医疗保健价格透明度:谨慎使用

Robert F. Graboyes, Jessica McBirney
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引用次数: 0

摘要

人们普遍认为,透明定价将推动医疗价格下降。虽然这在某些市场可能是正确的,但在许多其他市场,它对价格的影响很小,甚至可能通过默契的共谋推动价格上涨。在完全竞争条件下,价格是众所周知的,买卖双方的价格差别很小。这些条件在许多或大多数美国医疗保健市场都不存在。产业组织和反垄断文献表明,当市场上的卖家数量很少,新卖家的进入门槛很高时——大多数医疗保健服务都是如此——公众对价格的了解会导致隐性串通。在这种情况下,卖方根据价格信息采取行动,就好像他们在合谋限制供应和提高价格,而没有任何实际的合谋,而消费者不能或不会用价格来改变他们的行为。除了心照不宣的串通,医疗服务提供者比病人掌握更多的健康和护理信息。急诊病人不能讨价还价。从价格购物中获益最多的是第三方付款人,而不是患者。即使为患者提供了价格购物工具,他们也无法比较价格。这些警告并不意味着全面谴责价格透明度,但它们确实表明,政策制定者在发布透明度指令时应该高度选择性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Price Transparency in Healthcare: Apply with Caution
There’s a widespread perception that transparent pricing would push healthcare prices downward. While this may be true in certain markets, in many others, it would have little price impact or could even push prices upward via tacit collusion. Under perfect competition, prices are universally known and vary little across buyers and sellers. Such conditions are absent in many or most American healthcare markets. The industrial organization and antitrust literatures suggest that when the number of sellers in a market is small and barriers to entry for new sellers are high—as is true of most healthcare services—public knowledge of prices can lead to tacit collusion. In such cases, sellers act on price information as though they are conspiring to restrict supply and raise prices, without any actual conspiracy, while consumers cannot or do not use prices to change their behavior. Aside from tacit collusion, providers have better information on health and care than patients do. Emergency patients can’t price-shop. Third-party payers, not patients, reap most of the benefits of price-shopping. Even when patients are provided with price-shopping tools, they fail to compare prices. These cautions do not imply a blanket condemnation of price transparency, but they do suggest that policymakers should be highly selective in issuing transparency mandates.
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