网络外部性下的横向并购

Susumu Sato
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引用次数: 6

摘要

评估网络效应和双边性对数字经济中的并购控制至关重要。为了检验网络效应对并购福利属性的影响,本研究运用聚集博弈方法分析了具有企业直接和间接网络外部性的多产品企业寡头垄断模型。分析表明,网络外部性既增加了通过网络扩张并购的消费者利益,也增加了伴随而来的市场支配力成本。前者证明了涉及小企业的合并是正当的,但后者使得主导企业之间的合并更有可能伤害消费者。在双边市场中,并购对消费者剩余的影响取决于并购方并购前的价格结构。特别是当一个消费者群体通过并购方的双边定价得到补贴时,这些消费者很可能从并购中受益。研究结果为平台并购政策的制定提供了理论指导。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Horizontal Mergers in the Presence of Network Externalities
Evaluating network effects and two-sidedness is critical for merger control in the digital economy. To examine the impact of network effects on the welfare properties of mergers, this study analyzes a model of multiproduct-firm oligopoly with firm-level direct and indirect network externalities using an aggregative-games approach. The analysis shows that network externalities increase both the consumer benefits of mergers through network expansion and the cost of accompanying market power. The former justifies mergers involving small firms, but the latter makes mergers between dominant firms more likely to hurt consumers. In two-sided markets, the effect of mergers on consumer surplus depends on merging parties' pre-merger price structures. In particular, when a consumer group is subsidized through two-sided pricing by merging parties, such consumers are likely to benefit from mergers. These results provide theoretical guidance on merger policy toward platforms.
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