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The seeds of success: the pivotal role of first round cooperation in public goods games 成功的种子:公共产品博弈中第一轮合作的关键作用
IF 1.9
Journal of the Economic Science Association Pub Date : 2024-01-07 DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00153-3
Mehmet Y. Gürdal, Orhan Torul, Mustafa Yahşi
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引用次数: 0
Indefinitely repeated contests with incumbency advantage 具有在职优势的无限期重复竞赛
IF 1.9
Journal of the Economic Science Association Pub Date : 2024-01-06 DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00154-2
Cary Deck, Zachary Dorobiala, Paan Jindapon
{"title":"Indefinitely repeated contests with incumbency advantage","authors":"Cary Deck, Zachary Dorobiala, Paan Jindapon","doi":"10.1007/s40881-023-00154-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-023-00154-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"11 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139380606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Conditional cooperation and group size: experimental evidence from a public good game 有条件合作与群体规模:来自公益游戏的实验证据
IF 1.9
Journal of the Economic Science Association Pub Date : 2023-11-28 DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00152-4
Tianyi Li, C. Noussair
{"title":"Conditional cooperation and group size: experimental evidence from a public good game","authors":"Tianyi Li, C. Noussair","doi":"10.1007/s40881-023-00152-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-023-00152-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"36 1","pages":"1-15"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139225471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Overconfidence: the roles of gender, public observability and incentives 过度自信:性别、公众观察和激励的作用
Journal of the Economic Science Association Pub Date : 2023-10-24 DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00149-z
Hayk Amirkhanyan, Michał Krawczyk, Maciej Wilamowski, Paweł Bokszczanin
{"title":"Overconfidence: the roles of gender, public observability and incentives","authors":"Hayk Amirkhanyan, Michał Krawczyk, Maciej Wilamowski, Paweł Bokszczanin","doi":"10.1007/s40881-023-00149-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-023-00149-z","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this project, we manipulate the public observability of forecasts and outcomes of a physical task. We explore how these manipulations affect overconfidence (OC). Participants in the experiment are asked to hold a weight after predicting how long they think they could do it for. Comparing the prediction and outcome times (in seconds) yields a measure of OC. We independently vary two dimensions of public observability (of the outcome and of the prediction). Additionally, we manipulate incentives to come up with an accurate prediction. This design allows us to shed light on the mechanism behind male and female OC. Following the existing literature, we formulate several hypotheses regarding the differences in predictions and outcomes for males and females in the presence of the public observability of predictions and outcomes. Our experimental data do not provide support to most of the hypotheses: in particular, there is no evidence of a gender gap in overconfidence. The most robust finding that emerges from our results is that incentives on making correct predictions increase participants’ forecasts on their own performance (by about 24%) and their actual performance as well, but to a lower extent (by about 8%); in addition, incentives to predict correctly in fact increase error for females (by about 33%).","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"70 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135266132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Who’s who: how uncertainty about the favored group affects outcomes of affirmative action 谁是谁:优待群体的不确定性如何影响平权行动的结果
Journal of the Economic Science Association Pub Date : 2023-10-23 DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00143-5
Chi Trieu
{"title":"Who’s who: how uncertainty about the favored group affects outcomes of affirmative action","authors":"Chi Trieu","doi":"10.1007/s40881-023-00143-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-023-00143-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"SE-9 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135411647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Preference Survey Module: evidence on social preferences from Tehran 偏好调查模块:来自德黑兰的社会偏好证据
Journal of the Economic Science Association Pub Date : 2023-10-19 DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00151-5
Michael Kosfeld, Zahra Sharafi
{"title":"The Preference Survey Module: evidence on social preferences from Tehran","authors":"Michael Kosfeld, Zahra Sharafi","doi":"10.1007/s40881-023-00151-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-023-00151-5","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We provide evidence on the extent to which survey items in the Preference Survey Module and the resulting Global Preference Survey measuring social preferences—trust, altruism, positive and negative reciprocity—predict behavior in corresponding experimental games outside the original participant sample of Falk et al. (Manag Sci, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4455 ). Our results, which are based on a replication study with university students in Tehran, Iran, are mixed. While quantitative items considering hypothetical versions of the experimental games correlate significantly and economically meaningfully with individual behavior, none of the qualitative items show significant correlations. The only exception is altruism where results correspond more closely to the original findings.","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135667319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Adding household surveys to the behavioral economics toolbox: insights from the SOEP innovation sample 将家庭调查加入行为经济学工具箱:来自SOEP创新样本的见解
Journal of the Economic Science Association Pub Date : 2023-10-14 DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00150-6
Urs Fischbacher, Levent Neyse, David Richter, Carsten Schröder
{"title":"Adding household surveys to the behavioral economics toolbox: insights from the SOEP innovation sample","authors":"Urs Fischbacher, Levent Neyse, David Richter, Carsten Schröder","doi":"10.1007/s40881-023-00150-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-023-00150-6","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract While laboratory and field experiments are the major items in the toolbox of behavioral economists, household panel studies can complement them and expand their research potential. We introduce the German Socio-Economic Panel’s Innovation Sample (SOEP-IS), which offers researchers detailed panel data and the possibility to collect personalized experimental and survey data for free. We discuss what SOEP-IS can offer to behavioral economists and illustrate a set of design ideas with examples. Although we build our discussion on SOEP-IS, our purpose is to provide a guide that can be generalized to other household panel studies as well.","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"2011 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135803395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
stratEst: a software package for strategy frequency estimation 策略频率估计软件包
Journal of the Economic Science Association Pub Date : 2023-10-08 DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00141-7
Fabian Dvorak
{"title":"stratEst: a software package for strategy frequency estimation","authors":"Fabian Dvorak","doi":"10.1007/s40881-023-00141-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-023-00141-7","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract stratEst is a software package for strategy frequency estimation in the freely available statistical computing environment R (R Development Core Team in R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, 2022). The package aims at minimizing the start-up costs of running the modern strategy frequency estimation techniques used in experimental economics. Strategy frequency estimation (Stahl and Wilson in J Econ Behav Organ 25: 309–327, 1994; Stahl and Wilson in Games Econ Behav, 10: 218–254, 1995) models the choices of participants in an economic experiment as a finite-mixture of individual decision strategies. The parameters of the model describe the associated behavior of each strategy and its frequency in the data. stratEst provides a convenient and flexible framework for strategy frequency estimation, allowing the user to customize, store and reuse sets of candidate strategies. The package includes useful functions for data processing and simulation, strategy programming, model estimation, parameter testing, model checking, and model selection.","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135198589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Violations of first-order stochastic dominance 违反一阶随机优势
Journal of the Economic Science Association Pub Date : 2023-10-06 DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00142-6
Brett Williams
{"title":"Violations of first-order stochastic dominance","authors":"Brett Williams","doi":"10.1007/s40881-023-00142-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-023-00142-6","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I find necessary and sufficient conditions for first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) violations for choices from a budget line of Arrow securities. Applying this characterization to existing data, I compare FOSD violation rates across a broad set of risk preference elicitation tasks.","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135350513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Invariance of equilibrium to the strategy method I: theory 均衡不变性的策略方法1:理论
Journal of the Economic Science Association Pub Date : 2023-10-05 DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00145-3
Daniel L. Chen, Martin Schonger
{"title":"Invariance of equilibrium to the strategy method I: theory","authors":"Daniel L. Chen, Martin Schonger","doi":"10.1007/s40881-023-00145-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-023-00145-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"2011 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135436042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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