{"title":"Judicial Review, Plural Weighted Voting, and Democracy","authors":"Harald Borgebund, Matt Matravers","doi":"10.21814/eps.6.2.5687","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.6.2.5687","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines an important argument that has received little attention despite its wide implications. This is the claim that judicial review can be equated with plural weighted voting (PwV) because both are justified as instruments to achieve better outcomes, and both violate political equality. We take this argument to be a reductio: given that plural voting is unacceptable, judicial review must be rejected. If correct, this claim threatens to undermine much recent liberal democratic theorising. We argue that none of the obvious routes to distinguish judicial review from PwV offer a convincing way to distinguish these two schemes. Furthermore, this has important implications for how we should understand judicial review. The result is thus significant not only for the particular issues mentioned, but also for our understanding of the role instrumental justifications play in democratic theory.","PeriodicalId":109658,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140716970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Two Faces of Political Parties: How They Can Both Promote and Hinder Rawls’ Public Reason","authors":"Joana Pinto","doi":"10.21814/eps.6.2.4897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.6.2.4897","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the impact of political parties on a Rawlsian model of public reason. Political parties possess the potential to play a vital role in promoting public reason by connecting the background culture and the public political forum, identifying and systematizing the diverse array of opinions within a pluralist society. They can translate comprehensive doctrines into shared public values, advance electoral programs that articulate a reasonable political conception of justice and construct the deliberative arena necessary for public reason. However, it is crucial to recognize that political parties can also undermine public reason. They may prioritize sectarian interests over shared ones, appeal to non-liberal or perfectionist values, perpetuate misinformation, succumb to the influence of monetary donations, or adopt a closed-minded and rigid ideological stance. Achieving the ideal of public reason necessitates political parties striking a delicate balance between advancing their own agendas and respecting a practice of public justification.","PeriodicalId":109658,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140717578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Humanity with Dignity. Plea For a Functional Theory of Dignity","authors":"Bastian Klug","doi":"10.21814/eps.6.2.5214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.6.2.5214","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I present a functional theory of dignity which seeks to withstand the criticism of the concept of dignity, such those made by Andrea Sangiovanni, by arguing that there is more to dignity than these authors may ascribe. The functional theory of dignity is a reinterpretation of the notion of dignity in legal documents such as the UDHR, and calls for the protection of a dignified life for all human beings. The features of this concept of dignity follow from the historical function it has. A dignified life is a life free from hardship. We derive the need for its protection by remembering the reasons for the implementation of dignity in legal human rights documents – the negation of the atrocities in the Holocaust.","PeriodicalId":109658,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140717792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rawlsian Anti-Capitalist Environmental Justice","authors":"Tyra Lennie","doi":"10.21814/eps.6.2.5218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.6.2.5218","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I examine John Rawls’ claim in the first edition of A Theory of Justice that Justice as Fairness cannot include considerations about the environment and non-human animals. The paper aims to resolve the tension in this statement, as the idea of a Rawlsian well-ordered society without concern for the rest of nature presents as a contradiction. Through a more charitable reading of Rawlsian theory that borrows from anti-capitalist and environmental justice frameworks, we can see how Rawlsian justice connects tightly to these issues. I conclude that the Rawlsian well-ordered society must be committed to anti-capitalist environmental justice.","PeriodicalId":109658,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140717153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hip to Be Square: Moral Saints Revisited","authors":"Liam D. Ryan","doi":"10.21814/eps.6.1.5235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.6.1.5235","url":null,"abstract":"I defend the continuing importance, and attraction of, moral saints. The objective of this paper is twofold; firstly, to critique Wolf’s definition of sainthood, and secondly, to argue against her view that one should not desire to be a moral saint, nor emulate them. In section 1, I argue that moral saints are highly complex moral agents, and that Wolf’s definition does not capture this complexity. My second argument is that Wolf’s account that there are two kinds of saints, loving and rational, leads to a tension. Either: (1) the distinction between loving and rational saints is justifiable; but then arguments against the benefits of sainthood ought to be directed independently against each kind of saint which, Wolf does not do; or (2) the distinction is not justifiable, in which case the division is explanatorily impotent. In section 2, I will present Wolf’s argument for why one should not want to be a moral saint, nor even know one. I counter that Wolf over-emphasises non-moral values, to the point that these values have a monopoly on what constitutes a well-rounded life. Wolf must provide a more definitive scope for non-moral values, as the distinction between moral and non-moral values is ambiguous. Finally, I argue that moral saints can serve as moral exemplars and visionaries. By admiring and emulating them, we can adapt our own moral behavior, and by example, moral saints can discover new and better ways of pursuing moral goods.","PeriodicalId":109658,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"132 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124248949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Substantive or Procedural Autonomy: Willing Slaves and Deferential Housewives","authors":"M. Walsh","doi":"10.21814/eps.6.1.5236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.6.1.5236","url":null,"abstract":"Autonomy remains a central yet contested concept for contemporary feminism. In part, this results from a tension which is definitional to the concept of autonomy. Simply put, how can a concept of autonomy, of choice, explain the choice not to choose? In this paper, I argue that a consideration of procedural, content-neutral conditions of autonomy at work in the past, present and future of an agent allows insight into oppressive socialization without incorporating substantive limits within the concept of autonomy itself. This conception of autonomy promotes an evaluation of choice in terms of the conditions apparent in the act of choosing and sheds light on oppressive forces which diminish those conditions. Conceiving of autonomy as occurring across time and into the future also offers insight into the compatibility of deference and autonomy. This approach to autonomy best accommodates the multiplicities of human identities, values and goals.","PeriodicalId":109658,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127592799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rawls contra Rawls: Legitimacy, Normative Impact, and the Basic Structure","authors":"Giulio Fornaroli","doi":"10.21814/eps.5.2.209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.5.2.209","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I contrast two approaches to political legitimacy, both influenced by Rawls. One is the classic political liberal picture, according to which a state is legitimate if its “constitutional essentials” could be endorsed by reasonable citizens. The alternative is the idea that what makes a state legitimate is primarily its success at organizing the basic structure in a way that is demonstrably favorable to the governed. Specifically, I suggest that a state is legitimate insofar as it organizes the basic structure in a manner that makes it easier for citizens to behave justly towards one another and adopt autonomous choices. I then move to demonstrate the superiority of this normative impact solution to the problem of legitimacy vis-à-vis political liberalism, even when reasonable disagreement about justice is factored in.","PeriodicalId":109658,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"261 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114341260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction: On Celebrating Rawls","authors":"João Cardoso Rosas, António Baptista","doi":"10.21814/eps.5.2.221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.5.2.221","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction to the Special Issue on Celebrating Rawls ","PeriodicalId":109658,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"13 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128964260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are capabilities just recipient-oriented? An argument in favour of the capability to work, and of the UBI to protect it","authors":"Hugo Rajão","doi":"10.21814/eps.5.2.206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.5.2.206","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000Under the capability approach, a theory of justice should be capability-based. However, it has been noted that ‘capabilitarian’ theories are solely recipient-oriented. This discrepancy could be solved by people having access to the capabilities for a good life, provided that they contribute by sharing the burdens of cooperation. Nevertheless, the obligation to contribute is liable to come into conflict with the very notion of ‘capability’.\u0000This paper proposes a solution to address this apparent conflict. Since a person’s capabilities for a good life are conditional on her obligation to contribute, the key to ensuring the robustness of such capabilities is to make sure that the capability to work, on which they rely, is itself sufficiently robust. In this sense, it is argued, on the one hand, that the best way to reinforce the robustness of the capability to work is to distribute it through unconditional access to work that meets a minimum threshold of decency. On the other hand, it is argued that the most effective policy to this end results from the combination of employment guarantee policies with an unconditional basic income (UBI).\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":109658,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115654955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Three Kinds of Self-Respect in Rawls","authors":"Jorge Crego","doi":"10.21814/eps.5.2.207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.5.2.207","url":null,"abstract":"Rawls’s remarks on self-respect have been described as cryptic or ambiguous. The discussion on the meaning of respect and, specifically, Rawlsian self-respect has been considerably influenced by Darwall’s distinction between recognition respect and appraisal respect. Since Rawls identifies self-respect as an essential element of his theory of justice, clarifying the meaning of this concept is essential. This paper defends that Darwall’s dichotomic understanding of respect does not clarify Rawlsian conception of self-respect. Rawls uses the term self-respect to refer both to recognition self-respect and appraisal self-respect. However, he presents a third kind of self-respect which could be termed “value-confidence”. This third kind of self-respect concerns one’s confidence in the value of the particular conception of the good one has chosen. This value-confidence cannot be identified with recognition self-respect, since the latter has the fact of moral personality as its object, not the particular conception one happens to choose.","PeriodicalId":109658,"journal":{"name":"Ethics, Politics & Society","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123585356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}