IRPN: Competition Policy (Sub-Topic)最新文献

{"title":"The Rich List: The Global Corporate Race to Be Number One","authors":"Daniel Drache, Michel-Alexandre Rioux, Paul Longhurst","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2752752","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2752752","url":null,"abstract":"This report proceeds in two sections. First, the report presents our empirical data, mapping the power shifts in the corporate global power structure in order to ask: Who is caught up with their rivals? Who has fallen behind? And who are closing the gap? There are a lot of different metrics and ways to look at the rankings of the world’s largest corporations. We have combined a number of these important sources which track and compile the rankings based on 5 characteristics of corporate power which include: domestic market dominance, heavy transnationalization, technological advancement, cost-cutting, and soft power status. The second section the moves to address more theoretical and analytical questions about the changing global dynamic of the world economy, especially in terms of the role of government policies, regional groupings and international trade blocs such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Moreover, it concludes by framing a number of the reports' key findings: 1) thanks to a large head start, American remains number one for now, 2) China will continue to be number two for a very long time to come, 3) oil money and corporate heavy debt loads in the resources sector are threatening global stability, 4) geopolitical regions matter more than ever. Lastly, it highlights what we call ‘The Final 2016 Score’: 1-0 US over China.","PeriodicalId":113726,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Competition Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128636560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Qualcomm Decision: Protectionism? And for Whom?","authors":"Liyang Hou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2648741","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2648741","url":null,"abstract":"This essay reviews the Qualcomm decision made by the NDRC in 2015, a case about abusing standard essential patents. It observes that this decision essentially assessed conduct of abusing dominant positions under the framework of per se illegal. As a result, it, though possibly aiming to protect domestic smartphone producers, may quickly fail its purpose.","PeriodicalId":113726,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Competition Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121393319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Optimal Scope of Trade Secrets Law","authors":"L. Franzoni, A. Kaushik","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2636147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2636147","url":null,"abstract":"The paper investigates the optimal scope of trade secrets law. In the model, one innovative firm invests resources first to produce knowledge, and then to protect it from unwanted disclosure. A rival firm invests to ferret out this knowledge. Trade secrets law affects this \"secrecy contest\" by reducing the probability of unwanted disclosure given the efforts of the parties. We show how optimal trade secrets policy depends on structural market features and cost parameters. In the final section, we consider the limit case in which the innovation lies on the face of the product, and derive the optimal scope of legal provisions preventing copycat imitation of products (unfair competition, passing off).","PeriodicalId":113726,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Competition Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129518289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Competition Versus Regulation in the Post-Sunset PSTN","authors":"Richard D. Taylor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2242636","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2242636","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes a new framework to address competition, consumer protection and public interest concerns in a “post-sunset” PSTN broadband ecosystem” (BE). In the BE, enterprises are connected horizontally and vertically. Envisioning those enterprises as points within a three-dimensional lattice, it models a way to balance promotion of competition with a range of policies of governance in the absence of competition. This is a response to the current regulators’ dilemma that companies like Google, Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Microsoft and others are now in many of the same markets as companies which were once primarily carriers such as AT&T, Verizon, Time Warner and Comcast, which are now rapidly diversifying and fleeing into an unregulated all-IP mode.The FCC’s National Broadband Plan (NBP) envisions ubiquitous broadband access in the U.S., accomplished by a transition from traditional telephone technology – analog circuits, TDM switches, related infrastructure components – to an Internet Protocol (IP)-based national broadband network. However, the NBP does not specify a specific migration path from the old network to the new one, leaving critical questions of technology, business and regulation unanswered. The FCC and the market are now in a race to see which will answer them first.This transition is being “forced” by old TDM equipment reaching end-of-life and by large numbers of customers migrating away from traditional wireline voice communications and substituting mobile, VoIP and other alternatives. As the subscriber base declines, but the cost of maintaining the old network is fixed (or increasing), the cost per customer rises and profitability decreases, creating a voice “death spiral”. The major telecommunications carriers are already rapidly distancing themselves from the “old” telecommunications service and moving to diversified IP-based services.In the technical area there are transition questions about numbering, interconnection and interoperability, quality of service, and spectrum among others. From the business perspective, traditional carriers are faced with finding new business models to function in what can be described as a three-dimensional lattice that comprises the metastructure of the BE. From a regulatory perspective, there is a fundamental challenge as to whether the FCC has any jurisdiction over IP-based services at all under current rules. A long-term solution to these problems requires a new way of thinking about the structure of the market as implemented consistent with the NBP.The FCC has initiated a process to consider this, within the presumed scope of its current jurisdiction, although it may ultimately require Congress or the courts to define that scope. At the same time, the major carriers such as AT&T, Verizon, Time Warner and Comcast have initiated an aggressive campaign to have all IP-based services deregulated as “information services”. Arrayed against this are civil society/public interest organizations de","PeriodicalId":113726,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Competition Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114934967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Competition: A Potent Tool for Economic Development and Socio-Economic Welfare","authors":"S. Choudhary","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2202117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2202117","url":null,"abstract":"Competition law is being globally patronized as the most sought after tool for the realization of free market and opening of new vistas. The USA has long history of its experience with competition law who holds it to be an end in achieving the intended goal whereas UK model of Competition Law considers it to be a means in achieving the end. The main issue which arises is the acceptance of law by the society, consumer and business house and the matching of the objective of the Competition law with the socio-economic goals of the nation. Thus, even the development model of competition Law varies with the aim and aspiration of the nation but it has been widely accepted that competition law has to be brought in for more penetration into market and social welfare of the consumers. In India, the Competition Act aims to regulate the market forces thereby permitting healthy and beneficial competition, thereby maintaining a balance between the consumer welfare as well as the industry welfare.","PeriodicalId":113726,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Competition Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121807451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Fostering Innovation in Russian Companies in the Post-Crisis Period: Opportunities and Constraints","authors":"Y. Simachev, M. Kuzyk, D. Ivanov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2246280","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2246280","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years the Russian innovation policy has made a significant progress that manifests in developing its ‘tool kit’, increasing resource base, etc. However it has not yet succeeded in improving business innovation activities that remain local thus not giving prerequisites to transform the general macroeconomic context.\u0000Basing on a survey of more than 600 Russian industrial enterprises the authors analyze key features of innovation in Russian companies under economic recovery, as well as stimuli and obstacles for innovation activities. In particular, the paper shows that lack of competition is the key factor discouraging innovation and that the most limiting constraints to business innovation activities are instable economic environment and intra-corporate bureaucratization. \u0000Significant attention is paid to the analysis of the use of various instruments of state support for innovation and their beneficiaries. One of the findings is that Russian innovation policy is \"neutral\" to the size of companies, but there is a lack of instruments engaging new companies in innovation activities. The authors also discuss two possible models of government support for innovation: the former relies on international innovation spillover and the latter on domestic innovation and import-substitution.","PeriodicalId":113726,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Competition Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125789396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Industrial Policy and Competition","authors":"P. Aghion, M. Dewatripont, L. Du, A. Harrison, P. Legros","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1811643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1811643","url":null,"abstract":"The economic slowdown in the 70s in Latin America and Japan in the late 90s, generated a growing skepticism about the role of industrial policy in the process of economic development. Yet, new considerations have emerged over the recent period, which invite us to revisit the issue. This paper argues that sectoral state aids tend to foster productivity, productivity growth, and product innovation to a larger extent when it targets more competitive sectors and when it is not concentrated on one or a small number of firms in the sector. Using a theoretical framework in which two firms may choose either to operate in the same \"higher-growth\" sector or in different, \"lower-growth\" sector. We use a panel of medium and large Chinese enterprises for the period 1998 through 2007 to test for complementarity between competition and industrial policy. A main implication from our analysis is that the debate on industrial policy should no longer be for or against having such a policy. As it turns out, sectoral policies are being implemented in one form or another by a large number of countries worldwide, starting with China. Rather, the issue should be on how to design and govern sectoral policies in order to make them more competition-friendly and therefore more growth-enhancing.","PeriodicalId":113726,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Competition Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"abs/2304.14922 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125173485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"As Antitrust Case Ends, Microsoft is Victorious in Defeat","authors":"R. Lande, N. Hawker","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1845510","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1845510","url":null,"abstract":"As the final judgment in the celebrated Microsoft case ends, this piece very briefly assesses the impact of its remedy. When evaluated in terms of its most important goals, the remedy has proven to be a failure. Microsoft's monopoly power in the PC operating systems market is now as great as it was when the case was brought in 1998 or the remedy was ordered in 2002. The article also very briefly discusses the implications of this remedy for Google and AT&T.","PeriodicalId":113726,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Competition Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"105 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115174938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}