这对我有什么好处?公司被收购的ceo

Jay C. Hartzell, E. Ofek, D. Yermack
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引用次数: 420

摘要

我们研究目标首席执行官(ceo)在已完成的并购中获得的利益。某些目标ceo会以特别奖金或增加的“黄金降落伞”的形式协商巨额现金支付。这些商定的现金支付与CEO先前的超额薪酬呈正相关,与CEO成为收购公司高管的可能性呈负相关。回归估计表明,在对CEO进行特殊个人待遇的交易中,目标股东获得的收购溢价较低。目标公司的首席执行官在被收购时,以及在被收购后的几年内,都会经历非常高的离职率。版权所有2004,牛津大学出版社。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
What S in it for Me? Ceos Whose Firms are Acquired
We study benefits received by target chief executive officers (CEOs) in completed mergers and acquisitions. Certain target CEOs negotiate large cash payments in the form of special bonuses or increased golden parachutes. These negotiated cash payments are positively associated with the CEO's prior excess compensation and negatively associated with the likelihood that the CEO becomes an executive of the acquiring company. Regression estimates suggest that target shareholders receive lower acquisition premia in transactions involving extraordinary personal treatment of the CEO. Target CEOs experience very high turnover rates both at the time of acquisition and, for those who remain employed, for several years thereafter. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.
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