ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)最新文献_第10页

Financing a Sustainable Energy Transiton 为可持续能源转型融资

ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-08-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3676703

Bradford Cornell, C. Cicchetti

引用次数: 1

The Effect of Medical Cannabis Laws on Pharmaceutical Marketing to Physicians 医用大麻法律对向医生推销药品的影响

ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-08-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3666454

Thomas Lebesmuehlbacher, Rhet A. Smith

引用次数: 5

Price Transparency in Healthcare: Apply with Caution 医疗保健价格透明度:谨慎使用

ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3684790

Robert F. Graboyes, Jessica McBirney

{"title":"Price Transparency in Healthcare: Apply with Caution","authors":"Robert F. Graboyes, Jessica McBirney","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3684790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3684790","url":null,"abstract":"There’s a widespread perception that transparent pricing would push healthcare prices downward. While this may be true in certain markets, in many others, it would have little price impact or could even push prices upward via tacit collusion. Under perfect competition, prices are universally known and vary little across buyers and sellers. Such conditions are absent in many or most American healthcare markets. The industrial organization and antitrust literatures suggest that when the number of sellers in a market is small and barriers to entry for new sellers are high—as is true of most healthcare services—public knowledge of prices can lead to tacit collusion. In such cases, sellers act on price information as though they are conspiring to restrict supply and raise prices, without any actual conspiracy, while consumers cannot or do not use prices to change their behavior. Aside from tacit collusion, providers have better information on health and care than patients do. Emergency patients can’t price-shop. Third-party payers, not patients, reap most of the benefits of price-shopping. Even when patients are provided with price-shopping tools, they fail to compare prices. These cautions do not imply a blanket condemnation of price transparency, but they do suggest that policymakers should be highly selective in issuing transparency mandates.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90675697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Impact of Economic Regulation on Growth: Survey and Synthesis 经济调控对经济增长的影响:综述与综合

ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3684759

James Broughel, R. Hahn

引用次数: 5

Horizontal Mergers in the Presence of Network Externalities 网络外部性下的横向并购

ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-07-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3461769

Susumu Sato

引用次数: 6

Online Search Engine Competition with First-Mover Advantages, Potential Competition and a Competitive Fringe: Implications for Data Access Regulation and Antitrust 在线搜索引擎竞争与先发优势，潜在竞争和竞争边缘:对数据访问监管和反垄断的启示

ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-07-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3647092

Jordi Casanova

{"title":"Online Search Engine Competition with First-Mover Advantages, Potential Competition and a Competitive Fringe: Implications for Data Access Regulation and Antitrust","authors":"Jordi Casanova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3647092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3647092","url":null,"abstract":"Are dominant online search engines monopolies enjoying low contest-ability, due to high barriers to entry, or innovative first-movers? This paper argues that dominant online search engines maintain their leadership through an “innovation feedback loop”: a process whereby increasing R&D expenses allow dominant online search engines to maintain superior quality and achieve greater earnings over time, which in turn allow them to further increase R&D expenses to maintain leadership. Dominant online search engines use the innovation feedback loop to maintain their first-mover advantages, as entry barriers in the form of either economies of scale, switching costs or network effects do not protect their rents from technological discontinuities by potential or fringe competitors. Furthermore, first-mover advantages are also maintained via entry into adjacent markets, through either acquisition or organic growth. This allows dominant online search engines to increase advertising monetization, through collecting differentiated user data, and to improve their position against entry from potential competitors and competition from the fringe. We argue that when dominance is derived from first-mover advantages and innovation feedback loops, rather than high and non-transitory barriers to entry, competition policy and regulation should avoid undermining first-mover advantages through access regulation, as this is likely to result in trade-offs on innovation by all market players. We support instead a focus on prohibiting exclusionary behavior by first movers to avoid leadership derived from anti-competitive foreclosing abuses rather than from competition on the merits.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82324825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Governing Artificial Intelligence to benefit the UN Sustainable Development Goals 治理人工智能，助力联合国可持续发展目标

ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.1002/sd.2048

J. Truby

{"title":"Governing Artificial Intelligence to benefit the UN Sustainable Development Goals","authors":"J. Truby","doi":"10.1002/sd.2048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.2048","url":null,"abstract":"Big Tech's unregulated roll-out out of experimental AI poses risks to the achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with particular vulnerability for developing countries. The goal of financial inclusion is threatened by the imperfect and ungoverned design and implementation of AI decision-making software making important financial decisions affecting customers. Automated decision-making algorithms have displayed evidence of bias, lack ethical governance, and limit transparency in the basis for their decisions, causing unfair outcomes and amplify unequal access to finance. Poverty reduction and sustainable development targets are risked by Big Tech's potential exploitation of developing countries by using AI to harvest data and profits. Stakeholder progress toward preventing financial crime and corruption is further threatened by potential misuse of AI. In the light of such risks, Big Tech's unscrupulous history means it cannot be trusted to operate without regulatory oversight. The article proposes effective pre-emptive regulatory options to minimize scenarios of AI damaging the SDGs. It explores internationally accepted principles of AI governance, and argues for their implementation as regulatory requirements governing AI developers and coders, with compliance verified through algorithmic auditing. Furthermore, it argues that AI governance frameworks must require a benefit to the SDGs. The article argues that proactively predicting such problems can enable continued AI innovation through well-designed regulations adhering to international principles. It highlights risks of unregulated AI causing harm to human interests, where a public and regulatory backlash may result in over-regulation that could damage the otherwise beneficial development of AI.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79924296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 56

The Economic Impact of Telecommunications in the Republic of Guinea 几内亚共和国电信的经济影响

ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3652571

Raul L. Katz, Juan Jung

{"title":"The Economic Impact of Telecommunications in the Republic of Guinea","authors":"Raul L. Katz, Juan Jung","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3652571","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3652571","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to analyze the economic impact of telecommunications in the Republic of Guinea. The empirical analysis conducted suggests that the sector generates a significant direct and indirect economic impact, contributing to 6.02% of the country’s 2019 GDP. From a direct effect standpoint, the Guinean telecommunications companies have generated in 2019 US$ 581 million in revenues, which represent 5.04% of the country’s GDP. On the other hand, the sector generates approximately 1,413 direct jobs and 1.03% of total salaries in the Guinean workforce. Beyond the direct effects, the telecommunications industry has indirectly contributed US$ 113 million on average per year to the whole economy since 2010 (0.98% of the 2019 GDP). This contribution is driven by mobile services (voice and data), but does not consider fixed broadband, which has no impact, due to the limited number of subscribers. Sectors mostly impacted by telecommunications were found to be business services (43.04% of the indirect economic impact), financial services (15.81%), trade (12.28%), other services (mainly entertainment, 9.42%), the electricity, gas and water sector (9.25%), and manufacturing industries (5.98%). Given the economic importance of telecommunications, public policies and regulatory frameworks need to be defined to maximize investment in network deployment, particularly in mobile broadband.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75673837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Regulation in the Digital Economy. Is Ex-Ante Regulation of 'Gatekeepers' An Efficient and Fair Solution? 数字经济中的监管。事前监管“看门人”是有效和公平的解决方案吗?

ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-06-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3705928

Christophe Carugati

引用次数: 2

The Effects of Dental Hygienist Autonomy on Dental Care Utilization 牙科保健员自主性对牙科保健利用的影响

ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-06-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3635762

Jie Chen, C. Meyerhoefer, E. Timmons

{"title":"The Effects of Dental Hygienist Autonomy on Dental Care Utilization","authors":"Jie Chen, C. Meyerhoefer, E. Timmons","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3635762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3635762","url":null,"abstract":"Because of the limited supply of health care providers relative to the demand for health care services, increases in provider autonomy are believed to improve access to health care by reducing barriers to the provision of certain services. However, research on the impact of scope of practice laws for health and dental professionals is limited. We investigate the effects of regulations governing the practice autonomy of dental hygienists on dental care use and expenditure using the 2001–2014 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. We measure the strength of autonomy regulations by extending the Dental Hygiene Professional Practice Index to the years 2001–2014, allowing us to capture changes in regulations within states over time. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we find that relaxing supervision requirements to provide dental hygienists greater autonomy results in higher levels of dental care utilization in areas with a shortage of dental care providers. Moreover, expanding dental hygienist autonomy increased the use of many services that dental hygienists perform, such as cleanings, fluoride treatments, sealant applications, and fillings. We also find that greater autonomy reduces costs associated with dental treatment for both individuals and third-party payers.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82374937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1