{"title":"Prizes of the Canadian Philosophical Association / Prix de l'Association canadienne de philosophie Gagnants 2022 Winners","authors":"Prix de l’essai","doi":"10.1017/s0012217323000033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217323000033","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":84592,"journal":{"name":"Diarrhoea Dialogue","volume":"8 8 1","pages":"393 - 393"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90326022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Metaphysical Foundationalism and the Principle of Sufficient Reason","authors":"Thomas Oberle","doi":"10.1017/S001221732200018X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S001221732200018X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There is a ubiquitous claim in the grounding literature that metaphysical foundationalism violates the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) in virtue of positing a level of ungrounded facts. I argue that foundationalists can accept the PSR if they are willing to replace fundamentality as independence with completeness and deny that ground is a strict partial order. The upshot is that the PSR can be compatible with both metaphysical foundationalism and metaphysical infinitism, and so presupposing this fixed explanatory demand need not beg the question in favour of either view.","PeriodicalId":84592,"journal":{"name":"Diarrhoea Dialogue","volume":"31 1","pages":"421 - 430"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86756607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Limits of Simulation for Understanding Mental Illness: Defending a Steinian Theory of Empathy","authors":"Andrew Molas","doi":"10.1017/S0012217322000270","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217322000270","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I defend Edith Stein's theory of empathy as an alternative to simulation theories of empathy. Simulation theories of empathy involve using one's own cognitive resources to replicate the mental states of others by imagining being in their situation. I argue that this understanding of empathy is problematic within the context of mental healthcare because it can lead to the co-opting and assimilation of another person's experiences. In response, I maintain that Stein's theory is preferable because it involves appreciating others’ experiences as it is for them, and this alternative account of empathy avoids the assimilation of the experiences of others.","PeriodicalId":84592,"journal":{"name":"Diarrhoea Dialogue","volume":"25 1","pages":"395 - 405"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81376917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fictions in Legal Reasoning","authors":"Manish Oza","doi":"10.1017/S0012217322000312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217322000312","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A legal fiction is a knowingly false assumption that is given effect in a legal proceeding and that participants are not permitted to disprove. I offer a semantic pretence theory that shows how fiction-involving legal reasoning works.","PeriodicalId":84592,"journal":{"name":"Diarrhoea Dialogue","volume":"215 1","pages":"451 - 463"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79595351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Gallows Alien: Extending the Concept to Non-Human Organisms","authors":"Caitlin Hamblin-Yule","doi":"10.1017/S0012217322000361","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217322000361","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Immanuel Kant maintained throughout his life that non-human persons likely exist but he failed to specify how we could recognise them. In this article, I argue (a) that non-human organisms can be considered non-human persons if they can be judged as belonging to a species with a moral vocation, and (b) a species can be judged as having a moral vocation if at least one of its members is able to make what I will call a “moral sacrifice” in which that member sacrifices its physical life for the sake of its moral life.","PeriodicalId":84592,"journal":{"name":"Diarrhoea Dialogue","volume":"22 1","pages":"431 - 450"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91147221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Kantian Objectivism and Subject-Relative Well-Being","authors":"Logan Ginther","doi":"10.1017/S0012217322000269","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217322000269","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract When discussing well-being, subject-relative concerns are intuitively important ones. In this article, I argue that Immanuel Kant's theory of well-being can be satisfactorily subject-relative, despite his emphasis on objective moral well-being. Because the specifics of agents’ situations affect agents’ moral endowments, duties regarding moral well-being can be altered for subject-relative reasons. When it comes to thinking about the well-being of others, the important Kantian notion of respect for rational agents ensures that this will be decidedly subject-relative, too, and, what is more, that this will be aimed specifically at natural well-being (happiness).","PeriodicalId":84592,"journal":{"name":"Diarrhoea Dialogue","volume":"15 1","pages":"407 - 419"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85526754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pour une lecture déflationniste du doute cartésien","authors":"F. de Peretti","doi":"10.1017/S0012217322000427","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217322000427","url":null,"abstract":"Résumé L'on considère, selon une interprétation largement soutenue, que nous assistons dans la Méditation première à une montée en puissance du doute reposant sur une efficacité croissante des raisons de douter. Nous suggérons ici que nous pouvons défendre une lecture déflationniste du doute des Méditations en ce que la succession des arguments sceptiques utilisés par Descartes accuse une courbe d'efficacité décroissante. Cette lecture n'est bien évidemment pas sans conséquences, évoquées en conclusion, sur l'interprétation de l'exercice même du doute et, plus fondamentalement, de la doctrine cartésienne de la connaissance.","PeriodicalId":84592,"journal":{"name":"Diarrhoea Dialogue","volume":"68 1","pages":"465 - 491"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89313705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What Can a Constructivist Say About Animal Ethics — Or Any Other Normative Question, for That Matter?","authors":"Guillaume Soucy","doi":"10.1017/S0012217322000397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217322000397","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In Fellow Creatures, Christine Korsgaard claims that human beings ought to treat all sentient animals as ends in themselves. However, in this article, I argue that Korgaard's method goes beyond what a coherent constructivist conception allows, and I claim that we should therefore adopt a Humean rather than a Kantian version of constructivism. I believe that such a conception permits us to hold substantial ethical positions about non-human animals without having to compromise our ontological commitments.","PeriodicalId":84592,"journal":{"name":"Diarrhoea Dialogue","volume":"46 1","pages":"95 - 111"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91385041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"L’écho traumatique des menaces au sein de la famille : reviviscence et après-coup","authors":"P. Roman","doi":"10.3917/dia.237.0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/dia.237.0017","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":84592,"journal":{"name":"Diarrhoea Dialogue","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90224304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}