Horizontal Foreclosure With Vertically Shared Large Value: Qualcomm’s License Fee Contracts and Anti-Monopoly Decisions of Competition in the Smartphone Integrated Circuits Market of China, 2011–2014

Mariko Watanabe
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Abstract

\noindent The Chinese competition authority announced a sanction against Qualcomm, a leading semiconductor manufacturer in the United States. This study investigates whether Qualcomm's pricing strategy limited competition with its rivals. The study estimated two demand functions for handsets and integrated circuit (IC) chips, as well as the marginal cost of smartphones. It then factored in the price of IC chips. Based on the estimated prices of chips and demand parameters, the study identified the competitive relationship regarding the IC chips at the product level. I found followings; the cost of smartphone handset that installed Qualcomm's chipset is lower than that installed its rivals' products. Meanwhile, Qualcomm's chip generates a higher willingness to pay via transactions with increasing numbers of handset assemblers. Qualcomm did not commit vertical foreclosures since its product is not exclusive, and increased number of customers and WTP and higher prices of their products. However, it committed horizontal foreclosures, as evident from the pricing of the license fee, where Qualcomm limits competition by raising the cost for rivals; this observation is consistent with the authority's judgment. This anti-competition conduct is most severe in the CDMA2000 market in China.
纵向共享大价值的横向止赎:2011-2014年中国智能手机集成电路市场高通许可费合同与竞争的反垄断决策
中国竞争管理机构宣布对美国领先的半导体制造商高通(Qualcomm)实施制裁。本研究调查了高通的定价策略是否限制了其与竞争对手的竞争。该研究估计了手机和集成电路(IC)芯片的两种需求功能,以及智能手机的边际成本。然后将集成电路芯片的价格考虑在内。基于预估的芯片价格和需求参数,本研究确定了IC芯片在产品层面的竞争关系。我发现了以下内容:安装高通芯片组的智能手机的成本低于安装其竞争对手产品的智能手机。与此同时,通过与越来越多的手机组装商进行交易,高通的芯片产生了更高的支付意愿。高通之所以没有出现“纵向止赎”现象,是因为其产品不具有排他性,而且客户数量和WTP都有所增加,产品价格也有所提高。然而,它犯下了横向止赎,从许可费的定价就可以看出,高通通过提高竞争对手的成本来限制竞争;这一观察与当局的判断是一致的。这种反竞争行为在中国CDMA2000市场最为严重。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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