ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Ten Thousand Commandments 2021: An Annual Snapshot of the Federal Regulatory State","authors":"C. Crews Jr.","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3877388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3877388","url":null,"abstract":"Ten Thousand Commandments 2021 surveys the size, scope, and cost of federal regulation and intervention and effects on consumers, businesses, and the U.S. economy at large and otherwise attempts to shine a light on the under-appreciated “hidden tax” of America’s regulatory state. The new edition takes pains to bookend the four years of the Trump administration, documenting in detail the good (\"one-in, two-out,\" etc.) and bad (trade, antitrust, price controls, AI, leave policy, \"space force,\" etc.) from a classical liberal or ordered laissez-faire perspective. It also addresses regulation subtracted and added due to the Covid-19 virus. *Agencies’ stated priorities and “inventories” of rules were warning signs for Trump’s deregulatory agenda all along. While the Trump administration claimed to have met internal goals of implementing a “one-in, two-out” process for federal regulations and freezing costs, the longer horizon signaled agencies poised to reverse course and to issue substantially more regulatory actions than deregulatory ones. That impulse to regulation is unencumbered under Biden’s new executive directives to agencies.Federal government spending, deficits, and the national debt are staggering, but so is the impact of federal regulations. Unfortunately, the financial impact of these rules gets little attention in policy debates because, unlike spending and taxes, they are unbudgeted and impossible to quantify, a condition discussed in detail in the report. That circumstance is the reason cost-benefit analysis (little of which exists regardless) and administrative state excesses must be replaced with congressional accountability for regulatory lawmaking. Steps for more review, transparency, and accountability for new and existing federal regulations are also detailedHighlights from the 2021 edition include:* Apart from sector-specific executive orders and memoranda, the report details seven prominent ways the Trump administration streamlined regulation. Among them, and bookending four years of “one-in, two- out” for federal regulatory actions as prescribed by his Executive Order 13771, “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,” the claimed FY 2020 \"out/in\" ratio was 3.2 to 1 (and 1.3 to 1 if only significant deregulatory actions were counted).* President Trump’s unique regulatory streamlining was offset by his own actions and favorable comments or lob bying for regulatory intervention in the following areas:--Antitrust--Hospital and pharmaceutical price transparency mandates and price controls--Speech and social media content regulation--Private sector privacy regs, encryption, and algorithm regulation--Gov't threats to privacy: amplified databases, biometrics, and surveillance--Online taxes (which are regulatory)--Bipartisan large-scale infrastructure spending with regulatory effects--Trade restrictions--Farm bill and agricultural intervention--Subsidies with regulatory effects--Telecommunications interventions, including fo","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87793709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Digital Market Act and Market Failures in Digital Platforms - A Brief Reflection on Its Relevance","authors":"E. Sanjuan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3875158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3875158","url":null,"abstract":"The proposed regulation launched by the European Commission on the gatekeepers' regime under the name of the Digital Market Act and the Digital Services Act represents an important change in the regulation and commitments of the platforms that initially control the market, or have that capacity, precisely because of their large size. Experience has shown that there are market failures that need to be monitored and corrected, and that there are special features in digital markets that require further reflection.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83218865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Horizontal Foreclosure With Vertically Shared Large Value: Qualcomm’s License Fee Contracts and Anti-Monopoly Decisions of Competition in the Smartphone Integrated Circuits Market of China, 2011–2014","authors":"Mariko Watanabe","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3712738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3712738","url":null,"abstract":"noindent The Chinese competition authority announced a sanction against Qualcomm, a leading semiconductor manufacturer in the United States. This study investigates whether Qualcomm's pricing strategy limited competition with its rivals. The study estimated two demand functions for handsets and integrated circuit (IC) chips, as well as the marginal cost of smartphones. It then factored in the price of IC chips. Based on the estimated prices of chips and demand parameters, the study identified the competitive relationship regarding the IC chips at the product level. I found followings; the cost of smartphone handset that installed Qualcomm's chipset is lower than that installed its rivals' products. Meanwhile, Qualcomm's chip generates a higher willingness to pay via transactions with increasing numbers of handset assemblers. Qualcomm did not commit vertical foreclosures since its product is not exclusive, and increased number of customers and WTP and higher prices of their products. However, it committed horizontal foreclosures, as evident from the pricing of the license fee, where Qualcomm limits competition by raising the cost for rivals; this observation is consistent with the authority's judgment. This anti-competition conduct is most severe in the CDMA2000 market in China.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91330753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Having Your Say: Threats to Free Speech in the 21st Century","authors":"J. Shackleton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3893606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3893606","url":null,"abstract":"Free speech is, with free trade, freedom of enterprise and security of property, one of the key features of classical liberalism. It is currently being undermined, for a variety of plausible reasons, by government, social and mainstream media companies, and the behaviour of individuals, firms and non-profit organisations. Having thrown off the obvious shackles on free speech in the 1960s and 1970s, we are now imposing new forms of restriction on freedom of thought and expression. Young people in particular are being socialised into a censoriousness about dissident behaviour and speech which is reminiscent of totalitarian regimes. One reason for suppressing free speech is concern with ‘hate crimes’. But speech bans have a long history, which shows that, whatever the intent, they are often more likely to hurt disadvantaged groups than protect them. Recent restrictions on speech in western Europe, for example, have been copied to sinister purpose by oppressive governments. Political extremism is more widespread, but less dangerous, than is often supposed by mainstream politicians and commentators. The way to tackle it is by intelligent policing to restrict opportunities for violence rather than by blanket bans on freedom of expression. The presence of disturbing online content is leading governments towards increasing regulation of social media and Internet hosts. But the attempt to eliminate disinformation and harm from the Internet is likely to be doomed to failure. Recent legislative proposals will not achieve what they are intended to achieve, but may cause innovation and competition to suffer. Free speech is considered by both right and left as negotiable or even dispensable when faced with issues such as Covid-19 or Black Lives Matter. In such circumstances our political elites pursue a particular narrative through mainstream and social media and effectively ‘cancel’ those who express opposition or even mild doubt. The prevailing mood of political correctness inhibits comedians and makes people ashamed of what they or their parents used to laugh at in the past. While the consensus may be that there have to be some externally imposed limits on comedic speech, we can’t assume that those who police this speech will act reasonably. A healthy society needs to be able to laugh at itself, even if it occasionally hurts. A neglected area of concern is ‘commercial free speech’ – what advertisers can and can’t say. UK advertising is widely praised worldwide, and a major export earner. But it is increasingly restricted both by government bans and by the Advertising Standards Authority, an unrepresentative body which promotes a form of social engineering and has called for the regulation of political speech. Some aspects of religious freedom are under threat. Public Space Protection Orders and Community Protection Notices have been activated against Christian activists handing out leaflets and holding placards or even silently praying in anti-abortion demo","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76693203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Buying and Payment Habits: Using Grocery Data to Predict Credit Card Payments","authors":"Jung Youn Lee, Joonhyuk Yang, Eric T. Anderson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3868547","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3868547","url":null,"abstract":"This study shows that individuals' habits in grocery shopping are incrementally useful in predicting their credit card payment behaviors and that such incremental predictive power can translate into incremental profits for firms. Guided by prior work, we identify five broad grocery shopping habits that are correlated with payment behaviors: (1) shopping the same day of week, (2) relying on a shopping budget, (3) consistently buying the same brands and categories, (4) taking advantage of deals and promotions, and (5) buying healthier products. Knowledge of the five grocery habits offers guidance on how to transform the raw grocery data into inputs for flexible machine learning models, which we use to assess the incremental predictive power of grocery data. We find the incremental predictive gain from grocery data, above and beyond standard data sets used by issuers, ranges from 0.2% to 9.4%, depending on the data environment faced by issuers in various credit markets. Furthermore, simulations of issuers' credit extension decisions illustrate that the marginal impact on issuer profits ranges from 0.3% to 15.2% and is greatest for consumers who do not have an established credit history. This suggests that grocery data may enable credit card issuers to extend credit to consumers who currently have limited or no access to credit. We also discuss a boundary condition in which grocery data may not have incremental value. Overall, this study highlights how consumer data from a seemingly unrelated domain can help address a managerial problem in the focal domain.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78342980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ad Break: Why Curbs on Advertising Harm Free Speech","authors":"J. Shackleton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3893611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3893611","url":null,"abstract":"Advertising – ‘commercial speech’ – is a form of communication which brings considerable benefits to the economy and society, and restrictions on it need clear justification. Until the mid-1950s advertising was for the most part unregulated, subject only to laws relating to fraud and defamation which also affect other forms of speech. Since then, direct government restrictions have grown, and are still growing, in an attempt to serve public policy objectives of one kind or another. Some of these interventions may achieve little gain at excessive cost, but at least they are discussed in Parliament. However, many restrictions come from what is ostensibly industry self-regulation by the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA), a private body which has morphed from concern with ensuring that advertising is ‘legal, decent, honest and truthful’ to a much wider and more problematic brief. Today the ASA does not simply respond to complaints; it proactively seeks out breaches of its own rules. Moreover it deliberately attempts to change public attitudes through forbidding representation of certain types of otherwise lawful behaviour which may give offence to some groups. The ASA is an unrepresentative body which imposes its own attitudes on the advertising industry and thus on the general public. Its interpretation of ‘offence’ and ‘harm’ appears to differ from the view taken by others concerned with regulatory issues, such as Ofcom and Clearcast. As a consequence, creative expression which is permissible in television and films, YouTube, the theatre, books and newspapers is in effect forbidden in advertising. Rules are continually being expanded to cover more areas of our society and culture, and the ASA recently argued that even political manifestos should be regulated. We should reflect much more carefully on the often unthinking way in which we have acquiesced in restrictions on commercial speech while permitting similar material under the banner of entertainment or intellectual free speech. As Nobel prize-winning economist Ronald Coase discerned, the case for free speech is indivisible. If certain types of speech and imagery are forbidden in advertising, it may not be long before there will be pressure to forbid them in the arts, entertainment and politics.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91038734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Competencia Virtuosa: Todos Estamos Llamados a Ser Santos (Virtuous Competition: We Are All Called To Be Holy)","authors":"Pablo Trevisán","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3854049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3854049","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Abstract en Español:</b> Este trabajo intenta dar orden a ciertas ideas e inquietudes relacionadas con la Doctrina Social de la Iglesia y el derecho de la competencia. Resaltando la vida ejemplar de Enrique Shaw, un empresario laico argentino que está en proceso de canonización y cuyo testimonio debe interpelarnos, y siguiendo por hacer algunas aclaraciones previas sobre las ideas del Papa Francisco en materia económica, nos adentramos en el análisis de los principios e ideas de la Doctrina Social de la Iglesia. En particular, revisamos algunos pasajes de ciertas encíclicas de los Santos Padres que tratan temas relacionados con la economía, la competencia, y cuestiones relacionadas, para luego resaltar algunas enseñanzas de Jesús a través de sus parábolas en el Evangelio. Como conclusión, consideramos que los principios y enseñanzas de la Iglesia pueden servir mucho para inspirar e influir el ejercicio de una competencia libre y virtuosa. El objetivo no es cubrir todas nuestras inquietudes, sino ser un puntapié inicial de algo que pueda ser profundizado, criticado, debatido o mejorado por otros, de no ser por uno mismo, para que entre todos podamos aportar al enriquecimiento mutuo de ideas y al bien común.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> This work tries to give order to certain ideas and concerns related to the Social Doctrine of the Church and competition law. Highlighting the exemplary life of Enrique Shaw, an Argentine businessman who is in the process of canonization and whose testimony should challenge us, and following some preliminary clarifications about the ideas of Pope Francis in economic matters, we enter into the analysis of the principles and ideas of the Social Doctrine of the Church. In particular, we review some passages from certain encyclical letters of the Holy Fathers that deal with issues related to the economy, competition, and connected matters, and then highlight some teachings of Jesus through his parables in the Gospel. In conclusion, we believe that the principles and teachings of the Church can serve much to inspire and influence the exercise of free and virtuous competition. The objective is not to cover all our concerns, but to be a starting point for something that can be deepened, criticized, debated or improved by others, if not for oneself, so that together we can contribute to the mutual enrichment of ideas and good common.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90461004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Tech-Enabled Financial Data Access, Retail Investors, and Gambling-like Behavior in the Stock Market: Evidence from a Natural Experiment","authors":"Taha Havakhor, M. Rahman, Tianjian Zhang, Chenqi Zhu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3434812","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3434812","url":null,"abstract":"A significant portion of retail investors heavily engage in feedback trading, which is built on historical price data. As financial technologies lower individuals’ acquisition cost to these data, the abundance of (raw) information creates an illusion of knowledge for retail investors and boosts their overconfidence, which further induces them to trade too much. Against this backdrop, we investigate the impact of technology-enabled convenient access to financial data on retail investments. Our identification strategy exploits the sudden shutdown of Yahoo! Finance Application Programming Interface (API), which cut off the largest free price data access for retail investors engaging in feedback trading. We find that within one month after the API shutdown, retail trading volumes in stocks favored by those investors dropped by 8.6%-10.5%. The remaining retail trades became more predictive of future returns, suggesting less gambling-like behavior after the API shutdown. The study reveals a dark side of technology-led wider data provision to retail investors, and echoes regulators’ call to improve the financial literacy of retail investors.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85534145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Analysis of Competition Policies between U.S. And EU in the Era of Inter-Industry Convergence","authors":"G. Kang, Y. Jang, Tae Hyun Oh, J. Rim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3882455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3882455","url":null,"abstract":"In the era of inter-industry convergence, abuses of substantial market power by large digital platforms such as Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon, and their increasing number of acquisitions towards small- and medium-sized tech-firms suspicious of eliminating potential competitors are recent representative issues in the ICT sector. Alternative competition policies have been discussed to effectively deal with those firms’ anti-competitive behaviors in a changing environment of competition such as a digital platform economy instead of traditional policies. In this regard, we examine the U.S. and EU competition policy responses to ICT firms’ anti-competitive behaviors in order to provide policy implications to our competition authority. According to our case studies, the U.S. and EU competition and legal authorities consider characteristics of the digital platform economy when they conclude whether firm behaviors are anti-competitive. Furthermore, we find that Facebook's acquisition of WhatsApp leads to a tipping effect and harms market competition. Given these results, we suggest that our competition authority has to consider the balance between innovation and competition when they implement competition policies in the era of inter-industry convergence.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85020404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Holdup, Profit Distribution and Platform Antitrust","authors":"Danxia Xie, Jinglei Huang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3823668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3823668","url":null,"abstract":"The bargaining process between the platform and users has great impact on the pricing scheme and the successful establishment of a platform. When users receive utilities after paying a initial cost to join the platform, they face the risk of platform's aggressive pricing and are discouraged from joining the platform. The problem of incredible commitment leads to the launch failure of potential platforms and great welfare loss in equilibrium, which is named \"platform holdup'' by us. An effective and practical solution is that government supervises on platform's misbehaviour to provide implicit guarantee. For platforms, spontaneously providing subsidies to new users or dividends to joined users are also efficacious solutions. Competition can partly solve the problem, but may be inefficient and only effective under certain circumstances.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83561853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}