O CASO UBER E AS POSSÍVEIS PRATICAS RESTRITIVAS À CONCORRÊNCIA: COLUSÃO OU CONDUTA UNILATERAL? (Uber: Collusion, or Unilateral Conduct?)

Abstract

Portuguese Abstract: O presente artigo trata da análise do caso Uber no Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica, que teve como resultado o arquivamento pela autoridade antitruste brasileira, em virtude da inexistência de indícios suficientes para a configuração de infrações à ordem econômica. O estudo perpassa pelas possíveis condutas restritivas à concorrência nas quais a empresa Uber, derivada do modelo de negócio desenvolvido por uma empresa de rede de transporte (ERT) e inserida em um mercado inovador de serviços de transporte remunerado privado individual de passageiros e de plataforma de vários lados, poderia ter praticado, quais sejam: cartel hub and spoke, influência à adoção de conduta comercial uniforme, ou fixação de preço de revenda. A análise de tais práticas anticoncorrenciais pela Uber, através das metodologias de análise concorrenciais, regras per se e regra da razão, levou em consideração, principalmente, as eficiências e benefícios que a ERT Uber trouxe para o mercado e para o consumidor, através da profunda reestruturação dos serviços de transporte de passageiros do país.

English Abstract: Uber’s platform, as is the case of any transportation network company (TNC), is a multi-sided platform that promotes interaction between passengers and drivers. It is therefore relevant to analyze, based on the proceeding filed and later dismissed, by the Cade General Superintendence, the practice of possible anticompetitive conduct by Uber derived from a business model that didn’t even exist a few years ago. The case was based on the analysis of anticompetitive practices, especially hub and spoke cartel, the influence to the adoption of uniform business conduct and resale price fixing, taking into account the traditional analysis methodologies of competition crimes, per se rules and rule of reason. It was necessary to verify, from the definition of the query and the rule to be used, the net result that Uber TNC brought to the market and to consumers, through the deep restructuring of Brazil’s passenger transport services. In view of the high control exercised by the Uber platform with its suppliers, since its business model has its own characteristics that tend to coordinate their partner drivers’ performance, questioning the possible practice that restrict competition is pertinent. Such inquiries are basically related to how the Uber platform coordinates this operation. Actually, the approach of this article will occur in two phases: definition of conduct, in other words, categorize Uber’s business model in a few competition violations described in article 36 of the Brazilian Competition Defense Law (hub and spoke cartel, influence on the adoption of uniform business conduct, or resale price fixing); and then, define which analysis rule is used, whether rule of reason or unlawful per se.