Russell Contra Sense/Reference, the ‘Mont Blanc’ Correspondence

IF 0.5 3区哲学 Q3 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

History and Philosophy of Logic Pub Date : 2022-12-12 DOI:10.1080/01445340.2022.2153214

Clarence L. Hay

引用次数: 0

Abstract

ABSTRACT It is argued that Russell before 1905 saw no value in Frege's sense/reference distinction. This is clearest in the Mont Blanc correspondence. It is argued that Russell and Frege failed to engage because Frege lacked a grasp on the internal/external relations distinction. For Russell sense is either an external relation, objectionably separating out thought and reference, or an internal relation, so what is thought is altered such that we do not know what we are talking about. The novelty of the present paper lies in the arrangement of the parts and the claim that Russellian propositions are not made up of the things themselves but of transparent representatives thereof.

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Russell Contra Sense/Reference，“勃朗峰”通信

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来源期刊

History and Philosophy of Logic 综合性期刊-科学史与科学哲学

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

>12 weeks

期刊介绍： History and Philosophy of Logic contains articles, notes and book reviews dealing with the history and philosophy of logic. ’Logic’ is understood to be any volume of knowledge which was regarded as logic at the time in question. ’History’ refers back to ancient times and also to work in this century; however, the Editor will not accept articles, including review articles, on very recent work on a topic. ’Philosophy’ refers to broad and general questions: specialist articles which are now classed as ’philosophical logic’ will not be published. The Editor will consider articles on the relationship between logic and other branches of knowledge, but the component of logic must be substantial. Topics with no temporal specification are to be interpreted both historically and philosophically. Each topic includes its own metalogic where appropriate.