{"title":"Having the government as a client: Does this reduce earnings management of the firm?","authors":"Charmaine Glegg , Oneil Harris , Thanh Ngo , Jurica Susnjara","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2021.100022","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2021.100022","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Does government contracting translate to better earnings quality and less earnings management? In this study, we seek to answer this question. We find strong evidence that government suppliers strategically substitute accrual-based earnings management with real earnings management. Firms with government customers distinctively employ greater real activities manipulation than their industry peers, as proxied by abnormal discretionary expenditures, abnormal production costs, and total real activities manipulation while avoiding accrual manipulation. These findings are robust to a host of robustness checks including measurement errors, selection bias and endogeneity. Hence, our findings have implications for procurement policy as policymakers may underestimate the total earnings management activities of government suppliers.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"4 ","pages":"Article 100022"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319321000227/pdfft?md5=9d959bdb8839772a5bb7fabcb8ab109b&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319321000227-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77336098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Improving the efficacy of carbon tax policies","authors":"Elie Appelbaum","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2021.100027","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2021.100027","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines the efficacy of carbon tax policies in view of the interactions between such policies and the firm’s carbon efficiency and financing decisions. We show that because the government, unlike capital markets, does not price its policy’s risk by taking into account default probabilities, the firm takes advantage of the government by using senior debt to minimize the carbon tax policy’s cost. The shift to debt financing, in turn, mitigates the carbon tax policy’s efficacy, resulting in lower carbon efficiency, thus higher carbon emissions. To remedy the government’s predicament, we propose a correct-pricing rule that mimics market equilibrium conditions, thereby forcing firms to consider government interests. Such a rule renders senior debt no longer useful for reducing the carbon tax policy’s cost. As a result, the tax policy’s efficacy increases, hence reducing carbon emissions. Finally, we briefly consider and comment on the case of a social-welfare maximizing government that strategically chooses its carbon tax.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"4 ","pages":"Article 100027"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319321000276/pdfft?md5=75f4bcce149f458819740a101e881b9e&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319321000276-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87232351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An overview of the Fed's new credit policy tools and their cushioning effect on the COVID-19 recession","authors":"Michael D. Bordo , John V. Duca","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2021.100013","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2021.100013","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The economics literature lacks articles that provide a broad roadmap—let alone a logical explanation—of the new set of Federal Reserve policy tools that were created to counter the COVID-19 recession. This study provides an overview of the motivation for these new credit-easing programs—namely to damp feedback mechanisms and channels that would otherwise amplify the downturn and impede a subsequent recovery. The study then briefly assesses the impact of the new policy tools and addresses the risks they might pose. In addition, the new credit easing tools are put into historical context through a discussion of their development as part of the Fed's evolving and expanding role in countering financial crises.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"3 ","pages":"Article 100013"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.jge.2021.100013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75336549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Human capital and industrialization in Bolivia","authors":"Fernando De la Cruz Prego","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2021.100017","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2021.100017","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>There is wide academic consensus on institutional design being the key inhibitor of the Bolivian industrialization process during Evo Morales´s time in office. However, the effects of investment in human capital in the industrialization process has not been explored to the same degree. This is surprising since the country exhibited an outstanding performance in the improvement of human capital during this period. To explain this, we propose a new metric of human capital (industrial human capital) that sheds light on the failure of human capital to assist the Bolivian industrial effort. The results show that Bolivia made significant progress in promoting “generic human capital”, as in the case of other Latin-American and OECD countries, but its performance was radically different in terms of “industrial human capital”, with its main indicators stagnant or in decline. Instead of trying to reinterpret the explanation of Bolivia's industrial policy failure, we suggest that this inability to deploy successful industrial human capital was part and parcel of industrial institutional design failures.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"3 ","pages":"Article 100017"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319321000173/pdfft?md5=26861d6597b1c3a3f451aa3c7dda3267&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319321000173-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87366022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adedoyin Babajide , Ahmad Hassan Ahmad , Simeon Coleman
{"title":"Violent conflicts and state capacity: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa","authors":"Adedoyin Babajide , Ahmad Hassan Ahmad , Simeon Coleman","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2021.100019","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2021.100019","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper investigates the impacts of conflicts on state-capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), a region that has recorded a disproportionate number of armed conflicts and has a high presence in the Fragile States Index rankings. Individually, both conflicts and state-capacity are known to have important implications for economic development, which underscore their relevance for developing countries. Our aim here is to analyze the relationship between them and for this, we analyze a panel of 49 SSA countries spanning 2000–2015. Our results suggest that the effect of conflicts on state-capacity depends on the variable used to proxy state-capacity is important: conflicts diminish state-capacity when <em>tax revenue</em> is used as the proxy, but the effect is positive when proxied by <em>military expenditure</em>. Other proxies consider include r<em>egulatory quality, rule of law,</em> and g<em>overnment effectiveness</em>.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"3 ","pages":"Article 100019"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319321000197/pdfft?md5=f2fd90ca11c251bcd31a87471b3a93cd&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319321000197-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78199118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Elite Influence on General Political Preferences","authors":"Randall G. Holcombe","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2021.100021","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2021.100021","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Economic models of democratic decision-making tend to assume that voters have preferences and politicians adjust their platforms to conform to voter preferences. However, the direction of causation (mostly) goes the other way. Political elites offer policy platforms and voters adopt the policy preferences of their political anchors. Because the choices of individual voters do not affect aggregate political outcomes, voters tend to vote expressively, and might vote for outcomes they would not choose if the choice were theirs alone. The concept of expressive preferences is well-established. This paper takes the next step by explaining how voters form their expressive preferences. Expressive preferences tend to be anchored in a political identity associated with a candidate, party, or ideology, and people's political preferences on most issues are derived from their anchor preferences, which are defined by political elites.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"3 ","pages":"Article 100021"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319321000215/pdfft?md5=ac96201f2a87794a3d56de0b3050d04c&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319321000215-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86470512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Government and economics in the digital economy","authors":"Michael Spence","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2021.100020","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2021.100020","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The digital economy brings both opportunities and challenges. After introducing the benefits and potential problems brought about by the digital economy, I then discuss the important role of government in ensuring that the digital economy functions properly. Finally, I propose several directions in which governments should concentrate their efforts to facilitate the sound development of the digital economy.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"3 ","pages":"Article 100020"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319321000203/pdfft?md5=52cb75a1d310f567f803d0c1da065527&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319321000203-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78713801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why do countries in financial distress strategically delay seeking help?","authors":"Theofanis Tsoulouhas","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2021.100006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jge.2021.100006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The paper differs from current literature by providing a systematic analysis of the relationship between sovereign debt, financial distress and political career concerns via a novel game-theoretic model, in order to analyze the strategic behavior of governments in revealing financial distress and requesting a rescue program from international organizations. The analysis shows that, in equilibrium, a rent-seeking government will ”gamble for resurrection” by strategically delaying the revelation of financial distress through the creation of ”hidden debt,” hoping that things will improve in the future which will enable getting away with hiding the unfavorable news. This is so when the electorate only has short-term commitment power, if the government expects sufficient rents, provided a re-elected government adds to national output through experience, or international rescue organizations charge a relatively low interest rate, or the electorate discounts the future sufficiently. The analysis discusses incentive systems, such as differential interest rates when the government has been caught cheating, credit limiting and austerity, that can deter strategic delays, and a precommitment mechanism to get around time inconsistency.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"2 ","pages":"Article 100006"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.jge.2021.100006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136849775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ownership, Enforcement, and the Effects of Business Environment","authors":"Christine Zhenwei Qiang, He Wang, L. Colin Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2021.100007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2021.100007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate how the effects of the business environment depend on whether the measure is <em>de jure</em> or <em>de facto</em>, and how the business environment effects differ by ownership. Four aspects of the business environment are found to be relatively robust by multiple data sources: access to finance, electricity, internet, and human capital. The effects of <em>de jure</em> business environment indicators on firm performances depend on measures of contract enforcement. Foreign-owned firms benefit more from the maintenance of physical safety and ease in obtaining construction permits, and gain competitive advantage in productivity when domestic infrastructure or access to finance is worse.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"2 ","pages":"Article 100007"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.jge.2021.100007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84050168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bono Malum Superate: long-run effects of radical institutional change","authors":"Federico Asta , Lela Mélon , Rok Spruk","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2021.100008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2021.100008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine the effect radical institutional change on long-run growth through the case of the partition of Friuli Venezia Giulia in 1947 between Italy and Yugoslavia and the subsequent integration in two distinct institutional regimes. Friuli Venezia Giulia's long-run development trajectory is matched through a novel dataset with other countries on pre-1947 growth and development characteristics, producing a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the absence of the unification. By using the long- run growth and development paths of other countries for the period 1871-2016, we construct a plausible counterfactual scenario, showing pervasive and substantial long-run growth benefits of Italian unification. In the absence of unification, Friuli Venezia Giulia's per capita income would be 41 percent lower and Yugoslav-controlled Littoral would have 32 percent higher per capita income if it had joined Italy. A battery of large- sample placebo distributions and permutation tests confirm the significance of the 1947 border partition for long-run economic growth.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"2 ","pages":"Article 100008"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.jge.2021.100008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76426727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}