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Vague Disagreements: Vagueness Without Arbitrary Stipulation 含糊的分歧：没有任意约定的模糊性
KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-07-12 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2024-0016
Elsa Magnell
{"title":"Vague Disagreements: Vagueness Without Arbitrary Stipulation","authors":"Elsa Magnell","doi":"10.1515/krt-2024-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2024-0016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 According to Ruth Chang (2002, 2022), incommensurability in hard cases cannot be cases of vagueness. This is because vagueness, unlike hard cases, can always be resolved by arbitrary stipulation, leaving no resolutional remainder or substantive disagreement. Contrary to this, I argue that Chang’s argument fails because proponents of the vagueness view are in no way necessarily committed to the claim that vagueness always can be resolved by arbitrary stipulation. In fact, there seems to be no reason to assume that vagueness could not accommodate our intuitions about resolutional remainder and substantive disagreements in a satisfying way. If we want a simple theory, and if at least some incommensurability is vagueness, this could then be a reason for understanding incommensurability as vagueness; and perhaps even rejecting parity.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"28 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141652441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An Argument for Micropsychism: If There is a Conscious Whole, There Must be Conscious Parts 微观心理学论证：如果有有意识的整体，就一定有有意识的部分
KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-04-23 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2023-0025
Arjen Rookmaaker
{"title":"An Argument for Micropsychism: If There is a Conscious Whole, There Must be Conscious Parts","authors":"Arjen Rookmaaker","doi":"10.1515/krt-2023-0025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2023-0025","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Many philosophers today accept that phenomenal truths cannot be explained in terms of ordinary physical truths. Two possible routes to accounting for consciousness have received much attention: the emergentist route is to accept that ordinary experience is inexplicable in physical terms but that microscopic entities as described in physics nonetheless bring about conscious experience. The second route is to argue that microscopic entities have features not described in physics which can fully explain conscious experience. The view associated with panprotopsychism is that microscopic entities have no phenomenal properties. The view associated with panpsychism is that microscopic entities do have phenomenal properties. In this paper it is argued that if consciousness is extended in space only the latter view is possible. According to this argument for micropsychism, if phenomenal truths are not merely structural, all truths about a whole are truths about its parts plus structural relational truths. If there are phenomenal truths about the whole, this must be because there are phenomenal truths about its parts. It wouldn’t follow that panpsychism is true, since it does not follow that consciousness exists outside the wholes we know to be conscious, but it does follow that emergentism and protopanpsychism are false.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140671329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abduction in Animal Minds 动物思维中的诱拐
KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-12-20 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2023-0015
Vera Shumilina
{"title":"Abduction in Animal Minds","authors":"Vera Shumilina","doi":"10.1515/krt-2023-0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2023-0015","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Following ideas of Ch. S. Peirce on continuity of mind (synechism) and universality of semiotic processes (pansemiotism) as well as development of the understanding of manipulative abduction in works of L. Magnani the thesis of possibility of abductive reasoning in non-human animal minds is defended. The animal capacity to form explanatory hypotheses is demonstrated by instances of grasping regularities in environment, behavior of conspecifics and even self-knowledge. In the framework of debate on instinctual or rather inferential nature of abductive capacity questions of innate and acquired mechanisms of learning, the role of language in development of explanations and priority of inner (emotional) or outer (referential) perspectives in genesis of first explanatory hypotheses are considered.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"44 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139169271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Unity of Religious Experience: An Analytic Reading of Friedrich Schleiermacher’s Second Speech On Religion 宗教经验的统一性：对弗里德里希-施莱尔马赫《关于宗教的第二次演讲》的分析解读
KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-12-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2023-0008
Jan Seibert
{"title":"The Unity of Religious Experience: An Analytic Reading of Friedrich Schleiermacher’s Second Speech On Religion","authors":"Jan Seibert","doi":"10.1515/krt-2023-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2023-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I present a conception of individual religiousness in terms of religious experience. Using ideas of the early Friedrich Schleiermacher, I will claim that religious experiences are contemplative experiences of the totality of being. This understanding of religious experiences presents an alternative to how religious experience is often epistemologically thought about in the more contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. Furthermore, it has systematic advantages: It can construe religious plurality in terms of different ways to experience the totality of being, it stays neutral to metaphysical and moral debates such as whether there is a God whose laws we should obey, and it allows for an explanation of how religious intuitions and religious emotions relate to one another as well as of why religiousness and art often go hand in hand. Even though understanding religiousness in terms of contemplative experience also bears revisionary potential, I will discuss how more doxastic elements of religious people’s lives can be reintegrated into this picture.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"107 40","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138607917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Liberal Theory of Commodification 自由主义商品化理论
KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-25 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2023-0003
C. Mildenberger
{"title":"A Liberal Theory of Commodification","authors":"C. Mildenberger","doi":"10.1515/krt-2023-0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2023-0003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Judging on the basis of standard accounts of commodification, one might reasonably suggest that liberalism intrinsically lacks an adequate theory of commodification. Liberalism, with its commitment to individual choice and to neutrality as regards competing evaluation practices, seems conceptually incapable of identifying or abolishing many significant forms of commodification. This essay aims to refute this claim. It employs a strategy of appealing to the harm principle as grounds for a liberal anti-commodification theory. I claim that we are harmed when we are denied ways to meaningfully engage in certain evaluative practices, ways that depend on evaluations shared with others with whom we stand in meaningful social relationships. Markets can crowd out these shared evaluations, and to this extent cause us psychological harm; this in turn supplies grounds for restrictions on certain markets within a liberal state.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115760862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Are the Realist Bundle Theorists Committed to the Principle of Constituent Identity? 现实主义束理论家是否坚持成分同一性原则?
KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-05-04 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2023-0002
Marta Emilia Bielińska
{"title":"Are the Realist Bundle Theorists Committed to the Principle of Constituent Identity?","authors":"Marta Emilia Bielińska","doi":"10.1515/krt-2023-0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2023-0002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract One of the key questions in the contemporary analytic ontology concerns the relation between the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) and the Bundle Theory (BT). The majority of authors believe that BT implies PII. Therefore, it is widely believed that the world violating PII presented by Max Black (1952. “The Identity of Indiscernibles.” Mind 61 (242): 153–64) is also devastating for BT. However, this has been questioned by Rodriguez-Pereyra (2004. “The Bundle Theory is Compatible with Distinct but Indiscernible Particulars.” Analysis 64 (1): 72–81), who formulated an interpretation of BT with instances. Recently Robert (2019. “Can the Realist Bundle Theory Account for the Numerical Difference between Qualitavely Non-discernible Concrete Particulars?” Theorema 38 (1): 25–39) argued that this version of BT is not a constituent ontology and, therefore, Rodriguez-Pereyra’s solution comes at a price of excluding bundle theory from the domain of constituent ontologies, and, in this sense, it fails. I question Robert’s point by claiming that his account of constituent ontologies is too demanding. In particular, I show that the instance version of BT is compatible with the constrains defining constituent ontologies in general, and therefore Rodriguez-Pereyra’s argument is correct.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124709327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Philosophical Assumptions Behind the Rejection of Computer-Based Proofs 拒绝计算机证明背后的哲学假设
KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-04-27 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2022-0015
Katia Parshina
{"title":"Philosophical Assumptions Behind the Rejection of Computer-Based Proofs","authors":"Katia Parshina","doi":"10.1515/krt-2022-0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2022-0015","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In 1977, the first computer-assisted proof of a mathematical theorem was presented by K. Appel and W. Haken. The proof was met with a lot of criticism from both mathematicians and philosophers. In this paper, I present some examples of computer-assisted proofs, including Appel and Haken’s work. Then, I analyze the most famous arguments against the equal acceptance of computer-based and human-based proofs in mathematics and examine the philosophical assumptions behind the presented criticism. In the conclusion, I talk about whether the philosophical assumptions are justified as they are, or one needs to take a specific philosophical position to accept them.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130875411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Language Logicality: New Evidence in Favour of the Rescale Approach? 语言逻辑性:支持重量表方法的新证据?
KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-02-28 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2022-0030
Giada Coleschi
{"title":"Language Logicality: New Evidence in Favour of the Rescale Approach?","authors":"Giada Coleschi","doi":"10.1515/krt-2022-0030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2022-0030","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What is the relationship between syntax and logic? Is the former autonomous and independent of the latter? If it is not, what kind of logic syntax interfaces with? These questions are not unheard of, having been around for quite some time, along with different answers. In the generative tradition, for example, logic cannot provide a model for linguistic behaviour. Conversely, according to the logicality of language hypothesis logical considerations are relevant to syntactic formation and explain the ungrammaticality of certain constructions. This note offers a brief overview of the logicality of language hypothesis and proposes new evidence that seems to indicate that accepting the said hypothesis does not necessarily require assuming a “natural” logic.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125521158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Norm Externalisation and the Evolution of Cooperation 规范外化与合作的演化
KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-02-16 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2022-0022
Martina Valković
{"title":"Norm Externalisation and the Evolution of Cooperation","authors":"Martina Valković","doi":"10.1515/krt-2022-0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2022-0022","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In a recent article, Kyle Stanford gives an account of what he terms “externalisation”, understood as our tendency to objectify or externalise moral demands and obligations. According to Stanford, externalisation is a distinctive feature of our moral psychology which is adaptive since it enables and preserves cooperation. I claim that the main issue with this account is that it assumes an overly psychological and individualist, inward-to-outward looking perspective. I advocate taking an alternative perspective that turns the spotlight to social practices and the social reality they create. I show how, seen in this light, norm externalisation becomes a side-effect instead of an adaptation deserving of a special explanation.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114371335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Argumentative Exchange in Science: How Social Epistemology Brings Longino back down to Earth 科学中的辩论交换:社会认识论如何将朗吉诺带回现实
KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-02-10 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2022-0024
Emmanuel Ajdari
{"title":"Argumentative Exchange in Science: How Social Epistemology Brings Longino back down to Earth","authors":"Emmanuel Ajdari","doi":"10.1515/krt-2022-0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2022-0024","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In her account of scientific objectivity, feminist philosopher of science Helen Longino shows how scientific objectivity is not so much of individual practice, but rather a social commitment practiced by a scientific community, provided by the necessary accommodations for critical discourse. However, is this conception of scientific objectivity truly capable of living up to the social realities of critical discourse and deliberation within a scientific community? Drawing from Dutilh Novaes’ social epistemological account of argumentation, this paper highlights the challenges Longino’s scientific objectivity faces on a prescriptive and descriptive level, specifically in overcoming the various epistemic injustices Longino’s proposed structural accommodations for objectivity are still sensitive to. Dutilh Novaes’ social epistemological model of argumentation illustrates how the realities of critical debate too often don’t consist of true epistemic or knowledge exchange, even though such exchanges are essential to achieve Longino’s primary goal when redefining scientific objectivity: to wield out and address idiosyncratic background assumptions and individual bigotry that possibly influence a researcher’s scientific conduct.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114567223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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