{"title":"贿赂行为的框架效应:来自中国和乌干达的实验证据。","authors":"Alessio Gaggero, Simon Appleton, Lina Song","doi":"10.1007/s40881-018-0049-2","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this study we investigate the effect of framing on bribery behaviour. To do this, we replicate Barr and Serra (Exp Econ, 12(4):488-503, (2009) and carry out a simple one-shot bribery game that mimics corruption. In one treatment, we presented the experiment in a framed version, in which wording was embedded with social context; in the other, we removed the social context and presented the game in a neutral manner. The contribution of this paper is that it offers a comparison of framing effects in two highly corrupt countries: China and Uganda. Our results provide evidence of strong and significant framing effects for Uganda, but not for China.</p>","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"4 1","pages":"86-97"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40881-018-0049-2","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Framing effects on bribery behaviour: experimental evidence from China and Uganda.\",\"authors\":\"Alessio Gaggero, Simon Appleton, Lina Song\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s40881-018-0049-2\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>In this study we investigate the effect of framing on bribery behaviour. To do this, we replicate Barr and Serra (Exp Econ, 12(4):488-503, (2009) and carry out a simple one-shot bribery game that mimics corruption. In one treatment, we presented the experiment in a framed version, in which wording was embedded with social context; in the other, we removed the social context and presented the game in a neutral manner. The contribution of this paper is that it offers a comparison of framing effects in two highly corrupt countries: China and Uganda. Our results provide evidence of strong and significant framing effects for Uganda, but not for China.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":91563,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of the Economic Science Association\",\"volume\":\"4 1\",\"pages\":\"86-97\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40881-018-0049-2\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of the Economic Science Association\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-018-0049-2\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"2018/6/4 0:00:00\",\"PubModel\":\"Epub\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-018-0049-2","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2018/6/4 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Framing effects on bribery behaviour: experimental evidence from China and Uganda.
In this study we investigate the effect of framing on bribery behaviour. To do this, we replicate Barr and Serra (Exp Econ, 12(4):488-503, (2009) and carry out a simple one-shot bribery game that mimics corruption. In one treatment, we presented the experiment in a framed version, in which wording was embedded with social context; in the other, we removed the social context and presented the game in a neutral manner. The contribution of this paper is that it offers a comparison of framing effects in two highly corrupt countries: China and Uganda. Our results provide evidence of strong and significant framing effects for Uganda, but not for China.
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