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Induction by Direct Inference Meets the Goodman Problem 直接推理归纳法满足古德曼问题
KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-07-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2018-320202
Paul D. Thorn
{"title":"Induction by Direct Inference Meets the Goodman Problem","authors":"Paul D. Thorn","doi":"10.1515/krt-2018-320202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2018-320202","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I here aim to show that a particular approach to the problem of induction, which I will call \"induction by direct inference\", comfortably handles Goodman's problem of induction. I begin the article by describing induction by direct inference. After introducing induction by direct inference, I briefly introduce the Goodman problem, and explain why it is, prima facie, an obstacle to the proposed approach. I then show how one may address the Goodman problem, assuming one adopts induction by direct inference as an approach to the problem of induction. In particular, I show that a relatively standard treatment of what some have called the Reference Class Problem\" addresses the Goodman Problem. Indeed, plausible and relatively standard principles of direct inference yield the conclusion that the Goodman inference (involving the grue predicate) is defeated, so it is unnecessary to invoke considerations of `projectibility' in order to address the Goodman problem. I conclude the article by discussing the generality of the proposed approach, in dealing with variants of Goodman's example.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116718218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Inexpressibility Objection 不可表达性异议
KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-07-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2018-320203
Filippo Costantini
{"title":"The Inexpressibility Objection","authors":"Filippo Costantini","doi":"10.1515/krt-2018-320203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2018-320203","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, we offer a contribution to the discussion of one of the most important objections against a relativist position in the absolute generality debate. The inexpressibility objection accuses the generality-relativist of not being able to coherently express her own position. First, we examine Glanzberg's attempt to reply to this objection and we show that it fails. Second, we study the prospects of generalizing the relativist position. In particular, we analyze Fine's and Linnebo's modal approaches and we argue that, even though they are able to coherently express one of the core ideas of relativism while avoiding the inexpressibility objection, there is an important sense in which they are no longer relativist positions. Third, while strengthening the idea that the inexpressibility objection does succeed, we argue that this is no guarantee of the falsity of relativism. Relativism may be inexpressible but true. However, we stress that even if the inexpressibility objection does not supply a definitive, knock-down objection against relativism, if we want to discuss relativism in a rational way, the objection offers a compelling reason not to embrace generality-relativism.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132901236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Theoretical and Scientific Problems of Damasio's Conceptual Model of Consciousness 达马西奥意识概念模型的理论与科学问题
KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-07-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2018-320206
Luiz Augusto Rosa
{"title":"The Theoretical and Scientific Problems of Damasio's Conceptual Model of Consciousness","authors":"Luiz Augusto Rosa","doi":"10.1515/krt-2018-320206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2018-320206","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Here I assess Damasio's conceptual model of consciousness based mainly on the concepts of emotion, feeling, and consciousness by analyzing its conceptual implications and its theoretical and scientific problems. One of the conceptual implications of the direct interaction between the concept of feeling\" and the concept of ‘consciousness\" is the concept of consciousness as feeling a feeling\", which is also recognized by Damasio. The concept feeling a feeling\" directly implies the concept of consciousness as \"an emotional perception of an emotional perception\". Each implication has further theoretical implications that form a web of theoretical and scientific problems. I also argue that, since Damasio's model of consciousness is a neuroscientific model, it should provide a rigorous integration between the high-order concepts and the empirical concepts that underlie them, which, for example, is the case of Dehaene's model of consciousness. Moreover, at the end of the paper, I suggest some conceptual changes that would minimize the theoretical problems of Damasio's conceptual model of consciousness.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129011734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do Categorical Properties Confer Dispositions on Their Bearers? 范畴属性会赋予其持有者性格吗?
KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-07-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2018-320205
Vassilis Livanios
{"title":"Do Categorical Properties Confer Dispositions on Their Bearers?","authors":"Vassilis Livanios","doi":"10.1515/krt-2018-320205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2018-320205","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Categorical Monism (that is, the view that all fundamental natural properties are purely categorical) has recently been challenged by a number of philosophers. In this paper, I examine a challenge which can be based on Gabriele Contessa's [10] defence of the view that only powers can confer dispositions. In his paper Contessa argues against what he calls the Nomic Theory of Disposition Conferral (NTDC). According to NTDC, in each world in which they exist, (categorical) properties confer specific dispositions on their bearers; yet, which disposition a (categorical) property confers on its bearers depends on what the (contingent) laws of nature happen to be. Contessa, inter alia, rests his case on an intuitive analogy between cases of mimicking (in which objects do not actually possess the dispositions associated with their displayed behaviour) and cases of disposition conferral through the action of laws. In this paper, I criticize various aspects of Contessa's argumentation and show that the conclusion he arrives at (that is, only powers can confer dispositions) is controversial.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114264811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Beyond A-Theory and the Block Universe: A non-circular derivation of "before", change, and the local arrow of time 超越A理论和块宇宙:“以前”、变化和局部时间箭头的非圆形推导
KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-03-08 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2020-340103
Daniel Saudek
{"title":"Beyond A-Theory and the Block Universe: A non-circular derivation of \"before\", change, and the local arrow of time","authors":"Daniel Saudek","doi":"10.1515/krt-2020-340103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2020-340103","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article proposes a \"third way\" in the philosophy of time beyond A-theory and the block universe, in which time is understood as a purely local phenomenon. It does so by starting with simple metaphysical assumptions about substances and their properties. Based on these assumptions, the notions of \"before\", of change, and of time as local quantification of change can be derived non-circularly, i.e. without invoking temporal concepts. I then proceed to prove the irreversibility of local time by showing that the propositional content of the local past cannot be changed, since this would imply a contradiction, whereas that of the future can. Time's familiar asymmetric character, in particular the difference between the fixed past and the open or branching\" future, is therefore a non-illusory but purely local phenomenon. Such a model requires no past-present-future distinction valid for the entire cosmos, and is therefore consistent with special and general relativity.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128412957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Deploying Racist Soldiers: A critical take on the `right intention' requirement of Just War Theory 派遣种族主义士兵:对正义战争理论“正确意图”要求的批判
KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2018-320104
Nathan Wood
{"title":"Deploying Racist Soldiers: A critical take on the `right intention' requirement of Just War Theory","authors":"Nathan Wood","doi":"10.1515/krt-2018-320104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2018-320104","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In a recent article Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and B.J. Strawser argue that in order for a decision in war to be just, or indeed the decision to resort to war to be just, it must be the case that the decision is made for the right reasons. Furthermore, they argue that this requirement holds regardless of how much good is produced by said action. In this essay I argue that their argument is awed, in that it mistakes what makes an agent morally good for what makes an act morally good. I argue that the main thrust of Purves et al.'s argument in fact undermines the conclusion they wish to draw, and that the reasons for one's action do not make an in principle difference to the morality of actions in war. I further argue that this position undermines the traditional ad bellum just war constraint of right intention, and that the morality of actions in war is, at core, only concerned with outcomes. I conclude by clarifying that one's reasons for action do in fact matter when deciding to enter war or kill in war, but only because one's reasons significantly impact the way in which one acts. The purpose of this paper is to clear the theoretical space by showing why intentions/reasons do not in principle matter when assessing the morality of war (or killing), but this should not be taken as an argument that we should ignore intentions/reasons altogether","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117117853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Conference Report: The Generalized Theory of Evolution, Duesseldorf Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science, January 31 - February 3, 2018 会议报告:广义进化论，杜塞尔多夫逻辑与科学哲学中心，2018年1月31日至2月3日
KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2018-320106
Gregor P. Greslehner
{"title":"Conference Report: The Generalized Theory of Evolution, Duesseldorf Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science, January 31 - February 3, 2018","authors":"Gregor P. Greslehner","doi":"10.1515/krt-2018-320106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2018-320106","url":null,"abstract":"According to Theodosius Dobzhansky’s famous dictum, “nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution” [3]. On the other hand, philosophers like Ludwig Wittgenstein used to be rather skeptical concerning the relevance of evolutionary thinking to philosophy: “The Darwinian theory has no more to do with philosophy than has any other hypothesis of natural science” [6, 4.1122]. In the last decades, however, – in particular since Richard Dawkins coined the term ‘meme’ for the cultural counterpart of the gene [2] – the application of evolutionary principles has been successfully pursued in areas other than biology. The central principles are reproduction, variation, and selection [4]. Based on these principles, several models, methods, and theories of a wide range of phenomena have been developed – not confined to the realm of biology. More generally, philosophy of science, social sciences, psychology, economics, and many other areas show a growing interest in a generalized theory of evolution. Like in many disciplines and areas of research, the publication of an introductory textbook indicates a certain stage of maturity. Such a textbook has been provided (in German) by Gerhard Schurz [5]. An updated English version is currently in preparation. Being one of the first big conferences in this area, “The Generalized Theory of Evolution” brought together international researchers, scholars, and an interested audience to discuss the current state and trends of the interdisciplinary field of a generalized theory of evolution.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134638336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Procreative Beneficence and Genetic Enhancement 生殖福利和基因增强
KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2018-320105
Walter Friedrich Veit
{"title":"Procreative Beneficence and Genetic Enhancement","authors":"Walter Friedrich Veit","doi":"10.1515/krt-2018-320105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2018-320105","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Imagine a world where everyone is healthy, intelligent, long living and happy. Intuitively this seems wonderful albeit unrealistic. However, recent scientific breakthroughs in genetic engineering, namely CRISPR/Cas bring the question into public discourse, how the genetic enhancement of humans should be evaluated morally. In 2001, when preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and in vitro fertilisation (IVF), enabled parents to select between multiple embryos, Julian Savulescu introduced the principle of procreative beneficence (PPB), stating that parents have the obligations to choose the child that is expected to have the best life. In this paper I argue that accepting the PPB and the consequentialist principle (CP) that two acts with the same consequences are morally on par, commits one to accepting the parental obligation of genetically enhancing one's children","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122049264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 20
Against Foundationalism about Persistence-Conditions 反对关于持续条件的基础主义
KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2018-320102
D. Franken
{"title":"Against Foundationalism about Persistence-Conditions","authors":"D. Franken","doi":"10.1515/krt-2018-320102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2018-320102","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper I will argue against a view that I call foundationalism about persistence-conditions.The core of this view is that composite physical objects have their specific persistence-conditions in virtue of these conditions being fulfilled by the object's physical constituents at various times. I will provide two arguments - the argument from the possibility of instantaneous objects and the argument from the presence of persistence-conditions - which show that this view is untenable. These arguments will also point towards a more adequate understanding of what it means for an object to have certain persistence-conditions. I will expound this understanding and suggest, on its basis, an unorthodox, hylomorphist account of the persistence-conditions of objects","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133686562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Worrall zu Theorienunterbestimmtheit und Strukturenrealismus: Wirklich kein Problem? 这真的没问题吗?
KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2018-320103
Holger Leerhoff
{"title":"Worrall zu Theorienunterbestimmtheit und Strukturenrealismus: Wirklich kein Problem?","authors":"Holger Leerhoff","doi":"10.1515/krt-2018-320103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2018-320103","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the debate of scientific realism, the argument from underdeter- mination of theories by evidence is put forward by the antirealist side. According to this argument, for any scientific theory rival theories can be found which are equally well supported by the evidence but incompatible with the original theory. Structural realism is a form of realism that limits the realistic belief in the existence of the entities and structures talked about in scientific theories: Only the structures of reality are relevant in an epistemic sense and responsible for the truth and falsehood of theories. In the light of the antirealistic arguments, structural realism is supposed to have clear advantages over other varieties of scientific realism. In particular, Worrall ([21]) argues that structural realism is immune against the argument from underdetermination. I will sketch Worrall's line of argument in a more systematic manner and conclude that it is based on some problematic preconditions","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115462841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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