Georgia law review (Athens, Ga. : 1966)最新文献

{"title":"PROBATION AND MONETARY SANCTIONS IN GEORGIA: EVIDENCE FROM A MULTI-METHOD STUDY.","authors":"Sarah Shannon","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Georgia leads the nation in probation supervision, which has been the subject of recent legislative reforms. Probation supervision is the primary mechanism for monitoring and collecting legal financial obligations (LFOs) from people sentenced in Georgia courts. This Article analyzes how monetary sanctions and probation supervision intersect in Georgia using quantitative data from the Department of Community Supervision as well as interviews with probationers and probation officers gathered as part of the Multi-State Study of Monetary Sanctions between 2015 and 2018. Several key findings emerge: (1) there is substantial variation between judicial districts in the amount of fines and fees ordered to felony probationers in Georgia, with fines and fees in rural areas much higher than those in urban areas; (2) probationers express fear of incarceration solely for lack of ability to pay; (3) probation officers consider collecting LFOs as a distraction from their true mission of public safety; and (4) both probationers and probation officers question the purpose, effectiveness, and fairness of monetary sanctions in Georgia. This Article concludes with a discussion of reforms to date and further options for reform based on the findings from this research.</p>","PeriodicalId":81323,"journal":{"name":"Georgia law review (Athens, Ga. : 1966)","volume":"54 4","pages":"1213-1234"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8059697/pdf/nihms-1686163.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"38899271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing","authors":"Andrew D. Selbst","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2819182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2819182","url":null,"abstract":"Police departments large and small have begun to use data mining techniques to predict the where, when, and who of crime before it occurs. But data mining systems can have a disproportionately adverse impact on vulnerable communities, and predictive policing is no different. Reviewing the technical process of predictive policing, the Article begins by illustrating how use of predictive policing technology will often result in disparate impact on communities of color. After evaluating the possibilities for Fourth Amendment regulation and finding them wanting, the Article turns toward a new regulatory proposal.The Article proposes the use of a rulemaking procedure centered on “discrimination impact assessments.” Predictive policing, like a great deal of data mining solutions, is sold in part as a “neutral” method to counteract unconscious biases. At the moment, however, police departments adopting the technology are not evaluating its potential for a discriminatory impact, which might reproduce or exacerbate the unconscious biases its proponents claim it will cure. Modeled on the environmental impact statements of the National Environmental Policy Act, discrimination impact assessments would require police departments to evaluate the potential discriminatory effects of competing alternative algorithms and to publicly consider mitigation procedures. This regulation balances the need for police expertise in the adoption of new crime control technologies with transparency and public input regarding the potential for harm. Such a public process will also serve to increase trust between police departments and the communities they serve.","PeriodicalId":81323,"journal":{"name":"Georgia law review (Athens, Ga. : 1966)","volume":"55 1","pages":"3373"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79648907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Personal Property Servitudes on the Internet of Things","authors":"Christina Mulligan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2465651","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2465651","url":null,"abstract":"Software and internet connections once were confined to multi-purpose computers housed in rectangular boxes. No longer. Now, small appliances such as thermostats, watches, jewelry, and eyewear are being made available with networking capability. These networked objects make up the growing Internet of Things — pieces of personal property that run software and connect to the global Internet. These products are typically governed by terms of service or end-user license agreements that create restrictions on how products can be used or transferred — restrictions which would be unenforceable if the inside of the product consisted of gears rather than processing chips. This Article explores the differences between digital and analog goods by returning to a nearly century-old question from property law that has remained largely unanswered: why are complex and nonpossessory personal property interests disfavored, while comparative flexibility is permitted in real property? The Article concludes that greater flexibility in property interests is most beneficial when property is distinct, valuable, and rarely encountered. In contrast, greater standardization is appropriate when property is fungible, lacks value, and is casually or frequently interacted with.By establishing a new framework for deciding when property interests should be flexible and when they should be standardized, this Article not only answers a longstanding question from property law, but renders the answer highly relevant to some of the most interesting and novel types of property we encounter today.","PeriodicalId":81323,"journal":{"name":"Georgia law review (Athens, Ga. : 1966)","volume":"13 1","pages":"1121"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90507235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Supreme Court and the Rehabilitative Ideal","authors":"Chad W. Flanders","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2400508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2400508","url":null,"abstract":"Graham v. Florida was a watershed decision, not least because of the centrality of the so-called “rehabilitative ideal” to its holding that life in prison for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes was cruel and unusual. The Court’s emphasis on rehabilitation was surprising both in terms of the Court’s previous decisions on punishment, in which rehabilitation was barely included as a “purpose of punishment,” but also in terms of the history of academic and legislative skepticism if not hostility toward the idea of rehabilitation (which includes two recently decided sentencing cases, Tapia and Pepper). Courts and commentators have struggled to make sense of both the meaning and the scope of Graham’s rehabilitative holding. Their struggle is one about defining how (and whether) rehabilitation should play any substantial role in sentencing. My essay places Graham in the context of the recent history of rehabilitation, and views its attempt to “rehabilitate” rehabilitation in light of that history. The rehabilitative ideal encompasses not just one model, but three: the mostly discredited model of rehabilitation as treatment, a more modest model of rehabilitation as training, and an older model of rehabilitation as reform. Both the language and the result of Graham show it to be squarely in the tradition of the third model, where rehabilitation is not something the state provides, but something the offender is supposed to undergo, through a process of reflection, remorse, and atonement. Rehabilitation as reform is notable because it is compatible with a suspicion that prison in general is a bad place for rehabilitation and that it is unlikely that the state can do anything to positively aid the offender in reforming. At best, the state must get out of the way. Whether we want to extend Graham or reject it depends on whether we find its ideal of rehabilitation as reform appealing.","PeriodicalId":81323,"journal":{"name":"Georgia law review (Athens, Ga. : 1966)","volume":"36 1","pages":"3263"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75309893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Liberty without Capacity: Why States Should Ban Adolescent Driving","authors":"V. Hamilton","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2223571","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2223571","url":null,"abstract":"Car crashes kill more teens each year than any other cause; and of the crashes in which they are involved, teens are overwhelmingly at fault. Teens crash at rates far higher than those of older drivers, and the younger the teen driver, the higher the risk — 16-year-old drivers have crash rates 250% higher than those of 18-year-olds. Driving experience does not explain the difference; younger beginners crash at rates higher than those of older beginners. Instead, younger teens’ increased crash risk results primarily from immature regulatory competence. In other words, the capacities required for driving competence are still immature in adolescence, developing only with time, and age.Driving is thus arguably the greatest public health threat facing U.S. teens. Still, the United States remains the earliest-licensing nation in the developed world, and U.S. teens have a greater risk of being killed or injured in a car crash than do their foreign counterparts. Neither legal academics working in public health law nor those working in adolescent rights have focused attention on adolescent licensure. This article draws from principles of social ecology to explain the many aspects of this public health issue. It interrelates and analyzes research from the social and developmental sciences and accounts for the basic ends of the liberal state, the interests of immature citizens, political challenges, and constitutional boundaries to derive and make a sustained argument for the most effectual legal reforms to which this analysis inexorably points.","PeriodicalId":81323,"journal":{"name":"Georgia law review (Athens, Ga. : 1966)","volume":"61 1","pages":"3367"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76120729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Human Rights and Counterterrorism: A Contradiction or Necessary Bedfellows?","authors":"A. Guiora","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2046215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2046215","url":null,"abstract":"Ten years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, questions remain regarding the relationship between human rights and counterterrorism. The historical track record of the Executive Branch, Supreme Court, and Congress in this vein is troubling. While the contradiction suggested in this Essay's title need not be the case it is, nevertheless, the persistent reality in American history.This Essay assesses the current relationship between human rights and counterterrorism. In doing so, it reflects on wartime measures implemented by presidents throughout U.S. history and recommends a way forward that facilitates more effective protection of human rights without impinging on legitimate national security considerations. Many counterterrorism measures adopted in the aftermath of 9/11, including torture, rendition, indefinite detention, and denial of habeas corpus, reflect a fundamental denial of human rights. Furthermore, evidence that the circumstances do not justify such extraordinary measures illustrate that the tension between human rights and counterterrorism requires constant vigilance. This was recently highlighted when Attorney General Eric Holder suggested that individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism be denied Miranda rights. In recommending “ways forward” this Essay analyzes how operational counterterrorism measures can meet the recommended two-part test of respect for human rights and enhancing national security without unduly minimizing one at the expense of the other. It concludes that crisis points involving national security concerns are precisely when the Judiciary must engage in active judicial review in safeguarding basic rights.","PeriodicalId":81323,"journal":{"name":"Georgia law review (Athens, Ga. : 1966)","volume":"10 1","pages":"3514"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83330395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Playing Well with Others - But Still Winning: Chief Justice Roberts, Precedent, and the Possibilities of a Multi-Member Court","authors":"William D. Araiza","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1758001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1758001","url":null,"abstract":"This Essay, written for the Constitutional Law Roundtable at the 2010 meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools, considers the methods by which a justice inclined to weaken precedent may do so without explicitly overruling cases. Adding to the literature of “stealth overruling,” it considers examples of these methods from the first five years of the Roberts Court. It does not speculate that the Roberts Court, or Chief Justice Roberts himself, is any more inclined than past Courts or justices to overrule (by stealth or otherwise). However, it does suggest that Chief Justice Roberts has employed several methods of implicitly weakening precedents short of explicitly overruling them. These examples suggest that Chief Justice Roberts does know how to engage in stealth overruling when he wants to, and how to make those moves consistent with a formal commitment to judicial humility.","PeriodicalId":81323,"journal":{"name":"Georgia law review (Athens, Ga. : 1966)","volume":"38 1","pages":"1059"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78365521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Congressional End-Run: The Ignored Constraint on Judicial Review","authors":"Luke M. Milligan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1709405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1709405","url":null,"abstract":"This Article identifies an untended connection between the research of legal academics and political scientists. It explains how recent developments in constitutional theory, when read in good light, reveal a gap in the judicial politics literature on Supreme Court decisionmaking. The gap is the “congressional end-run.” End-runs occur when Congress mitigates the policy costs of adverse judicial review through neither formal limits on the Court’s autonomy nor substitution of its constitutional interpretation for that of the Court, but through a different decision which cannot, as a practical if not legal matter, be invalidated by the Court. End-runs come in several forms, including congressional decisions to grant authority to the Executive Branch, to adjust appropriations, to modify certain contingent laws, and to reorient legislation in alternate constitutional clauses. Ignored by political scientists, end-runs undoubtedly constrain the judicial decisionmaking of the strategic Justices assumed by judicial politics scholars. This Article calls on judicial politics scholars to incorporate the end-run into their formal SOP models and related empirical studies. Such incorporation promises to give political scientists a fuller sense of how their strategic Justices interact with Congress in our constitutional democracy.","PeriodicalId":81323,"journal":{"name":"Georgia law review (Athens, Ga. : 1966)","volume":"889 1","pages":"211-276"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85663640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Paradox of Omnipotence: Courts, Constitutions, and Commitments","authors":"David S. Law","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.701561","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.701561","url":null,"abstract":"Sovereigns, like individuals, must sometimes make commitments that limit their freedom of action in order to accomplish their goals. Scholars have observed that constitutional arrangements can, by restricting a sovereign's power, enable the sovereign to make such commitments. The opposite, however, can also be true: constitutional arrangements can and do impede sovereign commitment by entrenching inalienable governmental powers and immunities. This Article explores the nature and origins of the commitment problems that sovereigns face, and the role of courts in solving such problems. It begins by setting forth an analytical distinction between effective and persuasive commitments. Effective commitments are made for the purpose of imposing actual restraint upon the commitment-maker; persuasive commitments, by contrast, are intended not to bind the commitment-maker, but rather to induce some third party to behave a particular way. Each type of commitment, in turn, poses a specific set of challenges for the sovereign or other actor that wishes to commit itself. Of particular relevance to sovereigns are the matching problems of what might be called undercommitment, on the one hand, and overcommitment, on the other. The problem of undercommitment is an acute one for sovereigns: the more powerful the sovereign, the more difficult it may be for the sovereign to make commitments that other actors find credible. At the same time, however, any solution to the problem of undercommitment runs the risk of overcommitment: no sovereign wishes to incapacitate itself to an unforeseen or undesirable extent. Courts, it is argued, have the capacity to assist the sovereign in making commitments that are credible yet do not hobble the sovereign. In doing so, however, courts risk damage to the basis of their own power - namely, their own reputation for rendering fair and efficacious judgments. The Article concludes by suggesting that our Constitution can itself be understood as a form of sovereign commitment - one that is intended both to restrict the sovereign and to persuade the people of the sovereign's legitimacy - and that the doctrine of sovereign immunity compromises both of these goals.","PeriodicalId":81323,"journal":{"name":"Georgia law review (Athens, Ga. : 1966)","volume":"91 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88977835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Birth after death: perpetuities and the new reproductive technologies.","authors":"Sharona Hoffman,&nbsp;Andrew P Moriss","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":81323,"journal":{"name":"Georgia law review (Athens, Ga. : 1966)","volume":"38 2","pages":"575-631"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"26073043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}