Classics in Game Theory最新文献_第2页

1. Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games. PNAS 36 (1950) 48-49. 1. n人博弈中的均衡点。Pnas 36(1950) 48-49。

Classics in Game Theory Pub Date : 1997-12-31 DOI: 10.1515/9781400829156-006

John Nash

引用次数: 1

Frontmatter

Classics in Game Theory Pub Date : 1997-12-31 DOI: 10.1515/9781400829156-fm

引用次数: 0

11. A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy. International Economic Review 4 (1963) 235-246. 11. 一个经济核心的极限定理。国际经济评论4(1963)235-246。

Classics in Game Theory Pub Date : 1997-12-31 DOI: 10.1515/9781400829156-016

G. Debreu, H. Scarf

引用次数: 0

List of Contributors 贡献者名单

Classics in Game Theory Pub Date : 1997-12-31 DOI: 10.1515/9781400829156-024

引用次数: 0

7. A Value for n-Person Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953) 307-317. 7. n人游戏的价值对博弈论的贡献II(1953) 307-317。

Classics in Game Theory Pub Date : 1997-12-31 DOI: 10.1515/9781400829156-012

L. Shapley

引用次数: 8

15. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. 15. 由“贝叶斯”玩家参与的不完全信息博弈。

Classics in Game Theory Pub Date : 1997-12-31 DOI: 10.1515/9781400829156-020

J. Harsanyi

引用次数: 33

A LIMIT THEOREM ON THE CORE OF AN ECONOMY 一个经济核心的极限定理

Classics in Game Theory Pub Date : 1963-09-01 DOI: 10.1017/CCOL052123736X.012

G. Debreu, H. Scarf

引用次数: 281

VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN SOLUTIONS TO COOPERATIVE GAMES WITHOUT SIDE PAYMENTS 无侧支付的合作博弈的Von neumann-morgenstern解决方案

Classics in Game Theory Pub Date : 1960-05-01 DOI: 10.1090/S0002-9904-1960-10418-1

R. Aumann, B. Peleg

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引用次数: 97

AN ITERATIVE METHOD OF SOLVING A GAME 解决游戏的迭代方法

Classics in Game Theory Pub Date : 1951-09-01 DOI: 10.2307/1969530

J. Robinson

引用次数: 326

THE BARGAINING PROBLEM 讨价还价的问题

Classics in Game Theory Pub Date : 1950-04-01 DOI: 10.2307/1907266

J. Nash

引用次数: 3108