{"title":"ipo中的配置、逆向选择和级联:来自特拉维夫证券交易所的证据","authors":"Y. Amihud, Shmuel Hauser, Amir Kirsh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.293719","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines three theories of IPO underpricing, using data from Israel where the allocations to subscribers are equally prorated and publicly known. Rock's (1986) theory of adverse selection is supported: subscribers receive greater allocations in overpriced IPOs. And, while the average IPO excess return is 12%, the simulated allocation-weighted return to uninformed investors is slightly negative. Welch's (1992) theory of information cascades is supported by the pattern of allocations: demand is either extremely high or there is undersubscription, with very few cases in between. Also supported is the proposition that underpricing is a means to increase ownership dispersion.","PeriodicalId":124312,"journal":{"name":"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2002-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"211","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Allocations, Adverse Selection and Cascades in Ipos: Evidence from the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange\",\"authors\":\"Y. Amihud, Shmuel Hauser, Amir Kirsh\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.293719\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper examines three theories of IPO underpricing, using data from Israel where the allocations to subscribers are equally prorated and publicly known. Rock's (1986) theory of adverse selection is supported: subscribers receive greater allocations in overpriced IPOs. And, while the average IPO excess return is 12%, the simulated allocation-weighted return to uninformed investors is slightly negative. Welch's (1992) theory of information cascades is supported by the pattern of allocations: demand is either extremely high or there is undersubscription, with very few cases in between. Also supported is the proposition that underpricing is a means to increase ownership dispersion.\",\"PeriodicalId\":124312,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"48 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2002-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"211\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.293719\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.293719","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Allocations, Adverse Selection and Cascades in Ipos: Evidence from the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange
This paper examines three theories of IPO underpricing, using data from Israel where the allocations to subscribers are equally prorated and publicly known. Rock's (1986) theory of adverse selection is supported: subscribers receive greater allocations in overpriced IPOs. And, while the average IPO excess return is 12%, the simulated allocation-weighted return to uninformed investors is slightly negative. Welch's (1992) theory of information cascades is supported by the pattern of allocations: demand is either extremely high or there is undersubscription, with very few cases in between. Also supported is the proposition that underpricing is a means to increase ownership dispersion.
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