71位经济学家评论:使用采购拍卖来分配宽带刺激拨款

W. Baumol, K. Arrow, S. Athey, J. Baker, C. Bazelon, Timothy Brennan, T. Bresnahan, Jeremy I. Bulow, Yeon-Koo Che, P. Cramton, Daniel A. Ackerberg, James Alleman, Gregory S. Crawford, P. DeMarzo, Gerald R. Faulhaber, Jeremy T. Fox, Ian L. Gale, J. Goeree, Brent D. Goldfarb, S. Greenstein, R. Hahn, R. Hall, Ward Hanson, Barry E. Harris, R. Harris, J. Hauge, J. Hausman, T. Hazlett, K. Hendricks, H. Hudson, Mark A. Jamison, J. Kagel, A. Kahn, Ilan Kremer, Vijay B. Krishna, W. Lehr, Thomas M. Lenard, Jonathan D. Levin, Yuanchuan Lien, J. Mayo, David McAdams, Paul R. Milgrom, R. Noll, B. Owen, C. Plott, R. Porter, P. Reny, M. Riordan, D. Salant, Scott J. Savage, William Samuelson, R. Schmalensee, M. Schwartz, Andrzej Skrzypacz, V. Smith, Daniel R. Vincent, J. Waldfogel, S. Wallsten, R. Weber, Bradley S. Wimmer, Glenn Woroch, Lixin Ye, John J. Hayes, Gregory L. Rosston
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引用次数: 13

摘要

这份文件的签署者是研究电信、拍卖和竞争政策的经济学家。虽然我们可能对刺激方案存在分歧,但我们认为,重要的是要实施使刺激支出尽可能高效的机制。为此,我们共同鼓励国家电信信息局(NTIA)和农村公用事业局(RUS)采用拍卖机制来分配宽带刺激拨款。宽带刺激NOI要求NTIA和RUS应该使用哪些机制来分配赠款,以及这些机制如何解决传统赠款和贷款计划中的缺点。在这篇文章中,我们解释了为什么采购拍卖比传统的拨款审查过程更有效,更符合快速分配资金的刺激目标。我们建议NTIA/RUS使用采购拍卖来分配至少一部分刺激资金。美国复苏和再投资法案(ARRA)要求NTIA/RUS分配72亿美元的宽带补贴。该法案的宽带部分有双重目标,但并不完全一致,即提供即时经济刺激和改善宽带服务。NTIA/RUS在确定如何以满足这些目标的方式快速有效地使用这些资金方面面临着巨大的挑战。传统的奖助金申请过程漫长、复杂,并且涉及到对资助哪些项目的主观和武断的决定。换句话说,请求和审查拨款申请并不是实施计划的有效方式。相比之下,采购拍卖提供了一种机制,可以根据明确的规则快速、有效地分配赠款。因此,采购拍卖为NTIA/RUS提供了最大限度提高宽带性能的最有希望的方法,同时也创造了某种程度的“临时、及时和有针对性”的刺激。因此,我们强烈建议NTIA/RUS采用采购拍卖作为其分配赠款的首选方法。这份备忘录有三部分。首先,它解释了为什么传统的拨款申请程序不适合这项任务,而为什么采购拍卖更适合。其次,拟定采购拍卖计划。该计划旨在成为一个起点,从拍卖设计专家将着手建立和实施一个功能齐全的拍卖。最后,我们解释说,即使政策制定者对采购拍卖持怀疑态度,也可以将其作为刺激资金的初始部分迅速实施,以测试其相对于传统方法的有效性。这种方法将允许NTIA/RUS在随后的融资轮中快速扩展或修改采购拍卖计划。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Comments of 71 Concerned Economists: Using Procurement Auctions to Allocate Broadband Stimulus Grants
The signatories to this document are economists who have studied telecommunications, auctions, and competition policy. While we may disagree about the stimulus package, we believe that it is important to implement mechanisms that make stimulus spending as efficient as possible. To that end, we have come together to encourage the National Telecommunications Information Agency (NTIA) and Rural Utilities Service (RUS) to adopt auction mechanisms to allocate broadband stimulus grants. The broadband stimulus NOI asks which mechanisms NTIA and RUS should use to distribute grants and how those mechanisms address shortcomings in traditional grant and loan programs. In this note we explain why procurement auctions are more efficient and more consistent with the stimulus goals of allocating funds quickly than a traditional grant review process. We recommend that NTIA/RUS use procurement auctions to distribute at least part of the stimulus funds. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) requires NTIA/RUS to distribute $7.2 billion in broadband subsidies. The broadband component of the Act has dual, and not entirely consistent, objectives of providing immediate economic stimulus and improving broadband service. NTIA/RUS faces a formidable challenge in determining how to spend the money quickly and efficiently in ways that meet these goals. The traditional grant application process is long, complicated, and involves subjective and arbitrary decisions regarding which projects to fund. In other words, requesting and reviewing grant applications is not an effective way to implement the plan. Procurement auctions, in contrast, provide a mechanism that can allocate grant money quickly, efficiently, and according to well-defined rules. As a result, procurement auctions offer NTIA/RUS the most promising method of maximizing broadband improvement while also creating some level of “temporary, timely, and targeted” stimulus. We therefore strongly recommend that NTIA/RUS adopt procurement auctions as its preferred method of distributing grants. This memo has three parts. First, it explains why the traditional grant application process is unsuitable for this task and why procurement auctions are better suited. Second, it sketches out a procurement auction plan. This plan is intended to be a starting point from which auction design experts would proceed to build and implement a fully functional auction. Finally, we explain that even if policymakers are skeptical of procurement auctions, one could be implemented quickly as part of an initial tranche of stimulus funding in order to test its efficacy relative to traditional approaches. This approach would allow NTIA/RUS to quickly expand upon or modify the procurement auction program in subsequent funding rounds.
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