KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy最新文献_第4页

Androids, Oracles and Free Will 机器人，神谕和自由意志

KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-09-02 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2021-0010

M. Sekatskaya

引用次数: 0

KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2021-0019

Glenn Anderau

{"title":"Defining Fake News","authors":"Glenn Anderau","doi":"10.1515/krt-2021-0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0019","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Fake news is a worrying phenomenon which is growing increasingly widespread, partly because of the ease with which it is disseminated online. Combating the spread of fake news requires a clear understanding of the nature of fake news. However, the use of the term in everyday language is heterogenous and has no fixed meaning. Despite increasing philosophical attention to the topic, there is no consensus on the correct definition of “fake news” within philosophy either. This paper aims to bring clarity to the philosophical debate of fake news in two ways: Firstly, by providing an overview of existing philosophical definitions and secondly, by developing a new account of fake news. This paper will identify where there is agreement within the philosophical debate of definitions of “fake news” and isolate four key questions on which there is genuine disagreement. These concern the intentionality underlying fake news, its truth value, the question of whether fake news needs to reach a minimum audience, and the question of whether an account of fake news needs to be dynamic. By answering these four questions, I provide a novel account of defining “fake news”. This new definition hinges upon the fact that fake news has the function of being deliberately misleading about its own status as news.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129403744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Conference Report: SOPhiA 2021 会议报告:索菲亚2021

KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2021-0030

Ina Jäntgen

引用次数: 0

Searching Probabilistic Difference-Making within Specificity 搜索特异性内的概率差异

KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2021-0034

Andreas Lüchinger

引用次数: 0

Three Short Arguments Against Goff’s Grounding of Logical Laws in Universal Consciousness 对戈夫在宇宙意识中建立逻辑规律的三个简短论证

KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2021-0026

Andrew Thomas

引用次数: 0

Frontmatter

KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2021-frontmatter3

引用次数: 0

Three Roles of Empirical Information in Philosophy: Intuitions on Mathematics do Not Come for Free 经验信息在哲学中的三个角色:数学直觉不是免费的

KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2021-0025

Deborah Kant, José Antonio Pérez-Escobar, Deniz Sarikaya

引用次数: 5

Ontological Indifference of Theories and Semantic Primacy of Sentences 理论的本体论无关与句子的语义首因

KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-06-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2021-0014

D. Greimann

{"title":"Ontological Indifference of Theories and Semantic Primacy of Sentences","authors":"D. Greimann","doi":"10.1515/krt-2021-0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0014","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In his late philosophy, Quine generalized the structuralist view in the philosophy of mathematics that mathematical theories are indifferent to the ontology we choose for them. According to his ‘global structuralism’, the choice of objects does not matter to any scientific theory. In the literature, this doctrine is mainly understood as an epistemological thesis claiming that the empirical evidence for a theory does not depend on the choice of its objects. The present paper proposes a new interpretation suggested by Quine’s recently published Kant Lectures from 1980 according to which his global structuralism is a semantic thesis that belongs to his theory of ontological reduction. It claims that a theory can always be reformulated in such a way that its truth does not presuppose the existence of the original objects, but only of some objects that can be considered as their proxies. Quine derives this claim from the principle of the semantic primacy of sentences, which is supposed to license the ontological reductions he uses to establish his global structuralism. It is argued that these reductions do not actually work because they do not account for some hidden ontological commitments that are not detected by his criterion of ontological commitment.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"150 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134189079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Conference Report: The Third Conference of the East European Network for Philosophy of Science (EENPS 2021), 9–11 June, 2021 会议报告:第三届东欧科学哲学网络会议(EENPS 2021)， 2021年6月9-11日

KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-06-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2021-0016

Borut Trpin

{"title":"Conference Report: The Third Conference of the East European Network for Philosophy of Science (EENPS 2021), 9–11 June, 2021","authors":"Borut Trpin","doi":"10.1515/krt-2021-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0016","url":null,"abstract":"Between June 9 and June 11, 2021 approximately 80 speakers participated at the third East European Network for Philosophy of Science (EENPS) conference that took place in a hybrid format, online and in person at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade in Serbia. The EENPS was founded in 2015 by the fellows of the first cohort of European Philosophy of Science (EPSA) fellowship scheme for junior philosophers working in Central and Eastern Europe. Not to overlapwith EPSA biannual conferences, the EENPS decided to organize its conferences in even years: the first conference took place in Sofia, Bulgaria in 2016 and the second in Bratislava, Slovakia 2018. The third conference of the network was likewise planned for June 2020, but it was delayed for one year because of the pandemic. Select papers from each conference have been published in special issues of various journals – this year they will be published in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science (ISPS). The participants joined from all over the world, which also fulfilled one of the main aims of the network: to foster connections between philosophers of science working in Central and Eastern Europe (the network’s focal region) and those working inWestern Europe and elsewhere. The conference provided a good variety of topics, ranging from general philosophy of science to philosophy of specific sciences, history and philosophy of science, formal philosophy of science, and philosophy of mathematics and logic, and had two keynote talks, given by Anna Alexandrova (University of Cambridge) and Gerhard Schurz (University of Düsseldorf). The next conference of the EENPS will take place in summer 2022 in Tartu, Estonia, andwe expect that it will attract evenmore submissions and that by then it","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115562705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Two Shapes of Pragmatism 实用主义的两种形态

KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-06-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2021-0017

Léna Mudry

{"title":"Two Shapes of Pragmatism","authors":"Léna Mudry","doi":"10.1515/krt-2021-0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The ethics of belief is concerned with the question of what we should believe. According to evidentialism, what one should believe is determined by evidence only. Pragmatism claims that practical considerations too can be relevant. But pragmatism comes in two shapes. According to a more traditional version, practical considerations can provide practical reasons for or against belief. According to a new brand of pragmatism, pragmatic encroachment, practical considerations can affect positive epistemic status, such as epistemic rationality or knowledge. In the literature, the distinction between the two versions of pragmatism is not always made. If it is mentioned, it is quickly put aside. Sometimes, it is simply overlooked. As evidentialists face two distinct pragmatist challenges, they must get clearer on the distinction. But it matters for pragmatists too. As I see it, if one accepts one version of pragmatism, one should reject the other. This paper’s goals are to get clearer on the distinction and argue that both pragmatisms are independent. Accepting one version does not commit one to accept the other. Moreover, even if both pragmatisms tend to be neutral toward one another, I will argue that traditional pragmatism has good reasons to reject pragmatic encroachment and vice versa.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128795558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0