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RECURSIVE GAMES 递归的游戏
Classics in Game Theory Pub Date : 2020-11-10 DOI: 10.2307/j.ctv173f1fh.14
H. Everett
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引用次数: 23
EQUIVALENCE OF GAMES IN EXTENSIVE FORM 游戏在广泛形式中的等价性
Classics in Game Theory Pub Date : 2020-11-10 DOI: 10.2307/j.ctv173f1fh.10
F. B. Thompson
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引用次数: 104
EXTENSIVE GAMES AND THE PROBLEM OF INFORMATION 广泛的游戏和信息问题
Classics in Game Theory Pub Date : 2020-11-10 DOI: 10.2307/j.ctv173f1fh.11
H. W. Kuhn
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引用次数: 157
GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PLAYED BY “BAYESIAN” PLAYERS 由“贝叶斯”玩家进行的具有不完全信息的游戏
Classics in Game Theory Pub Date : 2020-11-10 DOI: 10.2307/j.ctv173f1fh.20
J. Harsanyi
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引用次数: 281
EXISTENCE OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA IN MARKETS WITH A CONTINUUM OF TRADERS 具有连续交易者的市场中竞争均衡的存在
Classics in Game Theory Pub Date : 2020-11-10 DOI: 10.2307/1909854
R. Aumann
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引用次数: 477
Index 指数
Classics in Game Theory Pub Date : 2020-11-10 DOI: 10.2307/j.ctv173f1fh.25
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引用次数: 0
9. Recursive Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games III (1957) 47-78. 9. 递归的游戏。对博弈论的贡献III(1957) 47-78。
Classics in Game Theory Pub Date : 1997-12-31 DOI: 10.1515/9781400829156-014
H. Everett
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引用次数: 0
18. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. Int. J. Game Th. 4 (1975) 25-55. 18. 广义对策中平衡点完美性概念的再检验。Int。J.游戏第4期(1975)25-55。
Classics in Game Theory Pub Date : 1997-12-31 DOI: 10.1515/9781400829156-023
R. Selten
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引用次数: 0
16. The Big Match. Ann. Math. Stat. 39 (1968) 159-163. 16. 大比赛。安。数学。法令39(1968)159-163。
Classics in Game Theory Pub Date : 1997-12-31 DOI: 10.1515/9781400829156-021
D. Blackwell, T. Ferguson
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引用次数: 0
10. Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments. Bulletin AMS 66 (1960) 173-179. 10. 无侧支付的合作博弈的Von Neumann-Morgenstern解决方案。AMS公报66(1960)173-179。
Classics in Game Theory Pub Date : 1997-12-31 DOI: 10.1515/9781400829156-015
R. Aumann, B. Peleg
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引用次数: 0
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