Are capabilities just recipient-oriented? An argument in favour of the capability to work, and of the UBI to protect it

Hugo Rajão
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Abstract

Under the capability approach, a theory of justice should be capability-based. However, it has been noted that ‘capabilitarian’ theories are solely recipient-oriented. This discrepancy could be solved by people having access to the capabilities for a good life, provided that they contribute by sharing the burdens of cooperation. Nevertheless, the obligation to contribute is liable to come into conflict with the very notion of ‘capability’. This paper proposes a solution to address this apparent conflict. Since a person’s capabilities for a good life are conditional on her obligation to contribute, the key to ensuring the robustness of such capabilities is to make sure that the capability to work, on which they rely, is itself sufficiently robust. In this sense, it is argued, on the one hand, that the best way to reinforce the robustness of the capability to work is to distribute it through unconditional access to work that meets a minimum threshold of decency. On the other hand, it is argued that the most effective policy to this end results from the combination of employment guarantee policies with an unconditional basic income (UBI).
功能仅仅是面向接收者的吗?一个支持工作能力的论点,以及支持保护这种能力的UBI
在能力观下,正义理论应该以能力为基础。然而,有人指出,“能力主义”理论完全是接受者导向的。这种差异可以通过人们获得过上美好生活的能力来解决,只要他们通过分担合作的负担作出贡献。然而,贡献的义务很容易与“能力”的概念发生冲突。本文提出了一个解决方案来解决这个明显的冲突。既然一个人过上美好生活的能力取决于她有义务做出贡献,那么确保这种能力强健的关键是确保他们所依赖的工作能力本身足够强健。从这个意义上说,有人认为,一方面,加强工作能力稳健性的最佳方式是通过无条件获得符合体面最低门槛的工作来分配它。另一方面,有人认为,实现这一目标的最有效政策是将就业保障政策与无条件基本收入(UBI)结合起来。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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