Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)最新文献

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Defending the Democratic Argument for Limitarianism: A Reply to Volacu and Dumitru. 捍卫限制主义的民主论点:对沃拉库和杜米特鲁的回答。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2019-01-01 Epub Date: 2018-10-25 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-018-0030-6
Dick Timmer
{"title":"Defending the Democratic Argument for Limitarianism: A Reply to Volacu and Dumitru.","authors":"Dick Timmer","doi":"10.1007/s11406-018-0030-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11406-018-0030-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this paper, I argue that limitarian policies are a good means to further political equality. Limitarianism, which is a view coined and defended by Robeyns (2017), is a partial view in distributive justice which claims that under non-ideal circumstances it is morally impermissible to be rich. In a recent paper, Volacu and Dumitru (2018) level two arguments against Robeyns' Democratic Argument for limitarianism. The Democratic Argument states that limitarianism is called for given the undermining influence current inequalities in income and wealth have for the value of democracy and political equality. Volacu and Dumitru's Incentive Objection holds that limitarianism places an excessive and inefficient burden on the rich in ensuring political equality. The Efficacy Objection holds that even if limitarianism limits excessive wealth it still fails to ensure the preservation of political equality. In this paper, I will argue that both of these objections fail, but on separate grounds. I argue that the Incentive objection fails because one could appeal to limitarian policies that are different from the ones discussed by Volacu and Dumitru and which escape the problem of reduced productivity. I argue against the Efficacy Objection that limitarian policies are a partial but highly valuable step towards establishing political equality, and that they can and should complement or be complemented by other strategies.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"47 4","pages":"1331-1339"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6695344/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10706671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What Is Unfair about Unequal Brute Luck? An Intergenerational Puzzle. 不平等的蛮力运气有何不妥?代际之谜
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2019-01-01 Epub Date: 2019-01-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-018-00053-5
S J Beard
{"title":"What Is Unfair about Unequal Brute Luck? An Intergenerational Puzzle.","authors":"S J Beard","doi":"10.1007/s11406-018-00053-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-00053-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>According to Luck egalitarians, fairness requires us to bring it about that nobody is worse off than others where this results from brute bad luck, but not where they choose or deserve to be so. In this paper, I consider one type of brute bad luck that appears paradigmatic of what a Luck Egalitarian ought to be most concerned about, namely that suffered by people who are born to badly off parents and are less well off as a result. However, when we consider what is supposedly unfair about this kind of unequal brute luck, luck egalitarians face a dilemma. According to the standard account of luck egalitarianism, differential brute luck is unfair because of its effects on the distribution of goods. Yet, where some parents are worse off because they have chosen to be imprudent, it may be impossible to neutralize these effects without creating a distribution that seems at least as unfair. This, I argue, is problematic for luck egalitarianism. I, therefore, explore two alternative views that can avoid this problem. On the first of these, proposed by Shlomi Segall, the distributional effects of unequal brute luck are unfair only when they make a situation more unequal, but not when they make it more equal. On the second, it is the unequal brute luck itself, rather than its distributional effects, that is unfair. I conclude with some considerations in favour of this second view, while accepting that both are valid responses to the problem I describe.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"47 4","pages":"1043-1051"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-018-00053-5","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138814036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Is Affectivity Passive or Active? 情感是被动的还是主动的?
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2018-01-01 Epub Date: 2017-12-05 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-017-9926-9
Robert Zaborowski
{"title":"Is Affectivity Passive or Active?","authors":"Robert Zaborowski","doi":"10.1007/s11406-017-9926-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9926-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this paper I adopt Aquinas' explanation of passivity and activity by means of acts remaining in the agent and acts passing over into external matter. I use it to propose a divide between immanent-type and transcendent-type acts. I then touch upon a grammatical distinction between three kinds of verbs. To argue for the activity and passivity of affectivity I refer to the group that includes acts of transcendent-type and whose verbs in both voices possess affective meaning. In the end I focus on cases in which an act of affective <i>f</i>-ing is mirrored in its object as being affectively <i>f</i>-ed.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"46 3","pages":"541-554"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-017-9926-9","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"36431388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Break-Up Check: Exploring Romantic Love through Relationship Terminations. 分手检查:通过关系终止探索浪漫爱情。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2018-01-01 Epub Date: 2017-12-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-017-9935-8
Pilar Lopez-Cantero
{"title":"The Break-Up Check: Exploring Romantic Love through Relationship Terminations.","authors":"Pilar Lopez-Cantero","doi":"10.1007/s11406-017-9935-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9935-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>People who experience love often experience break-ups as well. However, philosophers of love have paid little attention to the phenomenon. Here, I address that gap by looking at the grieving process which follows unchosen relationship terminations. I ask which one is the loss that, if it were to be recovered, would stop grief or make it unwarranted. Is it the beloved, the reciprocation of love, the relationship, or all of it? By answering this question I not only provide with an insight on the nature of break-ups, but also make a specific claim about the nature of love. I argue that the object that is universally lost in all break-ups is a person with certain intrinsic qualities, who is in a relationship characterised by certain shared activities and recognized as romantic. That means that, at least in romantic terminations, the beloved and the relationship are not independent objects of grief. So, plausibly, they may not independent objects of value in love. Hence, those who state otherwise (within the property view and the relationship view) should face up to this objection coming from the study of break-ups.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"46 3","pages":"689-703"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-017-9935-8","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"36429375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Tensed Emotions, Evolution, and Time. 紧张的情绪、进化和时间。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2018-01-01 Epub Date: 2017-11-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-017-9927-8
Olley Pearson
{"title":"Tensed Emotions, Evolution, and Time.","authors":"Olley Pearson","doi":"10.1007/s11406-017-9927-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9927-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Prior showed that one could be relieved that the exams were over and not that they finished before a certain date or before a certain entity. One might think that these differences in relief are responsive to differences in the world so that there is more to the exams being over than them finishing before a certain date or entity: there is a metaphysical tense. However, some have argued that these issues do not have any implications for the metaphysics of time because they can be explained with an evolutionary account: emotions can have a causal influence on events that come after them but not on events that come before them and so it evolutionarily advantageous that emotions that concern events after them feel and evaluate differently to those that concern events before them. Here I will argue that to date these evolutionary accounts remain insufficient and emotions continue to put pressure on those who deny there is a metaphysical tense. Prior's case shows that tensed and tenseless emotions differ in appropriateness. This asymmetry of value is not explained by the evolutionary account because whether or not an emotion is tensed is quite independent of whether it comes before or after something.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"46 2","pages":"401-409"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-017-9927-8","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"36431386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A New Universal Bundle Theory. 一个新的普遍束理论。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2018-01-01 Epub Date: 2017-12-18 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-017-9937-6
Ruoyu Zhang
{"title":"A New Universal Bundle Theory.","authors":"Ruoyu Zhang","doi":"10.1007/s11406-017-9937-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9937-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Universal Bundle Theory (UBT) holds that objects are fundamentally identical with bundles of universals. Universals are multiply instantiable properties. One popular objection to UBT concerns the possibility of distinct indiscernibles. There are mainly two replies in the literature, corresponding to two representative UBTs, which I shall call the Identity-View and the Instance-View. Each view faces serious problems. This paper proposes a new version of UBT and argues that it is better than these other two versions.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"46 2","pages":"473-486"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-017-9937-6","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"36431387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Are Lovers Ever One? Reconstructing the Union Theory of Love. 恋人是一体的吗?重构爱的结合论。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2018-01-01 Epub Date: 2017-06-09 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-017-9860-x
Elke Elisabeth Schmidt
{"title":"Are Lovers Ever One? Reconstructing the Union Theory of Love.","authors":"Elke Elisabeth Schmidt","doi":"10.1007/s11406-017-9860-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9860-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Current analytical philosophies of romantic love tend to identify the essence of such love with one specific element, such as concern for the beloved person, valuing the beloved person or the union between the lovers. This paper will deal with different forms of the union theory of love which takes love to be the physical, psychic or ontological union of two persons. Prima facie, this theory might appear to be implausible because it has several contra-intuitive implications, and yet, I submit, it is more coherent and attractive than it seems to be. I shall distinguish three specific models and thereby offer a differentiated account of the union theory which has not previously been provided in the literature (1). I will claim that two of these models (the strong ontological model and the striving model) should be rejected (2). I shall then defend the third model (the moderate ontological model) against certain possible objections (3); but nevertheless, I shall conclude by showing how this model, too, faces further significant objections which ultimately expose the limits of the union theory of love (4). In conclusion, I will sketch the outlines of a non-reductive cluster theory of love.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"46 3","pages":"705-719"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-017-9860-x","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"36429376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Predicting Divine Action. 预言神的行动。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2018-01-01 Epub Date: 2018-02-15 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-018-9947-z
Hugh Burling
{"title":"Predicting Divine Action.","authors":"Hugh Burling","doi":"10.1007/s11406-018-9947-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-9947-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article sets out a formal procedure for determining the probability that God would do a specified action, using our moral knowledge and understanding God as a perfect being. To motivate developing the procedure I show how natural theology - design arguments, the problems of evil and divine hiddenness, and the treatment of miracles and religious experiences as evidence for claims about God - routinely appeals to judgments involving these probabilities. To set out the procedure, I describe a decision-theoretic model for practical reasoning which is deontological so as to appeal to theists, but is designed not to presuppose any substantive moral commitments, and to accommodate normative and non-normative uncertainty. Then I explain how judgments about what we probably ought to do can be transformed into judgments about what God would probably do. Then I show the usefulness of the procedure by describing how it can help structure discussions in natural theology and a-theology, and how it offers an attractive alternative to 'skeptical theism'.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"46 4","pages":"785-801"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-018-9947-z","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"36748502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Mistake is to Myth What Pretense is to Fiction: A Reply to Goodman. 错误之于神话就像虚伪之于小说:对古德曼的回复。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2017-01-01 Epub Date: 2017-03-08 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-017-9812-5
Björn Lundgren
{"title":"Mistake is to Myth What Pretense is to Fiction: A Reply to Goodman.","authors":"Björn Lundgren","doi":"10.1007/s11406-017-9812-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9812-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this reply I defend Kripke's creationist thesis for mythical objects (<i>Reference and Existence</i>, 2013) against Jeffrey Goodman's counter-argument to the thesis (\"Creatures of fiction, objects of myth\", <i>Analysis, 74</i>(1), 35-40, 2014). I argue that Goodman has mistaken the basis for when mythical abstracta are created. Contrary to Goodman I show that, as well as how, Kripke's theory consistently retains the analogy between creation of mythical objects and creation of fictional objects, while also explaining in what way they differ.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"45 3","pages":"1275-1282"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-017-9812-5","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"36432033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Analytic Pragmatism and Universal LX Vocabulary. 分析实用主义与通用LX词汇。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2017-01-01 Epub Date: 2017-08-24 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-017-9866-4
Richard Samuels, Kevin Scharp
{"title":"Analytic Pragmatism and Universal LX Vocabulary.","authors":"Richard Samuels,&nbsp;Kevin Scharp","doi":"10.1007/s11406-017-9866-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9866-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In his recent John Locke Lectures - published as <i>Between Saying and Doing</i> - Brandom extends and refines his views on the nature of language and philosophy by developing a position that he calls <i>Analytic Pragmatism</i>. Although Brandom's project bears on an extraordinarily rich array of different philosophical issues, we focus here on the contention that certain vocabularies have a privileged status within our linguistic practices, and that when adequately understood, the practices in which these vocabularies figure can help furnish us with an account of semantic intentionality. Brandom's claim is that such vocabularies are privileged because they are a species of what he calls <i>universal LX vocabulary</i> -roughly, vocabulary whose mastery is implicit in any linguistic practice whatsoever. We show that, contrary to Brandom's claim, logical vocabulary per se fails to satisfy the conditions that must be met for something to count as universal LX vocabulary. Further, we show that exactly analogous considerations undermine his claim that modal vocabulary is universal LX. If our arguments are sound, then, contrary to what Brandom maintains, intentionality cannot be explicated as a \"pragmatically mediated semantic phenomenon\", at any rate not of the sort that he proposes.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"45 4","pages":"1803-1827"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-017-9866-4","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"36431384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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