KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"Conference Report: The Third International Conference of the German Society for Philosophy of Science (GWP.2019), 25-27 February, 2019","authors":"R. Trappes","doi":"10.1515/krt-2019-330106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2019-330106","url":null,"abstract":"During an unseasonably warm and sunny three days in February, the University of Cologne welcomed some 150 attendees for the third international conference of the German Society for the Philosophy of Science (GWP.2019). The conference covered a variety of philosophical themes, from epistemology and ethics to metaphysics and methodology, and encompassed studies from the whole gamut of natural and social sciences. The GWP has become a well-established scientific society since its foundation in 2012, as witnessed by its ever growing numbers and profile. As well as six plenary lectures, this third conference of the GWP featured nearly 130 talks in six parallel sessions. In accordance with the mission statement of the GWP, young researchers were encouraged to present and the conference programme was extended to accommodate talks by PhD students. The gender balance was less satisfactory; despite a positive policy of favoring submissions by women, they counted for only 35 of 130 speakers, or 27%. Together, the talks covered most of the key topics in contemporary philosophy of science; especially prominent were—in no particular order—modelling, explanation, understanding, interdisciplinarity, realism, values, reductionism, and of course discussions of theories, laws, concepts and evidence. While many talks were on biology and physics, the conference also covered a wide range of sciences including psychology, economics, biomedicine, mathematics, cognitive science, and climate science. The diversity of topics was reflected in the plenary lectures, which covered history, metaphysics, epistemology, policy making, and science communication. The conference began with the first keynote speaker, Kärin Nickelsen (LMU Munich), addressing the often fraught relationship between history and philosophy of science. While it is clear to many that philosophers must be sensitive to the history of the sciences, it is less clear how they can do so without cherry-picking or making unjustified generalizations. Using historical research on the fragmented and convoluted","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130467744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Creative Abduction, Factor Analysis, and the Causes of Liberal Democracy","authors":"C. Glymour","doi":"10.1515/krt-2019-330102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2019-330102","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The ultimate focus of the current essay is on methods of \"creative abduction\" that have some guarantees as reliable guides to the truth, and those that do not. Emphasizing work by Richard Englehart using data from the World Values Survey, Gerhard Schurz has analyzed literature surrounding Samuel Huntington's well-known claims that civilization is divided into eight contending traditions, some of which resist \"modernization\" - democracy, civil rights, equality of rights of women and minorities, secularism. Schurz suggests an evolutionary model of modernization and identifies opposing social forces. In a later essay, citing Englehart's work as an example, Schurz identifies factor analysis as an example of \"creative abduction\". The theories of Englehart and his collaborators are reviewed again in the current essay. Published simulations and standard statistical desiderata for causal inference show the methods Englehart used, factor analysis in particular, are not guides to truth for the kind of data Schurz recognizes as common in political science. Recent work in statistics, philosophy and computer science that makes advances towards such methods is briefly reviewed","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"214 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122105968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Optimistic Realism over Selectivism","authors":"Seungbae Park","doi":"10.1515/krt-2019-330105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2019-330105","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Selectivism holds that some theoretical contents of most present theories will be preserved in future theories. By contrast, optimistic realism holds that most theoretical contents of most present theories will be preserved in future theories. I construct a pessimistic induction over selectivists to undermine selectivism, and an optimistic induction over optimistic realists to support optimistic realism. The former holds that since the selectivists of the early twentieth century were overly cautious about their present theories, those of the early twenty-first century are also overly cautious about their present theories. The latter holds that since the optimistic realists of the early twentieth century were right about their present theories, those of the early twentyfirst century are also right about their present theories","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132701523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Emergence of Public Meaning from a Teleosemantic and Game Theoretical Perspective","authors":"Karim Baraghith","doi":"10.1515/krt-2019-330103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2019-330103","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The generalized theory of evolution suggests that evolutionary algorithms apply to biological and cultural processes like language alike. Variation, selection and reproduction constitute abstract and formal traits of complex, open and often self-regulating systems. Accepting this basic assumption provides us with a powerful background methodology for this investigation: explaining the emergence and proliferation of semantic patterns, that become conventional. A teleosemantic theory of public (conventional) meaning (Millikan 1984; 2005) grounded in a generalized theory of evolution explains the proliferation of public language forms in terms of their adaptive proper function. It has also been suggested, that the emergence of meaning, can be formalized with game-theoretical tools (Skyrms 2010) within signaling systems of coordination. I want to show how closely related these approaches are, both in terms of explanandum and of outcomes. To put it in a nutshell: If the emergence of public meaning can be satisfyingly explained in terms of signaling games, then the cultural evolutionary dynamics will serve as an adequate model to describe their proliferation. Public or conventional meaning (in contrast to personal meaning) can be fully understood in terms of its evolutionary function in a population of communicators. Furthermore, I want to argue how this understanding of conventional meaning could lead us to a strong semantic holism","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131663208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Against an Identity Criterion for Fictional Ersatz Realism","authors":"Timothy Meier","doi":"10.1515/krt-2018-320307","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2018-320307","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Fictional ersatz realism is the metaphysical stance that abstract fictional entities exist and are dependent on fiction and literary practices. Everett [4] tackled the position of ersatz realism by claiming that the ersatz realist cannot provide an identity criterion for fictional entities that does not imply a contradiction. Al- though Woodward [20] proposed a defense to Everett's argument, I will argue that ersatz realism is no tenable position, as it still cannot provide an adequate identity criterion. To establish this result, I will provide a base frame for identity criteria available to the ersatz realist. Afterwords, I will show that to any identity criterion the ersatz realist may propose there is a story such that a fictional entity corresponding to this story is not self-identical, imposing a contradiction to the metaphysical account of ersatz realism.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121369005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Three Errors in the Substance View's Defense","authors":"Rob Lovering","doi":"10.1515/krt-2018-320305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2018-320305","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to the theory of intrinsic value and moral standing known as the substance view,\" all human beings have intrinsic value, full moral standing and, with these, a right to life. The substance view has been defended by numerous contemporary philosophers who use the theory to argue that the standard human fetus has a right to life and, ultimately, that abortion is prima facie seriously wrong. In this paper, I identify three important errors committed by some of these philosophers in their defense of the theory|what I refer to as the extratheoretical-proposition error,\" quantitative-differences error,\" and non-normative-answer error\"|and conclude that these errors render their defense inadequate.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126208008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Revisiting Kumm's Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism","authors":"Maximilian Fenner","doi":"10.1515/krt-2018-320304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2018-320304","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I revisit Mattias Kumm's work on a `cosmopolitan conception of law'. I make two claims: First, I claim that although some criticism can be resisted by Kumm, under closer methodological scrutiny there are flaws in his theory. Second, I claim that these flaws challenge Kumm's approach when reading the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) as a `global constitution'. This also has pertinent practical implications for the functioning of the United Nations. This contribution does not take a stance on the nature of law but focuses on this conception in the context of politics and law. In a first section, I recount Kumm's cosmopolitan conception of law. In a second section, I claim that implicit monism in the relationship between national and international law and theoretical idealization pose serious dificulties to the cosmopolitan approach. In a third section, I claim that these flaws pose a challenge to the United Nations when considering the UN Charter as a `global constitution'. I sum up my findings in a final section and reflect on a future outlook for research on global constitutionalism in political philosophy.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"295 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116223853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Limits of Stanley and Williamson's Attack on Ryle's View About Know-How","authors":"J. C. Espejo-Serna","doi":"10.1515/krt-2018-320306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2018-320306","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The purpose of this paper is to discuss Stanley and Williamson's take on Ryle's argument against know-how being know-that. For this, I provide an initial consideration of the possibility of isolating Ryle's argument from his overall philosophical outlook and Stanley and Williamson's purpose in their discussion of Ryle. I then examine in detail Stanley and Williamson's reconstruction of Ryle's argument with the specific aim of showing where they have introduced extraneous elements: I examine what they take to best additional assumptions needed for the argument to be valid and how they construct the premises in order to attempt to show that Ryle's argument is not sound. I end the paper showing the limits of Stanley and Williamson's attack, suggesting how the extraneous elements Stanley and Williamson introduce already bias the discussion against Ryle. The main aim is not to defend a form of Ryle's regress but rather advocate the need for a deeper discussion of Ryle's views of mind and action when discussing his views on know-how.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116977616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Conference Report: SOPhiA 2018","authors":"Frenzis Herbert Scheffels","doi":"10.1515/krt-2018-320308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2018-320308","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134192852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Normativity in Lewis' and Bicchieri's Accounts of Conventions and Norms","authors":"Martina Valković","doi":"10.1515/krt-2018-320204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2018-320204","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Lewis [3] argues that, generally, we ought to conform to conventions because that answers (1) our own preferences, and (2) the preferences of others. While (1) is based on instrumental rationality, (2) is based on a moral principle or norm: other things being equal, we should do what answers others' preferences. Bicchieri [1] claims there is a third kind of normativity, neither rational nor moral, that applies to social norms. I argue that conventions draw their normativity from instrumental rationality and other independent moral principles or norms, and that it is unclear what further normativity could there be.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125224174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}