{"title":"When is punishment harmful to cooperation? A note on antisocial and perverse punishment","authors":"Tingting Fu, L. Putterman","doi":"10.1007/s40881-018-0053-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-018-0053-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"4 1","pages":"151 - 164"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2018-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40881-018-0053-6","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52944689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
B. Rockenbach, Sebastian Schneiders, Marcin Waligora
{"title":"Pushing the bad away: reverse Tullock contests","authors":"B. Rockenbach, Sebastian Schneiders, Marcin Waligora","doi":"10.1007/s40881-018-0052-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-018-0052-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"4 1","pages":"73 - 85"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2018-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40881-018-0052-7","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52944602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inside information in Ponzi schemes","authors":"K. Sadiraj, A. Schram","doi":"10.1007/s40881-018-0047-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-018-0047-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"4 1","pages":"29 - 45"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2018-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40881-018-0047-4","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52944520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Experimental guidance for eliciting beliefs with the Stochastic Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism","authors":"Ingrid Burfurd, Tom Wilkening","doi":"10.1007/s40881-018-0046-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-018-0046-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"4 1","pages":"15 - 28"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2018-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40881-018-0046-5","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52944410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Framing effects on bribery behaviour: experimental evidence from China and Uganda.","authors":"Alessio Gaggero, Simon Appleton, Lina Song","doi":"10.1007/s40881-018-0049-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-018-0049-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this study we investigate the effect of framing on bribery behaviour. To do this, we replicate Barr and Serra (Exp Econ, 12(4):488-503, (2009) and carry out a simple one-shot bribery game that mimics corruption. In one treatment, we presented the experiment in a framed version, in which wording was embedded with social context; in the other, we removed the social context and presented the game in a neutral manner. The contribution of this paper is that it offers a comparison of framing effects in two highly corrupt countries: China and Uganda. Our results provide evidence of strong and significant framing effects for Uganda, but not for China.</p>","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"4 1","pages":"86-97"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40881-018-0049-2","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37164738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The limits of guilt","authors":"Loukas Balafoutas, Helena Fornwagner","doi":"10.1007/s40881-017-0043-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-017-0043-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"3 1","pages":"137 - 148"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2017-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40881-017-0043-0","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52944271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Revisiting gender differences in ultimatum bargaining: experimental evidence from the US and China","authors":"Shuwen Li, Xiangdong Qin, Daniel Houser","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3050080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3050080","url":null,"abstract":"We report results from a replication of Solnick (Econ Inq 39(2):189, 2001), which finds using an ultimatum game that, in relation to males, more is demanded from female proposers and less is offered to female responders. We conduct Solnick’s (2001) game using participants from a large US university and a large Chinese university. We find little evidence of gender differences across proposer and responder decisions in both locations.","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"4 1","pages":"180-190"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2017-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/ssrn.3050080","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48124205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Antonio A Arechar, Gordon Kraft-Todd, David G Rand
{"title":"Turking Overtime: How Participant Characteristics and Behavior Vary Over Time and Day on Amazon Mechanical Turk.","authors":"Antonio A Arechar, Gordon Kraft-Todd, David G Rand","doi":"10.1007/s40881-017-0035-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s40881-017-0035-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Online experiments allow researchers to collect datasets at times not typical of laboratory studies. We recruit 2,336 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk to examine if participant characteristics and behaviors differ depending on whether the experiment is conducted during the day versus night, and on weekdays versus weekends. Participants make incentivized decisions involving prosociality, punishment, and discounting, and complete a demographic and personality survey. We find no time or day differences in behavior, but do find that participants at nights and on weekends are less experienced with online studies; on weekends are less reflective; and at night are less conscientious and more neurotic. These results are largely robust to finer grained measures of time and day. We also find that those who participated earlier in the course of the study are more experienced, reflective, and agreeable, but less charitable than later participants.</p>","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"3 1","pages":"1-11"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2017-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5675003/pdf/nihms877212.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"35545955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does the absence of human sellers bias bidding behavior in auction experiments?","authors":"Björn Bartling, T. Gesche, N. Netzer","doi":"10.1007/s40881-017-0037-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-017-0037-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"3 1","pages":"44 - 61"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2017-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40881-017-0037-y","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46280206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does the absence of human sellers bias bidding behavior in auction experiments?","authors":"Björn Bartling, T. Gesche, N. Netzer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2770532","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2770532","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the impact of human subjects in the role of a seller on bidding in experimental second-price auctions. Overbidding is a robust finding in second-price auctions, and spite among bidders has been advanced as an explanation. If spite extends to the seller, then the absence of human sellers who receive the auction revenue may bias upwards the bidding behavior in existing experimental auctions. We derive the equilibrium bidding function in a model where bidders have preferences regarding both the payoffs of other bidders and the seller’s revenue. Overbidding is optimal when buyers are spiteful only towards other buyers. However, optimal bids are lower and potentially even truthful when spite extends to the seller. We experimentally test the model predictions by exogenously varying the presence of human subjects in the roles of the seller and competing bidders. We do not detect a systematic effect of the presence of a human seller on overbidding. We conclude that overbidding is not an artefact of the standard experimental implementation of second-price auctions in which human sellers are absent.","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"3 1","pages":"44-61"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2017-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49068217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}