Cognitive Neuroscience最新文献

{"title":"Reasonable criteria for functionalists; scarce criteria from phenomenological perspective.","authors":"Andrew Haun,&nbsp;Naotsugu Tsuchiya","doi":"10.1080/17588928.2020.1838473","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2020.1838473","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In their article, Doerig et al suggest a set of criteria for evaluating theories of consciousness. Naturally, their criteria are situated in their own particular perspective on consciousness science, which we have critiqued in the past. Their first criterion is likely to be the one that is most productive and least contentious: if the field can agree to a family of paradigm cases for consciousness, this would be an important endeavor for the field.</p>","PeriodicalId":10413,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Neuroscience","volume":"12 2","pages":"95-96"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17588928.2020.1838473","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"38689263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What makes us so certain that we're conscious?","authors":"Michael S A Graziano","doi":"10.1080/17588928.2020.1838468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2020.1838468","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In the attention schema theory (AST), having an automatically constructed self-model that depicts you as containing consciousness makes you intuitively believe that you have consciousness. The reason why such a self-model evolved in the brains of complex animals is that it serves the useful role of modeling, and thus helping to control, the powerful and subtle process of attention, by which the brain seizes on and deeply processes information.</p>","PeriodicalId":10413,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Neuroscience","volume":"12 2","pages":"67-68"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17588928.2020.1838468","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"38695686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Criteria for empirical theories of consciousness should focus on the explanatory power of mechanisms, not on functional equivalence.","authors":"Johannes J Fahrenfort,&nbsp;Simon van Gaal","doi":"10.1080/17588928.2020.1838470","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2020.1838470","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Doerig and colleagues put forward the notion that we need hard and theory-neutral criteria by which to arbitrate between empirical (mechanistic) theories of consciousness. However, most of the criteria that they propose are not theory neutral because they focus on functional equivalence between systems. Because empirical theories of consciousness are mechanistic rather than functionalist, we think these criteria are not helpful when arbitrating between them.</p>","PeriodicalId":10413,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Neuroscience","volume":"12 2","pages":"93-94"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17588928.2020.1838470","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"38616159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Supracategorical fear information revealed by aversively conditioning multiple categories.","authors":"Seth M Levine,&nbsp;Miriam Kumpf,&nbsp;Rainer Rupprecht,&nbsp;Jens V Schwarzbach","doi":"10.1080/17588928.2020.1839039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2020.1839039","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Fear-generalization is a critical function for survival, in which an organism extracts information from a specific instantiation of a threat (e.g., the western diamondback rattlesnake in my front yard on Sunday) and learns to fear - and accordingly respond to - pertinent higher-order information (e.g., snakes live in my yard). Previous work investigating fear-conditioning in humans has used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to demonstrate that activity patterns representing stimuli from an aversively-conditioned category (CS+) are more similar to each other than those of a neutral category (CS-). Here we used fMRI and <i>multiple</i> aversively-conditioned categories to ask whether we would find only similarity increases <i>within</i> the CS+ categories or also similarity increases <i>between</i> the CS+ categories. Using representational similarity analysis, we correlated several models to activity patterns underlying different brain regions and found that, following fear-conditioning, between-category and within-category similarity increased for the CS+ categories in the insula, superior frontal gyrus (SFG), and the right temporal pole. When specifically investigating fear-<i>generalization</i>, these between- and within-category effects were detected in the SFG. These results advance prior pattern-based neuroimaging work by exploring the effect of aversively-conditioning multiple categories and indicate an extended role for such regions in potentially representing supracategorical information during fear-learning.</p>","PeriodicalId":10413,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Neuroscience","volume":"12 1","pages":"28-39"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17588928.2020.1839039","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"38651212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Theories of consciousness are solutions in need of problems.","authors":"Stephen M Fleming","doi":"10.1080/17588928.2020.1841744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2020.1841744","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Doerig et al. point out a number of shortcomings with existing theories of consciousness and argue they should be systematically constrained by empirical data. In this commentary I suggest a further constraint - the potential functions of (the contents of) consciousness. One such candidate function in humans is the social sharing of reportable mental states. The social function of consciousnessprovides a general framework within which to understand the evolution and neurobiology of conscious awareness.</p>","PeriodicalId":10413,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Neuroscience","volume":"12 2","pages":"86-88"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17588928.2020.1841744","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"38695688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Proposal to create discussion forum to consider evidence on theories of consciousness.","authors":"Stan Klein","doi":"10.1080/17588928.2020.1846026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2020.1846026","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>I consider the Doerig, Schruger, Herzog (this issue) paper to be a very important paper on the multiple empirical theories of consciousness (ToCs). The paper compared 13 different approaches. It would be wonderful to create a forum for all interested parties to discuss the many issues this paper brought up. Equally important is what the paper didn't bring up. Namely, how do the different empirical approaches connect to qualia, the subjective aspects of consciousness. In my mind, qualia is the biggest mystery facing present science. It would be good to see how the multiple interpretations might connect to qualia.</p>","PeriodicalId":10413,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Neuroscience","volume":"12 2","pages":"91-92"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17588928.2020.1846026","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"38704608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Hard criteria for empirical theories of consciousness.","authors":"Adrien Doerig,&nbsp;Aaron Schurger,&nbsp;Michael H Herzog","doi":"10.1080/17588928.2020.1772214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2020.1772214","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Consciousness is now a well-established field of empirical research. A large body of experimental results has been accumulated and is steadily growing. In parallel, many Theories of Consciousness (ToCs) have been proposed. These theories are diverse in nature, ranging from computational to neurophysiological and quantum theoretical approaches. This contrasts with other fields of natural science, which host a smaller number of competing theories. We suggest that one reason for this abundance of extremely different theories may be the lack of stringent criteria specifying how empirical data constrains ToCs. First, we argue that consciousness is a well-defined topic from an empirical point of view and motivate a purely empirical stance on the quest for consciousness. Second, we present a checklist of criteria that, we propose, empirical ToCs need to cope with. Third, we review 13 of the most influential ToCs and subject them to the criteria. Our analysis helps to situate these different ToCs in the theoretical landscapeand sheds light on their strengths and weaknesses from a strictly empirical point of view.</p>","PeriodicalId":10413,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Neuroscience","volume":"12 2","pages":"41-62"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17588928.2020.1772214","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"38158102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Feeling & knowing: Making minds conscious.","authors":"Antonio Damasio","doi":"10.1080/17588928.2020.1846027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2020.1846027","url":null,"abstract":"(1) Let me begin by thanking Doerig et al. for including my work in their survey of empirical theories of consciousness (although I am a bit spooked by being assigned the number 13!), especially given the authors’ concern for the large number of currently competing theories. I also appreciate their idea that the reason for this abundance may be a lack of stringent selection criteria although I suggest that the problem actually begins prior to the selection of proposals: it concerns the clarification of what exactly is the point of these studies. This is not a new problem. I recall spending many hours, most of them pleasant, discussing this very issue with some of the most distinguished contributors to the field ― Gerald Edelman, Giulio Tononi, Francis Crick, Christof Koch, Stanislas Dehaene, Jean Pierre Changeux, David Chalmers, Stuart Hameroff, Roger Penrose ― but no clear agreement ever emerged as to what the exact phenomenon was that we were so devoted to understanding. My position, then and now, is that the approach to consciousness must begin with introspection. We can inspect our mental processes and decide, on the basis of their psychological analysis, what the phenomenon of interest is. Subsequently, we can use facts drawn from physics, chemistry, biology, and neuroscience to build hypotheses regarding the mechanisms behind the phenomenon. (2) Introspection tells me that consciousness consists of an enrichment of the basic process of mind. Minds are made of flowing, representational, imagetic patterns based on varied sensory mappings, primarily related to perception and memory recall. The flow of images is not ‘conscious,’ per se, but can be rendered conscious by adding to it knowledge to the effect that the ongoing mental contents belong to a particular organism. (3) The above transformation is first accomplished by feelings. Feelings are hybrid processes, based largely on the body’s interior and carried out, physiologically, as an interaction between (i) homeostatically driven, life-regulatory routines occurring in the chemical-visceral interior, and (ii) interoceptive maps generated at multiple peripheral levels (e.g., spinal ganglia; trigeminal ganglion) and central nervous system (e.g., brainstem nuclei; insular cortices; cingulate cortices). Whereas exteroception accomplishes the mapping of external objects and actions that are strictly separate from the perceiving organism, interoception accomplishes the mapping of internal organism events. As a result, an interaction between ‘object of perception’ and ‘subject’ is maintained throughout the process and results in a unique hybrid. Moreover, the anatomical and physiological features of interoception are also unique. The critical step in the generation of consciousness, then, is the revelation, made within the mind, that the mind belongs to and is located within a specific living organism. This revelation is firstly accomplished by feeling but is complemented by (a) proprioceptive sig","PeriodicalId":10413,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Neuroscience","volume":"12 2","pages":"65-66"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17588928.2020.1846027","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"38713443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Unified Neural Theory of Conscious Seeing, Hearing, Feeling, and Knowing.","authors":"Stephen Grossberg","doi":"10.1080/17588928.2020.1839401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2020.1839401","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Adaptive Resonance Theory does more than satisfy 'hard criteria' for ToCs.</p>","PeriodicalId":10413,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Neuroscience","volume":"12 2","pages":"69-73"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17588928.2020.1839401","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"38559939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Higher-order theories do just fine.","authors":"Matthias Michel,&nbsp;Hakwan Lau","doi":"10.1080/17588928.2020.1839402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2020.1839402","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Doerig et al. have set several criteria that theories of consciousness need to fulfill. By these criteria, higher-order theories fare better than most existing theories. But they also argue that higher-order theories may not be able to answer both the 'small network argument' and the 'other systems argument'. In response, we focus on the case of the Perceptual Reality Monitoring theory to explain why higher-order theories do just fine.</p>","PeriodicalId":10413,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Neuroscience","volume":"12 2","pages":"77-78"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17588928.2020.1839402","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"38593461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}