North Carolina journal of law & technology最新文献

{"title":"Regulatory Arbitrage Strategies and Tactics in Telecommunications","authors":"R. Frieden","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.456920","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.456920","url":null,"abstract":"Recently several states have launched investigations of certain MCI telephone call routings based on competitors' claims that the company eliminated or reduced payments it should have made. The MCI investigations may trigger closer scrutiny of numerous strategies and tactics used by telecommunications carriers to reduce the payments they make to other carriers. Also this scrutiny may call attention to how carriers exploit inconsistent regulatory treatment of functionally the same services. Regulatory asymmetry occurs when telecommunications service providers offer identical services, but incur different regulatory burdens. More extensive regulatory oversight, higher fees, and subsidy obligations may apply to carriers based on artificial classifications of services based on geography (intrastate versus interstate) and type (telecommunications as a stand alone service versus one where telecommunications is a minor element of an information service). Additionally inconsistent regulatory treatment may occur based on carrier classifications using historical market share and perceptions of their market power. Existing, \"legacy\" regulatory classifications have established arbitrary dichotomies based on service, which regulatory agency has jurisdiction, what services qualify for promotion through favorable regulatory treatment, and how carriers and regulators decide to allocate costs. Regulatory arbitrage results when stakeholders, such as telecommunications service providers like MCI, exploit differences in legislative and regulatory classifications to accrue financial and competitive advantages achieved by avoiding regulatory burdens, or by foisting payment obligations onto other carriers. This article will examine tactics designed to exploit regulatory arbitrage with an eye toward identifying areas where inconsistent regulatory treatment distorts the competitive marketplace without offsetting public interest benefits. The paper concludes that legislatures and regulators should eliminate opportunities to avoid regulatory burdens through routing and service classification tactics unless compelling reasons persist for maintaining regulatory asymmetry.","PeriodicalId":90661,"journal":{"name":"North Carolina journal of law & technology","volume":"5 1","pages":"227"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67735984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Contents and Front Matter","authors":"N. Carolina.","doi":"10.1039/9781847552631-fp001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1039/9781847552631-fp001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":90661,"journal":{"name":"North Carolina journal of law & technology","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"57888852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The International Patent Propensity Divide","authors":"D. Benoliel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3504110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3504110","url":null,"abstract":"This Article contributes conceptually and empirically towards an innovation-based growth theory for developing countries. The proposed theory adheres to the growing importance given by theoreticians and policy makers alike to re-visiting the neoclassical economics “one size fits all” innovation policy propagated by current international intellectual property instruments. \u0000 \u0000In arguing for an innovation-based growth theory, the Article offers a unique statistical country panel data model for comparing patent propensity rates as a proxy for national innovation over sixteen years (1996–2011) between two groups of countries straddling the developing-developed countries divide: “Emerging Economies” and “Advanced Economies.” The International Monetary Fund has labeled certain developing countries as “Emerging Economies,” which are hotbeds of meaningful innovation within the developing world, and others as “Advanced Economies,” which includes most of the countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.","PeriodicalId":90661,"journal":{"name":"North Carolina journal of law & technology","volume":"15 1","pages":"49"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68599693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}