explicitly the effect on required returns, and show that our result differs from models that consider the bid-ask spread to be an exogenous cost.","PeriodicalId":124312,"journal":{"name":"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115227408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Allocations, Adverse Selection and Cascades in Ipos: Evidence from the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange","authors":"Y. Amihud, Shmuel Hauser, Amir Kirsh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.293719","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.293719","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines three theories of IPO underpricing, using data from Israel where the allocations to subscribers are equally prorated and publicly known. Rock's (1986) theory of adverse selection is supported: subscribers receive greater allocations in overpriced IPOs. And, while the average IPO excess return is 12%, the simulated allocation-weighted return to uninformed investors is slightly negative. Welch's (1992) theory of information cascades is supported by the pattern of allocations: demand is either extremely high or there is undersubscription, with very few cases in between. Also supported is the proposition that underpricing is a means to increase ownership dispersion.","PeriodicalId":124312,"journal":{"name":"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114711823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tree Induction Vs Logistic Regression: A Learning Curve Analysis","authors":"C. Perlich, F. Provost, J. Simonoff","doi":"10.1162/153244304322972694","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/153244304322972694","url":null,"abstract":"Tree induction and logistic regression are two standard, off-the-shelf methods for building models for classification. We present a large-scale experimental comparison of logistic regression and tree induction, assessing classification accuracy and the quality of rankings based on class-membership probabilities. We use a learning-curve analysis to examine the relationship of these measures to the size of the training set. The results of the study show several things. (1) Contrary to some prior observations, logistic regression does not generally outperform tree induction. (2) More specifically, and not surprisingly, logistic regression is better for smaller training sets and tree induction for larger data sets. Importantly, this often holds for training sets drawn from the same domain (that is, the learning curves cross), so conclusions about induction-algorithm superiority on a given domain must be based on an analysis of the learning curves. (3) Contrary to conventional wisdom, tree induction is effective at producing probability-based rankings, although apparently comparatively less so for a given training-set size than at making classifications. Finally, (4) the domains on which tree induction and logistic regression are ultimately preferable can be characterized surprisingly well by a simple measure of the separability of signal from noise.","PeriodicalId":124312,"journal":{"name":"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128277461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fee Speech: Signaling, Risk-Sharing, and the Impact of Fee Structure on Investor Welfare","authors":"Sanjiv Ranjan Das, R. Sundaram","doi":"10.1093/RFS/15.5.1465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/RFS/15.5.1465","url":null,"abstract":"The fee structure used to compensate investment advisers is central to the study of fund design, and affects investor welfare in at least three ways: (i) by influencing the portfolio-selection incentives of the adviser, (ii) by affecting risk-sharing between adviser and investor, and (iii) through its use as a signal of quality by superior investment advisers. In this paper, we describe a model in which all of these features are present, and use it to compare two popular and contrasting forms of fee contracts, the \"fulcrum \" and the \"incentive \" types, from the standpoint of investor welfare. While the former has some undeniably attractive features (that have, in particular, been used by regulators to justify its mandatory use in a mutual fund context), we find surprisingly that it is the latter that is often more attractive from the standpoint of investor welfare. Our model is a flexible one; our conclusions are shown to be robust to many extensions of interest. The results are also extended to consider unrestricted fee structures and competitive markets for fund managers. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":124312,"journal":{"name":"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"213 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132159276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Geographic Diversification and Agency Costs of Debt of Multinational Firms","authors":"John A. Doukas, Christos Pantzalis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.282850","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.282850","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders of multinational and non-multinational firms and provides an explanation for the puzzle that multinational firms use less long-term debt but more short-term debt than domestic firms. Using a sample of 6,951 firm-year observations for multinational and domestic firms over the 1988-1994 period, we find that alternative measures of agency costs have statistically significant negative effects on firm long-term leverage. The results, however, also show that the negative effects of agency costs of debt on long-term leverage are significantly greater for multinational than non-multinational firms. It is documented that the effect of the agency costs of debt on leverage are increased by the firm's degree of foreign involvement. The evidence shows that firm's increasing foreign involvement exacerbates agency costs of debt leading to lower (greater) use of long-term (short-term) debt financing. This result is also confirmed using alternative measures of foreign involvement. The evidence is consistent with the view that multinational corporations are susceptible to higher agency costs of debt than domestic corporations because geographic diversity renders active monitoring more difficult and expensive in comparison to domestic firms. The results fail to support the view that MNCs' lower long-term debt ratios are due to the advantages of the internal capital markets.","PeriodicalId":124312,"journal":{"name":"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"131 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121494846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Value at Risk Models in Finance","authors":"S. Manganelli, R. Engle","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.356220","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.356220","url":null,"abstract":"The main objective of this paper is to survey and evaluate the performance of the most popular univariate VaR methodologies, paying particular attention to their underlying assumptions and to their logical flaws. In the process, we show that the Historical Simulation method and its variants can be considered as special cases of the CAViaR framework developed by Engle and Manganelli (1999). We also provide two original methodological contributions. The first one introduces the extreme value theory into the CAViaR model. The second one concerns the estimation of the expected shortfall (the expected loss, given that the return exceeded the VaR) using a regression technique. The performance of the models surveyed in the paper is evaluated using a Monte Carlo simulation. We generate data using GARCH processes with different distributions and compare the estimated quantiles to the true ones. The results show that CAViaR models perform best with heavy-tailed DGP. JEL Classification: C22, G22","PeriodicalId":124312,"journal":{"name":"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"214 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121722705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Art as an Investment and the Underperformance of Masterpieces","authors":"Jiang Mei, Michael J. Moses","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.311701","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.311701","url":null,"abstract":"This paper constructs a new data set of repeated sales of artworks and estimates an annual index of art prices for the period 1875-2000. Contrary to earlier studies, we find art outperforms fixed income securities as an investment, though it significantly under-performs stocks in the US. Art is also found to have lower volatility and lower correlation with other assets, making it more attractive for portfolio diversification than discovered in earlier research. There is strong evidence of underperformance of masterpieces, meaning expensive paintings tend to underperform the art market index. The evidence is mixed on whether the \"law of one price\" holds in the New York auction market.","PeriodicalId":124312,"journal":{"name":"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129847052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What S in it for Me? Ceos Whose Firms are Acquired","authors":"Jay C. Hartzell, E. Ofek, D. Yermack","doi":"10.1093/RFS/HHG034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/RFS/HHG034","url":null,"abstract":"We study benefits received by target chief executive officers (CEOs) in completed mergers and acquisitions. Certain target CEOs negotiate large cash payments in the form of special bonuses or increased golden parachutes. These negotiated cash payments are positively associated with the CEO's prior excess compensation and negatively associated with the likelihood that the CEO becomes an executive of the acquiring company. Regression estimates suggest that target shareholders receive lower acquisition premia in transactions involving extraordinary personal treatment of the CEO. Target CEOs experience very high turnover rates both at the time of acquisition and, for those who remain employed, for several years thereafter. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":124312,"journal":{"name":"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127966380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Incentives for Voluntary Disclosure","authors":"J. Ronen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.155328","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.155328","url":null,"abstract":"Rule l0b-5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act allows investors to sue firms for misrepresentation or omission. Since firms are principal-agent contracts between owners, contract designers and privately informed managers, owners are the ultimate firms' voluntary disclosure strategists. We analyze voluntary disclosure equilibrium in a game with two types of owners: expected liquidating dividends motivated (VMO) and expected price motivated (PMO). We find that Rule l0b-5: (i) does not deter misrepresentation and may suppress voluntary disclosure or, (ii) induces some firms to adopt a partial disclosure policy of disclosing only bad news or only good news.","PeriodicalId":124312,"journal":{"name":"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127124586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hedging Volatility Risk","authors":"M. Brenner, Ernest Y. Ou, Jin E. Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.319011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.319011","url":null,"abstract":"Volatility risk has played a major role in several financial debacles (for example,Barings Bank, Long Term Capital Management). This risk could have been managed using options on volatility which were proposed in the past but were never offered for trading mainly due to the lack of a tradable underlying asset.The objective of this paper is to introduce a new volatility instrument, an option on a straddle, which can be used to hedge volatility risk. The design and valuation ofsuch an instrument are the basic ingredients of a successful financial product. Unlike theproposed volatility index option, the underlying of this proposed contract is a traded atthe-money-forward straddle, which should be more appealing to potential participants. In order to value these options, we combine the approaches of compound options and stochastic volatility. We use the lognormal process for the underlying asset, the Orenstein-Uhlenbeck process for volatility, and assume that the two Brownian motions are independent. Our numerical results show that the straddle option price is very sensitive to the changes in volatility which means that the proposed contract is indeed a very powerful instrument to hedge volatility risk.","PeriodicalId":124312,"journal":{"name":"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131650112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}