Georgia law review (Athens, Ga. : 1966)最新文献

{"title":"Possession as the Root of Title","authors":"R. Epstein","doi":"10.4324/9780203822562-12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203822562-12","url":null,"abstract":"A beautiful sea shell is washed ashore after a storm. A man picks it up and puts it in his pocket. A second man comes along and takes it away from him by force. The first man sues to recover the shell, and he is met with the argument that he never owned it a t all. How does the legal system respond to this claim? How should it respond? The same man finds the same shell, only now the state, through its public processes, comes along and insists that the shell belongs to the common fund. It offers the man nothing for it, claiming that the shell was found by luck and coincidence and not by planned and systematic labor. How does the legal system respond to this claim? How should it respond? The questions just put can recur in a thousand different forms in any organized legal system. The system itself presupposes that there are rights over given things that are vested in certain individuals withir, that system. And the system kiiows fill well that these property rights in things are defined not against the thing, but over the thing and against the rest of the world; that property rights normally entail (roughly) exclusive possession and use of one thing in question and the right to transfer it voluntarily to an0ther.l The exact contours of these rights, however important to basic theory, are not central to the main concern here. The more insistent question is: What principles decide which individuals have ownership rights (whatever they precisely entail) over what things. The question must be distinguished from the related issue which simply asks what are the social or public functions of the institution of ownership. I t could be decided that ownership is necessary to create effective incentives for the development and improvement of property or to reduce or eliminate conflicts between private persons. Yet even if these points are true, such broad justifications for ownership do not solve the more particular question of how given bits of property are matched with given individuals. It is to this question","PeriodicalId":81323,"journal":{"name":"Georgia law review (Athens, Ga. : 1966)","volume":"1 1","pages":"1221"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1979-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91222215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ideology and History","authors":"D. Forte","doi":"10.1057/9781137365330.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137365330.0010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":81323,"journal":{"name":"Georgia law review (Athens, Ga. : 1966)","volume":"176 1","pages":"1501"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1979-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82975909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The right to life.","authors":"G. Fletcher","doi":"10.5840/MONIST198063215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/MONIST198063215","url":null,"abstract":"In the theory of rights we repeatedly encounter the problem of reconcil ing someone's having a right, with his properly suffering damage to the in terest protected by the right. In the case of right to life, we have to assess numerous cases in which individuals are killed or allowed to die, and yet we wish nonetheless to affirm their right to life. These cases include killing an ag gressor in self-defense, accidental homicide, terminating life-sustaining therapy, and capital punishment. Two fashionable ways of reconciling commonplace killing with the right to life will no longer do. One approach is to claim that the right to life is merely a prima facie right; it is subject to being overridden by competing con siderations.1 Even when stripped of confusing associations with principles of proof, the notion of a prima facie right cannot withstand criticism. If someone's right to life prevails over the wishes of those who wish to kill him or her, we hardly would say that the right is merely prima facie. And if the victim's right of defense permits the killing of an aggressor, we are hard pres sed to say that the aggressor's right to life is somehow overridden and thus \"lost\" in the collision with a higher value. It seems that the right remains the same, whether overridden or not.2 Another fashionable argument builds on a theory of forfeiture.3 Aggres sors and criminals supposedly forfeit their right to life; that they have no right to life explains why murderers are properly subject to the death penalty and why some aggressors are subject to being killed in response to their aggres sion. This argument has already encountered considerable scepticism,4 and yet it is so tempting a solution that it reasserts itself.5 One item on our agenda is to rid ourselves of this theory with a more thorough refutation. My program in this paper is to provide an account of how it is that those with a right to life may nonetheless be properly subject to an untimely death. Among the advantages of this account, it avoids the shortcomings of theories that stress either the prima facie nature of rights or the forfeiture of rights through conduct. In thinking about fundamental human rights, such as the rights to life, liberty, private property and privacy, we often encounter the protagonist who wants to know: What is the definition of the right? What precisely is the right holder entitled to claim of other people? Yet no straightforward answer emerges from the quest for definition. The reason is that an adequate analysis of the \"right to life\" requires attention to three distinct questions:","PeriodicalId":81323,"journal":{"name":"Georgia law review (Athens, Ga. : 1966)","volume":"15 1","pages":"1371-94"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1968-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75644562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}