{"title":"Russell Contra Sense/Reference, the ‘Mont Blanc’ Correspondence","authors":"Clarence L. Hay","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2022.2153214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2022.2153214","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT It is argued that Russell before 1905 saw no value in Frege's sense/reference distinction. This is clearest in the Mont Blanc correspondence. It is argued that Russell and Frege failed to engage because Frege lacked a grasp on the internal/external relations distinction. For Russell sense is either an external relation, objectionably separating out thought and reference, or an internal relation, so what is thought is altered such that we do not know what we are talking about. The novelty of the present paper lies in the arrangement of the parts and the claim that Russellian propositions are not made up of the things themselves but of transparent representatives thereof.","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47933309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How to Distinguish Simple Objectless Ideas","authors":"J. Claas","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2022.2142462","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2022.2142462","url":null,"abstract":"Bernard Bolzano offers a criterion of individuation for ideas, according to which ideas are distinct if and only if they represent different objects or are composed differently. It fails to individuate ideas that are both simple and fail to represent, in particular syncategorematic ideas and logical constants. However, Bolzano also provides the means to close this gap. He suggests that we can distinguish ideas if they are not substitutable for each other in propositions, which we can, in turn, distinguish in terms of their truth-values. This paper explicates this suggestion and develops it into an improved individuation criterion for ideas: ideas also are distinct if we cannot replace them for one another in propositions salva veritate.","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43147566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"John von Neumann’s Discovery of the 2nd Incompleteness Theorem","authors":"G. Formica","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2022.2137324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2022.2137324","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Shortly after Kurt Gödel had announced an early version of the 1st incompleteness theorem, John von Neumann wrote a letter to inform him of a remarkable discovery, i.e. that the consistency of a formal system containing arithmetic is unprovable, now known as the 2nd incompleteness theorem. Although today von Neumann’s proof of the theorem is considered lost, recent literature has explored many of the issues surrounding his discovery. Yet, one question still awaits a satisfactory answer: how did von Neumann achieve his result, knowing as little as he seemingly did about the 1st incompleteness theorem? In this article, I shall advance a conjectural argument to answer this question, after having rejected the argument widely shared in the literature and having analyzed the relevant documents surrounding his discovery. The argument I shall advance strictly links two of the three letters written by von Neumann to Gödel in the late 1930 and early 1931 (i.e. respectively that of November 20, 1930 and that of January 12, 1931) and finds the key for von Neumann’s discovery in his prompt understanding of the Gödel sentence A – as the documents refer to it – as expressing consistency for a formal system that contains arithmetic.","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":"44 1","pages":"66 - 90"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44755081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Kant’s Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit and Proof-theoretic Semantics","authors":"Tiago Rezende de Castro Alves","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2022.2142461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2022.2142461","url":null,"abstract":"According to Schroeder-Heister 2018, proof-theoretic semantics is ‘an alternative to truth-condition semantics. It is based on the fundamental assumption that the central notion in terms of which meanings are assigned to certain expressions of our language, in particular to logical constants, is that of proof rather than truth. In this sense proof-theoretic semantics is semantics in terms of proof. Proof-theoretic semantics also means the semantics of proofs, i.e. the semantics of entities which describe how we arrive at certain assertions given certain assumptions.' This text advocates that proof-theoretic semantics, as described above, was an approach to semantical issues in logic that appeared in mainstream philosophical literature at least a couple of centuries before the tradition of general proof theory (cf. Prawitz 1971) came into being. This is done by means of an interpretive analysis of Kant’s 1762 essay Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren, in which two theses are argued: first, that the issue of justifying the logical validity of inferences is approached by Kant in this text, in a strong sense, in terms of proofs; and second, that the purpose of his effort is to establish a point concerning the semantical equivalence between certain distinct valid inferences.","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":"44 1","pages":"273 - 286"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59177883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ramsey's Lost Counterfactual","authors":"Caterina Sisti","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2022.2110011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2022.2110011","url":null,"abstract":"In contemporary works on conditionals, the Ramsey test is a procedure for the evaluation of conditional sentences. There are several versions of the test, all inspired by a footnote by the British philosopher and mathematician Frank Ramsey, in his General Propositions and Causality. However, no study on Ramsey's own account of conditionals has been put forth so far. Furthermore, the footnote seems to cover indicative conditionals only, and this has led to the belief that no account of counterfactuals can be found in Ramsey's work. In this paper, I recover Ramsey's account of counterfactuals and show that it is sketched in the footnote too. The result is a well-developed account of counterfactuals that resembles many contemporary ones. But Ramsey uses the same approach also for other types of conditionals, and this casts doubts on the current criteria for the classification of this type of sentences.","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":"44 1","pages":"311 - 326"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46702236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lvov-Warsaw School. Past and Present Logic","authors":"K. Gan-Krzywoszyńska, P. Leśniewski","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2022.2114059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2022.2114059","url":null,"abstract":"Lvov-Warsaw School. Past and Present Logic, by Á. Garrido and U. Wybraniec-Skardowska, Studies in Universal Logic, Springer Birkhäuser, 2018, xviii+ 815 pp., EUR 58.84 (Hardcover Book), ISBN: 978-3-319-65429-4, EUR 53.49 (Softcover Book), ISBN: 978-3-030-09740-0, EUR 42.79 (eBook), ISBN: 978-3-319-65430-0. Reviewed by K. GAN-KRZYWOSZYŃSKA and P. LEŚNIEWSKI, Faculty of Philosophy, Adam Mickiewicz University, ul. Szamarzewskiego 89C, 60-568 Poznań, Poland, katarzyna.gan-krzywoszynska@amu.edu.pl, grus@amu.edu.pl","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":"44 1","pages":"343 - 349"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49074692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Modal Homotopy Type Theory. The Prospect of a New Logic for Philosophy","authors":"A. Klev, C. Zwanziger","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2022.2107383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2022.2107383","url":null,"abstract":"Published in History and Philosophy of Logic (Vol. 44, No. 3, 2023)","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":"405 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138506633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Bounds of Transcendental Logic","authors":"S. Kovač","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2022.2078596","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2022.2078596","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":"44 1","pages":"107 - 110"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42197917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number","authors":"Richard Lawrence","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2022.2080373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2022.2080373","url":null,"abstract":"project to provide a new for the philosophy of number inspired by the idea that numbers are magnitudes . Hossack advocates understanding magnitudes as properties of , a which pluralities, continua, and series a natural is a property of a plurality, a real is a property of a continuum, and an ordinal is a property of a series. The out a modern theory of quantity and magnitude, based on the ancient theory of quantity in and in order to argue that we can have a priori knowledge of the natural numbers, the real numbers, and the ordinals. It is a refreshing and innovative attempt at that longstanding goal.","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":"43 1","pages":"404 - 406"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41881465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Essays on Argumentation in Antiquity","authors":"M. Scanlan","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2022.2063669","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2022.2063669","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":"43 1","pages":"391 - 394"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48412475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}