电信监管套利策略与策略

R. Frieden
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引用次数: 1

摘要

最近,几个州对MCI的某些电话呼叫路由展开了调查,原因是竞争对手声称该公司取消或减少了本应支付的款项。MCI的调查可能会引发对电信运营商用于减少向其他运营商支付费用的众多战略和策略的更严格审查。此外,这种审查可能会引起人们对运营商如何利用功能相同的服务的不一致的监管待遇的关注。当电信服务提供商提供相同的服务,但承担不同的监管负担时,就会出现监管不对称。更广泛的监管、更高的费用和补贴义务可能适用于基于地理(州内与州际)和类型(作为独立服务的电信与作为信息服务的次要元素的电信)的人为服务分类的运营商。此外,根据运营商的历史市场份额和对其市场力量的看法进行分类,可能会出现不一致的监管待遇。现有的“遗留”监管分类已经建立了基于服务的任意二分法,哪个监管机构有管辖权,哪些服务有资格通过优惠的监管待遇来推广,以及运营商和监管机构如何决定分配成本。当利益相关者,如MCI等电信服务提供商,利用立法和监管分类的差异,通过避免监管负担或将支付义务强加给其他运营商来积累财务和竞争优势时,就会出现监管套利。本文将研究旨在利用监管套利的策略,着眼于识别不一致的监管待遇扭曲竞争市场而不抵消公共利益利益的领域。本文的结论是,立法机构和监管机构应消除通过路由和服务分类策略来避免监管负担的机会,除非维持监管不对称的令人信服的理由仍然存在。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Regulatory Arbitrage Strategies and Tactics in Telecommunications
Recently several states have launched investigations of certain MCI telephone call routings based on competitors' claims that the company eliminated or reduced payments it should have made. The MCI investigations may trigger closer scrutiny of numerous strategies and tactics used by telecommunications carriers to reduce the payments they make to other carriers. Also this scrutiny may call attention to how carriers exploit inconsistent regulatory treatment of functionally the same services. Regulatory asymmetry occurs when telecommunications service providers offer identical services, but incur different regulatory burdens. More extensive regulatory oversight, higher fees, and subsidy obligations may apply to carriers based on artificial classifications of services based on geography (intrastate versus interstate) and type (telecommunications as a stand alone service versus one where telecommunications is a minor element of an information service). Additionally inconsistent regulatory treatment may occur based on carrier classifications using historical market share and perceptions of their market power. Existing, "legacy" regulatory classifications have established arbitrary dichotomies based on service, which regulatory agency has jurisdiction, what services qualify for promotion through favorable regulatory treatment, and how carriers and regulators decide to allocate costs. Regulatory arbitrage results when stakeholders, such as telecommunications service providers like MCI, exploit differences in legislative and regulatory classifications to accrue financial and competitive advantages achieved by avoiding regulatory burdens, or by foisting payment obligations onto other carriers. This article will examine tactics designed to exploit regulatory arbitrage with an eye toward identifying areas where inconsistent regulatory treatment distorts the competitive marketplace without offsetting public interest benefits. The paper concludes that legislatures and regulators should eliminate opportunities to avoid regulatory burdens through routing and service classification tactics unless compelling reasons persist for maintaining regulatory asymmetry.
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