History and Philosophy of Logic最新文献

{"title":"Logic in Question. Talks from the Annual Sorbonne Logic Workshop (2011–2019)","authors":"G. Guibert, B. Sauzay","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2023.2251827","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2023.2251827","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43493050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Aristotle's Proofs Through the Impossible in Prior Analytics 1.15","authors":"Riccardo Zanichelli","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2023.2241183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2023.2241183","url":null,"abstract":"In Prior Analytics 1.15, Aristotle attempts to give a proof through the impossible of Barbara, Celarent, Darii, and Ferio with an assertoric first premiss, a contingent second premiss, and a possible conclusion. These proofs have been controversial since antiquity. I shall show that they are valid, and that Aristotle is able to explain them by relying on two meta-syllogistic lemmas on the nature of possibility interpreted as syntactic consistency. It will turn out that Aristotle's proofs are not of the intended schemata. I shall investigate some of the results that the impact of this reconstruction on the modal syllogistic has: the relationship between Aristotle's syllogistic and the logics of relevance; the value of Aristotle's requirement that universal affirmative propositions be taken ‘absolutely’; the destruction of many Aristotelian proofs; the recovery of certain principles of modal opposition from a charge of inconsistency.","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45800094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Arthur Prior's Proofs of the Necessities of Identity and Difference","authors":"Nils Kürbis","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2023.2237758","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2023.2237758","url":null,"abstract":"This paper draws attention to a proof of the necessity of identity given by Arthur Prior. In its simplicity it is comparable to a proof of Quine’s, popularised by Kripke, but it is slightly di ff erent. Prior’s Polish notation is transcribed into more familiar idiom. Prior’s proof is followed by a proof of the necessity of di ff erence, possibly the first such proof in the literature, which is also repeated here and transcribed. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of Prior’s views on identity and di ff erence over time.","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48452942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Logicism and Principle of Tolerance: Carnap’s Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics*","authors":"Stefano Domingues Stival","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2023.2230103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2023.2230103","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this paper, the connection between logicism and the principle of tolerance in Carnap’s philosophy of logic and mathematics is to be presented in terms of the history of its development. Such development is conditioned by two lines of criticism to Carnap’s attempt to combine Logicism and Conventionalism, the first of which comes from Gödel, the second from Alfred Tarski. The presentation will take place in three steps. First, the Logicism of Carnap before the publication of The Logical Syntax of Language will be analyzed in its main features. Second, the relationship between Logicism and the Principle of Tolerance at the time of the publication of Logical Syntax, and thirdly, in the so-called semantical phase of Carnap’s thought will be examined. On the basis of the two preceding points, we will then critically analyze two interpretations of the possibility to maintain a philosophical position like that of Carnap nowadays.","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49303561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An Enhanced Account of Relative Identity: Double-Reference Starting Point and Dual-Track Feature","authors":"B. Mou","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2023.2229611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2023.2229611","url":null,"abstract":"This article gives a holistic re-examination of the semantic content and syntactic structure of the concept of relative identity: it suggests and explains an expanded and enhanced dual-track characterization ofrelativeidentity.Itisexpandedinthissense:itsduecoverageisnot narrowlyrestrictedtothe equal-status caseof identity statements(the symmetric case for identity simplex) but also includes the category-assimilating case (the asymmetric case for identity complex), both of which are unified by the shared semantic core content of relative identity. It is enhanced in this sense: it is intended to give a more refined characterization of relative identity for the sake of enhancing our understanding of the structure and content of real-life relative-identity statements in people’s basic employment of language in view of the relation between thought, language, and the world.","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46521994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Connexivity in Aristotle’s Logic","authors":"Fabian Ruge","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2023.2203984","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2023.2203984","url":null,"abstract":"At APr 2.4 57a36–13, Aristotle presents a notorious reductio argument in which he derives the claim ‘If B is not large, B is large’ and calls that result impossible. Aristotle is thus committed to some form of connexivity and this paper argues that his commitment is to a strong form of connexivity which excludes even cases in which ‘B is large’ is necessary. It is further argued that Aristotle’s view of connexivity is best understood as arising from his analysis of affirmation and negation in terms of combination and separation: a proposition that separates two terms cannot entail a proposition that combines the same two terms. In order to motivate this account of connexivity, this paper interprets Aristotle as emphasising the predicative structure, especially the copulae, of the argument’s component propositions. The arguments for this are based on a consideration of the larger context of APr 2.2–4. A reconstruction of the argument using propositional variables does not fully capture Aristotle’s intentions.","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43064935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An Axiomatic System Based on Ladd-Franklin's Antilogism","authors":"Fangzhou Xu","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2023.2207245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2023.2207245","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41871628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Brouwer's Intuition of Twoity and Constructions in Separable Mathematics","authors":"Bruno Bentzen","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2023.2210908","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2023.2210908","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45473304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dashtakī's Solution to the Liar Paradox: A Synthesis of the Earlier Solutions Proposed by Ṭūsī and Samarqandī","authors":"Mohammad Saleh Zarepour","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2023.2210918","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2023.2210918","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractṢadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī (d. 1498) has proposed a solution to the liar paradox according to which the liar sentence is a self-referential sentence in which the predicate ‘false’ is iterated. Discussing the conditions for the truth-aptness of the sentences with nested and iterated instances of the predicates ‘true’ and/or ‘false’, Dashtakī argued that the liar sentence is not truth-apt at all. In the tradition of Arabic logic, the central elements of Dashtakī's solution—the self-referentiality of the liar sentence and the implicit iteration of the predicate ‘false’—were initially highlighted in two earlier solutions proposed by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274) and Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 1322), respectively. Here I investigate all three solutions and show that Dashtakī's solution can be taken as a synthesis of the other two. None of these solutions seems to be convincing at the end of the day. Nevertheless, all of them include significant logical and philosophical insights. In particular, although Dashtakī's solution is not itself compelling, it is only a few steps away from a promising solution. The appendix to this paper includes translations of the relevant passages.Keywords: The liar paradoxArabic logical-Dashtakīal-Ṭusīal-Samarqandī AcknowledgementsI am thankful to Reza Pourjavady for insightful discussions we had about al-Shīrāzī, Ibn Kammuna, and Dashtakī, and to Stephen Read for his extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 For a classification of different families of solutions to the liar paradox in the tradition of Arabic logic, see Zarepour Citation2021, secs. 1–2.2 To the best of my knowledge, the earliest study of Dashtakī's solution in the secondary literature is provided by Miller Citation1989. A more detailed analysis of this solution has recently been offered by El-Rouayheb Citation2020.3 It is more precise if we talk about ‘the liar sentences’ instead of ‘the liar sentence’. However, for the sake of simplicity I use only the latter. Almost all the solutions that are studied in this paper are concerned, in the first place, with the liar sentence ‘every sentence I say at this moment is false’. The contextual assumption which guarantees that the latter sentence is indeed a liar sentence is that that sentence is said by someone who does not say any other sentence at the moment of saying that sentence.4 Abharī's solution is analysed and reconstructed by Zarepour Citation2021. A discussion of Ṭūsī's commentary on Abharī's solution can be found in Alwishah and Sanson Citation2009, sec. 3.5 A truth-apt sentence is capable of having a truth value. It can be either true or false. Consequently, if a sentence is not truth-apt, it has no truth-value. It can be neither true nor false.6 al-Ṭūsī Citation1974, 236, ll. 3–4.7 al-Ṭūsī Citation1974, 237, l. 4.8 In contemporary versions of the correspondence theory of truth, corr","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135791982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Arthur N. Prior on the Labours of Ł3 Conjunctions","authors":"J. J. Joaquin, Peter Eldridge-Smith","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2023.2211311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2023.2211311","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43004948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}