抢劫、利润分配与平台反垄断

Danxia Xie, Jinglei Huang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

平台与用户之间的议价过程对定价方案和平台的成功建立有很大的影响。当用户在支付初始费用加入平台后获得公用事业时,他们面临平台激进定价的风险,并且不鼓励他们加入平台。难以置信的承诺问题导致潜在平台的启动失败和巨大的均衡福利损失,我们称之为“平台劫持”。政府对平台不当行为进行监管,提供隐性担保,是一种有效且切实可行的解决方案。对于平台而言,自发地对新用户进行补贴或对已加入用户进行分红也是有效的解决方案。竞争可以部分解决问题,但可能是低效的,只有在某些情况下才有效。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Holdup, Profit Distribution and Platform Antitrust
The bargaining process between the platform and users has great impact on the pricing scheme and the successful establishment of a platform. When users receive utilities after paying a initial cost to join the platform, they face the risk of platform's aggressive pricing and are discouraged from joining the platform. The problem of incredible commitment leads to the launch failure of potential platforms and great welfare loss in equilibrium, which is named "platform holdup'' by us. An effective and practical solution is that government supervises on platform's misbehaviour to provide implicit guarantee. For platforms, spontaneously providing subsidies to new users or dividends to joined users are also efficacious solutions. Competition can partly solve the problem, but may be inefficient and only effective under certain circumstances.
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