IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"The Web Economy, Two-Sided Markets and Competition Policy","authors":"David S. Evans","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1584363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1584363","url":null,"abstract":"The web economy has grown rapidly in the last decade. Online businesses have several key features that are important for understanding the pro-competitive and anti-competitive strategies they may engage in. The two-sided markets literature helps elucidate many of these strategies. It also provides guidance for the antitrust analysis of market definition and exclusionary practices for web-based businesses.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133713684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Decision of the Commission of 13 May 2009 in the Intel Case: Where is the Foreclosure and Consumer Harm?","authors":"D. Geradin","doi":"10.1093/JECLAP/LPP016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JECLAP/LPP016","url":null,"abstract":"On 21 September 2009, the European Commission published a provisional non-confidential version of its 13 May 2009 Decision in which it condemned Intel to a record fine of € 1.06 billion on the ground that it had granted conditional rebates and payments to a number of OEMs and a large retailer of consumer electronics purchasing its x86 CPUs, and that it had paid OEMs to delay, cancel or in some other way restrict the commercialization of specific AMD-based products. This paper shows that the Commission Decision contains a number of flaws. They include the facts that the Decision: (i) relies in substance on a per se prohibition of conditional rebates recognized by the formalistic case-law of the Community courts, notwithstanding that the Commission had clearly indicated in various important policy documents, including its Guidance Paper on Article 82 EC, its intention to move away from this approach for an effects-based analysis; (ii) states, contrary to sound policy, that it need not conduct an “as efficient competitor” test, but conducts a misguided one anyway; (iii) insufficiently supports its speculative theory that the OEMs’ purchasing policy was influenced by their understanding of Intel’s alleged intention to reduce or eliminate their rebates should they buy x86 CPUs from AMD; (iv) fails to demonstrate its contention that Intel’s rebates harm competition and consumers; and (v) conducts an excessively restrictive analysis of the efficiencies created by Intel’s rebates. The Intel decision thus stands for the dangerous proposition that any dominant firm is at risk under Article 82 EC if there exists evidence that employees of a customer believe that reducing present purchases from it could have repercussions with regard to the availability and terms of future purchases, even if the belief is ambiguous, equivocal or contrary to written assurances of the firm or its executives, and without any showing of foreclosure. While the foregoing may be considered as an overstatement and that an “agreement” on conditions (not a mere unilateral belief on the part of the customer) is necessary to find a violation, the Commission accords itself so much latitude on how it collects, interprets and weighs evidence that the distinction is illusory. The compatibility of the Commission Decision with EC competition law will now be examined by the Court of First Instance of the European Communities to which Intel lodged an appeal. Because of the wide-ranging implications of this Decision, not only for Intel but for all large corporations having to negotiate price incentives with their customers, it is to be hoped that the Court of First Instance of the EC will review this decision carefully and hold the Commission to the same rigorous standards it has applied in the merger control area. An important question (that will not be addressed by the Court of First Instance, but which is nevertheless relevant from a policy standpoint) is whether antitrust intervention was at","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122034071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Comments of 71 Concerned Economists: Using Procurement Auctions to Allocate Broadband Stimulus Grants","authors":"W. Baumol, K. Arrow, S. Athey, J. Baker, C. Bazelon, Timothy Brennan, T. Bresnahan, Jeremy I. Bulow, Yeon-Koo Che, P. Cramton, Daniel A. Ackerberg, James Alleman, Gregory S. Crawford, P. DeMarzo, Gerald R. Faulhaber, Jeremy T. Fox, Ian L. Gale, J. Goeree, Brent D. Goldfarb, S. Greenstein, R. Hahn, R. Hall, Ward Hanson, Barry E. Harris, R. Harris, J. Hauge, J. Hausman, T. Hazlett, K. Hendricks, H. Hudson, Mark A. Jamison, J. Kagel, A. Kahn, Ilan Kremer, Vijay B. Krishna, W. Lehr, Thomas M. Lenard, Jonathan D. Levin, Yuanchuan Lien, J. Mayo, David McAdams, Paul R. Milgrom, R. Noll, B. Owen, C. Plott, R. Porter, P. Reny, M. Riordan, D. Salant, Scott J. Savage, William Samuelson, R. Schmalensee, M. Schwartz, Andrzej Skrzypacz, V. Smith, Daniel R. Vincent, J. Waldfogel, S. Wallsten, R. Weber, Bradley S. Wimmer, Glenn Woroch, Lixin Ye, John J. Hayes, Gregory L. Rosston","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1377523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1377523","url":null,"abstract":"The signatories to this document are economists who have studied telecommunications, auctions, and competition policy. While we may disagree about the stimulus package, we believe that it is important to implement mechanisms that make stimulus spending as efficient as possible. To that end, we have come together to encourage the National Telecommunications Information Agency (NTIA) and Rural Utilities Service (RUS) to adopt auction mechanisms to allocate broadband stimulus grants. The broadband stimulus NOI asks which mechanisms NTIA and RUS should use to distribute grants and how those mechanisms address shortcomings in traditional grant and loan programs. In this note we explain why procurement auctions are more efficient and more consistent with the stimulus goals of allocating funds quickly than a traditional grant review process. We recommend that NTIA/RUS use procurement auctions to distribute at least part of the stimulus funds. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) requires NTIA/RUS to distribute $7.2 billion in broadband subsidies. The broadband component of the Act has dual, and not entirely consistent, objectives of providing immediate economic stimulus and improving broadband service. NTIA/RUS faces a formidable challenge in determining how to spend the money quickly and efficiently in ways that meet these goals. The traditional grant application process is long, complicated, and involves subjective and arbitrary decisions regarding which projects to fund. In other words, requesting and reviewing grant applications is not an effective way to implement the plan. Procurement auctions, in contrast, provide a mechanism that can allocate grant money quickly, efficiently, and according to well-defined rules. As a result, procurement auctions offer NTIA/RUS the most promising method of maximizing broadband improvement while also creating some level of “temporary, timely, and targeted” stimulus. We therefore strongly recommend that NTIA/RUS adopt procurement auctions as its preferred method of distributing grants. This memo has three parts. First, it explains why the traditional grant application process is unsuitable for this task and why procurement auctions are better suited. Second, it sketches out a procurement auction plan. This plan is intended to be a starting point from which auction design experts would proceed to build and implement a fully functional auction. Finally, we explain that even if policymakers are skeptical of procurement auctions, one could be implemented quickly as part of an initial tranche of stimulus funding in order to test its efficacy relative to traditional approaches. This approach would allow NTIA/RUS to quickly expand upon or modify the procurement auction program in subsequent funding rounds.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"37 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126959601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What's the 'Interest' in FDA Drug Advisory Committee Conflicts of Interest?","authors":"J. Golec, J. Vernon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1394428","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1394428","url":null,"abstract":"Food and Drug Administration (FDA) drug advisory committee members sometimes have financial interests tied to drug companies. Congress and the public have become concerned that these financial interests lead to conflicts of interest. They conclude that the conflicts bias committee recommendations, and lead to unsafe or ineffective drugs being approved for public consumption, or, conversely, delays in approval of safe and effective drugs. Our paper provides empirical evidence, based on an event study methodology, that advisory committee meetings lead to weak or statistically insignificant effects on stock prices and hence equity values of regulated companies assumed to be affected by the particular matters coming before committee meetings.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124076104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Hit Me with a Missed Call: The Use of Missed Calls at the Bottom of the Pyramid","authors":"N. Sivapragasam","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1572282","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1572282","url":null,"abstract":"‘Missed calling’ is an innovative way of communicating, growing in use among the 3 billion mobile users that exist today. Supported by caller identification facilities and built-in address books that most mobile phones come equipped with, the practice allows mobile users to pass on the cost of communication to others,. This has allowed many at the bottom of the economic pyramid (or BOP) to fulfill a variety of communication needs at virtually no cost. This paper explores the use of missed calling as a means of cost-minimization at the BOP in five emerging Asian countries. The paper draws on findings from a five-country, 8600 sample study conducted in 2006. Contradictory to much of the existing literature, this article finds that the practice is as popular among non-BOP mobile owners as with BOP mobile owners. What may have originated as a cost-minimizing strategy may in fact now have become a ‘strategy of convenience’ used at all levels of the economic pyramid.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128397085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Efficiency Risk of Network Neutrality Rules","authors":"George S. Ford, Thomas M. Koutsky, Lawrence J. Spiwak","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.925347","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.925347","url":null,"abstract":"In this Policy Bulletin, we evaluate Network Neutrality proposals from the standpoint of consumer welfare and economic efficiency by presenting a cost/benefit analysis framework for examining the effect on consumers of Network Neutrality proposals that would limit operators from injecting intelligence into broadband Internet access networks. For a Network Neutrality proposal to be justified, the purported benefits of that proposal must exceed the costs, including the inefficiency in network design as well as the risk of increased industry concentration and market power. Publicly available cost studies show that if IP video services increase in popularity, the cost of providing a residential subscriber a \"stupid\" network that is video-capable could reach $300 to $400 per month more than an \"intelligent\" network, which would certainly put broadband out of the reach of many Americans. We also present a simple model which shows that voluntary investments in network efficiency always improve consumer and social welfare - even if, as some Network Neutrality proponents contend, stupid networks are otherwise preferred by consumers.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131133834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Patents, Capital Structure and the Demand for Corporate Securities","authors":"Stefano Rossi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.686029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.686029","url":null,"abstract":"I assess empirically the implications of patent grants for corporate financing, investment and stock returns. I show that industry patents are associated with more firm-level equity issues and reduced leverage. Firms in industries with more patents issue more equity at a given point in time. Within industries, however, equity issuers are not patent recipients themselves. Remarkably, such equity issuers do not increase investments, dividends, or acquisitions. Rather, they hold the proceeds of equity issues in cash reserves. Finally, patent recipients earn high positive abnormal returns. These findings cast doubt on traditional views of patents as signals of investment opportunities or reductions of information asymmetry. The evidence is instead consistent with the view that patents are a catalyst for investor sentiment.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"21-22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131788890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Financial Data at Corporate Web Sites: Does User Sophistication Matter?","authors":"Michael L. Ettredge, V. Richardson, Susan Scholz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.142936","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.142936","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates companies' decisions to disseminate financial information at their corporate Internet Web sites. We expect that companies tailor the selection of data items presented at their sites to the relative sophistication of their user base. Based on prior literature, we predict which financial information items are likely to be preferred by analysts, proxying for sophisticated users, or by retail investors, who are generally less sophisticated users. Consistent with our hypotheses, the results suggest that the information provided at Web sites varies systematically with companies' levels of analyst following and retail ownership. Higher levels of analyst following are associated with relatively objective, more extensive data, and higher levels of retail ownership are associated with relatively subjective, more abbreviated information.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122887899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Potentiality of ICTs in Rural Human Development in Bangladesh and a Conceptual Framework of Community Informatics to Facilitate the Development","authors":"Mohammad Shahedul Islam, Mohammad Shamsur Rahman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1619770","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1619770","url":null,"abstract":"There is no doubt that the biggest challenge Bangladesh has to face in this millennium is to find successful solutions of the problem of poverty, by improving the human development conditions, especially in rural areas. It is believed that Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) can play a vital role in achieving this objective. ICT is gaining much attention in present times for its ability towards human development and poverty alleviation. In this paper, the prospect of rural human development opportunities in Bangladesh has been explored from the viewpoint of Community Informatics (CI) model.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"105 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129701703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An Approach to Investigating Socio-Economic Tussles Arising from Building the Future Internet","authors":"Costas Kalogiros, C. Courcoubetis, G. Stamoulis, M. Boniface, E. Meyer, M. Waldburger, Daniel Field, B. Stiller","doi":"10.1007/978-3-642-20898-0_11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20898-0_11","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132902822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}