IRPN: Competition Policy (Sub-Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Do the Poor Pay More for Increasing Market Concentration? A Study of Retail Petroleum Markets","authors":"Franco Mariuzzo, Peter L. Ormosi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3877256","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3877256","url":null,"abstract":"One of the central tenets of industrial organisation is that increasing/decreasing market concentration is likely to lead to increased/reduced markups. But does this affect every consumer to the same extent? Previous literature agrees that there can be significant price dispersion even in the case of homogeneous goods, which is at least partially due to the heterogeneity in how much consumers engage with the market. We link this heterogeneity to the impact of changing market concentration on markups. For this purpose, we employ a combination of 18 years of station-level motor fuel price data from Western Australia and a rich set of information on local market concentration. We summon a non-parametric causal forest approach to explore the heterogeneity in the effect of market exit/entry. The paper offers evidence of the distributional effect of changing market concentration. Areas with lower income experience a larger increase in petrol stations' price margin as a result of market exit. On the other hand, entry does not benefit the same low-income areas with a larger reduction in the margin than in high-income areas. We argue that these findings are due to differences in how much consumers in different demographic groups engage with the market. Our findings give support to the argument that antitrust could help address inequality while staying true to its mission of promoting competition, provided that priorities are given to not only fixing supply-side problems but also to exploring demand-side remedies.","PeriodicalId":113726,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Competition Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128927425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Brief Appraisal of the Contribution of the UN Set of Multinational Agreed Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices 1980","authors":"Washington Ombis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3569177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3569177","url":null,"abstract":"Competition Law has adopted an international/global dimension overtime. One of the first notable attempts to globalize competition law among nations was the 1980 UN Set of Multinational Agreed Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices. Although a promise this international instrument was not adopted by states due to varied reasons ranging from: political, social and economic differences among states.<br><br>This paper critically analyzes the rules by offering its advantages and disadvantages and whilst doing so the paper argues that for there to be complete harmonization of competition law there is need to have binding rules as non - binding rules tend to make numerous states reluctant in ratifying and committing themselves to international treaties. <br><br>Will international harmonization of competition law remain a global dream?","PeriodicalId":113726,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Competition Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"126 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124452802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Collusion by Blockchain and Smart Contracts","authors":"Thibault Schrepel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3315182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3315182","url":null,"abstract":"Blockchain may transform transactions the same way the Internet altered the dissemination and nature of information. If that were to be the case, all relationships between companies would change, including prohibited ones such as collusive agreements. For that reason, the stakes are crucial and the absence of academic studies entirely dedicated to this issue must be remedied. \u0000 \u0000To this end, this article introduces the first taxonomy of collusion on blockchain. The discussion then moves on to explore their functioning, their robustness and their limits through the three fundamental stages of the existence of collusive agreements: their birth, life and death. The article further highlights how companies may use smart contracts and sophisticated algorithms to collude in the blockchain environment, thus contributing to the literature solely focused on algorithms. \u0000 \u0000Using empirical studies, economic analyses and existing case law, we draw legal conclusions that we extend beyond the sole blockchain technology. Along the way, we propose methods of action for antitrust and competition agencies.","PeriodicalId":113726,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Competition Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125036969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Playing a Double Game? Pursuing Innovation Through Ambidexterity in an International Acquisition Program from the Arabian Gulf Region","authors":"K. Park, O. Meglio","doi":"10.1111/radm.12361","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/radm.12361","url":null,"abstract":"Acquisitions represent a strategy for enhancing competitive responsiveness in the global management of technology and innovation. Even more than single and domestic acquisitions, cross&#8208;border acquisition programs present opportunities for firms seeking to sustain innovation. Yet, scant attention has been paid to the innovation dynamics of pursuing multiple, international acquisitions. We remedy this gap by investigating a multinational logistics firm enacting a multi&#8208;decade program of cross&#8208;border, technology intensive acquisitions and achieving dual competencies in (1) innovation and ambidexterity, (2) the exploration and exploitation capabilities of ambidexterity, and (3) tight and loose integration approaches. We determine that the firm relied on contextual, temporal, and structural manifestations of ambidexterity in acquisition integration. Findings illuminate the processual nature of an international acquisition program and suggest how ambidexterity benefits the acquisition of both innovation and innovative capabilities, when a firm applies a portfolio of tight&#8208;to&#8208;loose integration approaches.","PeriodicalId":113726,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Competition Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124830352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"O CASO UBER E AS POSSÍVEIS PRATICAS RESTRITIVAS À CONCORRÊNCIA: COLUSÃO OU CONDUTA UNILATERAL? (Uber: Collusion, or Unilateral Conduct?)","authors":"Alexandre Cordeiro Macedo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3305603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3305603","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Portuguese Abstract: </b>O presente artigo trata da análise do caso Uber no Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica, que teve como resultado o arquivamento pela autoridade antitruste brasileira, em virtude da inexistência de indícios suficientes para a configuração de infrações à ordem econômica. O estudo perpassa pelas possíveis condutas restritivas à concorrência nas quais a empresa Uber, derivada do modelo de negócio desenvolvido por uma empresa de rede de transporte (ERT) e inserida em um mercado inovador de serviços de transporte remunerado privado individual de passageiros e de plataforma de vários lados, poderia ter praticado, quais sejam: cartel hub and spoke, influência à adoção de conduta comercial uniforme, ou fixação de preço de revenda. A análise de tais práticas anticoncorrenciais pela Uber, através das metodologias de análise concorrenciais, regras per se e regra da razão, levou em consideração, principalmente, as eficiências e benefícios que a ERT Uber trouxe para o mercado e para o consumidor, através da profunda reestruturação dos serviços de transporte de passageiros do país.<br><br><b>English Abstract: </b>Uber’s platform, as is the case of any transportation network company (TNC), is a multi-sided platform that promotes interaction between passengers and drivers. It is therefore relevant to analyze, based on the proceeding filed and later dismissed, by the Cade General Superintendence, the practice of possible anticompetitive conduct by Uber derived from a business model that didn’t even exist a few years ago. The case was based on the analysis of anticompetitive practices, especially hub and spoke cartel, the influence to the adoption of uniform business conduct and resale price fixing, taking into account the traditional analysis methodologies of competition crimes, per se rules and rule of reason. It was necessary to verify, from the definition of the query and the rule to be used, the net result that Uber TNC brought to the market and to consumers, through the deep restructuring of Brazil’s passenger transport services. In view of the high control exercised by the Uber platform with its suppliers, since its business model has its own characteristics that tend to coordinate their partner drivers’ performance, questioning the possible practice that restrict competition is pertinent. Such inquiries are basically related to how the Uber platform coordinates this operation. Actually, the approach of this article will occur in two phases: definition of conduct, in other words, categorize Uber’s business model in a few competition violations described in article 36 of the Brazilian Competition Defense Law (hub and spoke cartel, influence on the adoption of uniform business conduct, or resale price fixing); and then, define which analysis rule is used, whether rule of reason or unlawful per se.","PeriodicalId":113726,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Competition Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114915428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Optimal Prize Allocations in Contests with Maximal Performance Objective","authors":"Zongwei Lu, Christian Riis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2847064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2847064","url":null,"abstract":"Given a fixed prize budget for a contest, what is the optimal prize allocation among contestants? The answer depends on the objective of the contest designer, which typically is either to maximize the total performance of all contestants or simply the champion's performance. We try to shed light on this question for both objectives in a standard model in which contestants are heterogeneous in skill and exert effort to win a prize. We show that weak concavity of the reduced-form cost function leads to optimality of single prize for both objectives, which generalizes the previous results in the literature. We find a dual relationship between the cost function and the principal's utility function (in particular, risk attitude), which not only helps to provide intuition for the optimality but also directly provides results for a principal with a different risk attitude. Surprisingly, with the traditional Cobb-Douglas functional form, optimality of single prize, when the number of contestants is three, continues to hold for arbitrary degree of convexity under maximal performance objective. On the contrary, if the reduced-form cost function is piecewise linear, then it may be optimal to reward the runners-up if the function is convex enough. When the number of prizes under consideration is two, there is an interesting relationship between the two objectives. In the derivation of the results, a series of simple facts about the winning probability functions are presented, which may be useful for future works in contest theory and multi-object auction theory.","PeriodicalId":113726,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Competition Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124825003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Methodologies for Market Studies","authors":"J. Mancini, F. Maiorano","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3862522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3862522","url":null,"abstract":"Market studies are a widely-used tool for competition authorities to develop a better understanding of competitive conditions within one or more sectors. They involve a range of different objectives, and their approach varies significantly according to the specific sector or issue being considered. This paper identifies the various information collection and analytical methodologies used in market studies, as well as some common considerations regarding their selection and application. Selecting methodologies for information gathering and analysis in a market study is an iterative process, and should be guided by a set of initial hypotheses as well as a project plan. Information gathering often starts with the compilation of background research, which is then supplemented with stakeholder interviews, targeted information requests, surveys and other information. Analytical methodologies applied by market study teams can be guided by an initial mapping of the market structure, which can be followed by pricing analyses, including price comparisons and profitability analyses. Other quantitative and qualitative analyses have focused on the dynamics between suppliers in a market, as well as the characteristics and behaviour of consumers. Market studies can also identify regulatory barriers to competition using competition assessment methodologies.","PeriodicalId":113726,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Competition Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"127 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129298771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Endogenous Choice of Price or Quantity Contract with Upstream R&D Investment: Linear Pricing and Two-Part Tariff Contract with Bargaining","authors":"Dongjoon Lee, Kangsik Choi, Tatsuhiko Nariu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2814868","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2814868","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the endogenous choice of strategic variable (a price or a quantity) by downstream firms in a two-tier industry in which an upstream firm performs the R&D investment. We show that when the upstream firm offers either linear discriminatory or uniform input price, it is a dominant strategy for each downstream firm to choose Bertrand competition when two products become relatively differentiated. Second, from the viewpoint of downstream firms, we show that Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot competition in some boundaries of Cournot equilibrium, which implies that each downstream firm faces a prisoners' dilemma under the Cournot equilibrium. However, when the downstream firms involve in centralized bargaining with an upstream firm to determine the two-part tariff discriminatory (uniform) input pricing contracts, we find that choosing price (quantity) contract is the dominant strategy for downstream firms. In this case, we further show that the level of social welfare is the same regardless of the mode of product market competition (i.e., Bertrand or Cournot).","PeriodicalId":113726,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Competition Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"31 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124828053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Mergers in Innovative Industries: The Role of Product Market Competition","authors":"Guillermo Marshall, Álvaro Parra","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2822319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2822319","url":null,"abstract":"We study how competition affects innovation (and welfare) when firms compete both in the product market and in innovation development. This relationship is complex and may lead to scenarios in which a lessening of competition increases R&D and consumer welfare in the long run, which is in contrast to arguments provided by antitrust agencies in recent merger cases. We provide conditions for when a merger increases industry innovation and when evaluating mergers based on static price effects is aligned with a fully dynamic merger evaluation. These conditions are based on properties of the product market payoffs.","PeriodicalId":113726,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Competition Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132799960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Protecting and Promoting Competition in Response to ‘Disruptive’ Innovations in Legal Services: OECD Background Paper","authors":"J. Mancini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3862531","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3862531","url":null,"abstract":"Despite traditional resistance to change in legal professions, pro-competitive “disruptive” innovations are beginning to transform legal services and the manner in which they are delivered. Online service delivery is allowing both legal professionals and unlicensed providers to serve clients remotely while taking advantage of the scalability of digital platforms. In addition, ranking and review information regarding legal professionals is becoming increasingly accessible, and is allowing clients to assess the quality of professionals before retaining them – a previously difficult proposition. Further, the unbundling of services, partially driven by increasing client awareness and fee pressure, is transforming the distribution of tasks in legal services and ending traditional “black box” models of service delivery. As a result, standardized activities are being outsourced to low-cost providers (including unlicensed ones), and new billing models are being introduced. Finally, automation is changing the nature, and volume, of tasks that legal professionals perform. Although the extent to which the work of legal professions can be automated is subject to debate, automated systems have been introduced which offer new capabilities and, in at least some instances, improved performance relative to legal professionals.<br><br>As a result of these innovations and the new competition they bring, the regulatory framework in which legal professionals operate is under pressure. The exclusivity enjoyed by legal professionals, and the precise scope of activities to which it applies, is becoming unclear as unlicensed entrants offer a widening range of services. Restrictions on the quantity of professionals that can operate in specified regions are being questioned at a time where the services they provide could easily be made available online. Further, legal professional self-regulators may be unable, or ill-suited, to identify accommodations that permit innovative entrants to serve consumers.<br><br>Competition authorities, which may have limited experience in legal services markets given that enforcement issues have been rare, should be aware of the challenges described above. Authorities can play a role in advocating for regulatory systems that reflect current market realities and ensure market access for pro-competitive disruptive innovations. Such a role could include advising policymakers who may be seeking to balance the benefits of competition with other policy objectives such as consumer protection. This process will require consideration of the objectives of legal professional regulations, particularly those addressing market failure, as well as the current design of those regulations.","PeriodicalId":113726,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Competition Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124195760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}