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Time-dependent Stackelberg protection location games 时间依赖的Stackelberg保护位置游戏
IF 0.8 4区 管理学
Operations Research Letters Pub Date : 2025-03-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2025.107278
Lotte van Aken, Loe Schlicher , Marco Slikker
{"title":"Time-dependent Stackelberg protection location games","authors":"Lotte van Aken,&nbsp;Loe Schlicher ,&nbsp;Marco Slikker","doi":"10.1016/j.orl.2025.107278","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.orl.2025.107278","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a Stackelberg game in which a government positions rapid response teams and thereafter a terrorist attacks a location on a line segment. We assume the damage associated to such an attack to be time dependent. We show that there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that balances the possible damage on all intervals of the line segment that result from positioning the rapid response teams. We discuss implications for an instance of the model.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":54682,"journal":{"name":"Operations Research Letters","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 107278"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143703946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Positivity of incomplete cooperative games revisited 重新审视不完全合作博弈的积极性
IF 0.8 4区 管理学
Operations Research Letters Pub Date : 2025-03-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2025.107277
Martin Černý
{"title":"Positivity of incomplete cooperative games revisited","authors":"Martin Černý","doi":"10.1016/j.orl.2025.107277","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.orl.2025.107277","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider incomplete cooperative games, where only some coalitions' values are specified and others remain indeterminate. Focusing on <em>positive extensions</em>—fully defined cooperative games that agree with the partial data and have nonnegative dividends—we introduce a novel, two-stage dividend-assignment procedure that fully characterizes all such extensions. Our method offers a general criterion for positivity-extendability, introduces an explicit lower bound game, and provides an understanding of the structure of extreme points in the extension set. These contributions significantly expand the toolkit for theoretical analyses and practical computations of incomplete cooperative games, and also shed new light on properties of classical cooperative games.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":54682,"journal":{"name":"Operations Research Letters","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 107277"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143609251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
New axiomatizations of the Priority value for cooperative games with priority structure 具有优先级结构的合作博弈优先级值的新公理化
IF 0.8 4区 管理学
Operations Research Letters Pub Date : 2025-03-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2025.107266
Songtao He, Erfang Shan, Yuxin Sun
{"title":"New axiomatizations of the Priority value for cooperative games with priority structure","authors":"Songtao He,&nbsp;Erfang Shan,&nbsp;Yuxin Sun","doi":"10.1016/j.orl.2025.107266","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.orl.2025.107266","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The principle of gain-loss imposes that whenever the total worth generated does not change, a player can only gain at the expense of another one. In this paper we provide two new axiomatizations of the Priority value using the axiom of gain-loss and the other standard properties serving as axiomatizations of the Shapley value. Also, we introduce the axiom of equal treatment of priority players among necessary players and we show that this axiom, jointly with the standard properties of additivity, null player and priority player out, characterizes the Priority value without relying on efficiency. In addition, we obtain a charaterization of the Priority value inspired by a more general result for the weighted Priority values in Béal et al. (2023) <span><span>[2]</span></span>.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":54682,"journal":{"name":"Operations Research Letters","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 107266"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143534508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Erratum to “Cooperative equilibria of strategy-form games with both nontransferable and transferable utilities” [Oper. Res. Lett. 54 (2024) 107109] 对“具有不可转移效用和可转移效用的策略形式博弈的合作均衡”的勘误[op。附编第54(2024)107109条]
IF 0.8 4区 管理学
Operations Research Letters Pub Date : 2025-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2025.107254
Zhe Yang , Xinyu Yang
{"title":"Erratum to “Cooperative equilibria of strategy-form games with both nontransferable and transferable utilities” [Oper. Res. Lett. 54 (2024) 107109]","authors":"Zhe Yang ,&nbsp;Xinyu Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.orl.2025.107254","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.orl.2025.107254","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We correct an error in the statement of Theorem 3.2. Moreover, we correct some typos.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":54682,"journal":{"name":"Operations Research Letters","volume":"59 ","pages":"Article 107254"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143508642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Finite customer-pool queues 有限客户池队列
IF 0.8 4区 管理学
Operations Research Letters Pub Date : 2025-02-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2025.107267
Onno Boxma , Offer Kella , Michel Mandjes
{"title":"Finite customer-pool queues","authors":"Onno Boxma ,&nbsp;Offer Kella ,&nbsp;Michel Mandjes","doi":"10.1016/j.orl.2025.107267","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.orl.2025.107267","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper we consider an M/G/1-type queue fed by a finite customer-pool. In terms of transforms, we characterize the time-dependent distribution of the number of customers and the workload, as well as the associated waiting times.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":54682,"journal":{"name":"Operations Research Letters","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 107267"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2025-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143534455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Offline expansion strategy of E-tailers as suppliers for brick-and-mortar stores 电子零售商作为实体店供应商的线下扩张策略
IF 0.8 4区 管理学
Operations Research Letters Pub Date : 2025-02-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2025.107276
Wen He , Lu Wang , Qianbo Yin
{"title":"Offline expansion strategy of E-tailers as suppliers for brick-and-mortar stores","authors":"Wen He ,&nbsp;Lu Wang ,&nbsp;Qianbo Yin","doi":"10.1016/j.orl.2025.107276","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.orl.2025.107276","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>E-commerce giants have recently ventured into offline retail by serving as suppliers for brick-and-mortar stores. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretical model to investigate the economic rationale behind the strategy and its impacts on online and offline retail. We find that an offline monopolist will always have an incentive to participate in the e-tailer's offline expansion initiative, but may be deterred due to competition. Under certain conditions, the e-tailer prefers supplying third-party retailers over opening its own store.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":54682,"journal":{"name":"Operations Research Letters","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 107276"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2025-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143534454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Single sample prophet inequality for uniform matroids of rank 2 秩为2的一致拟阵的单样本预言不等式
IF 0.8 4区 管理学
Operations Research Letters Pub Date : 2025-02-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2025.107257
Kanstantsin Pashkovich, Alice Sayutina
{"title":"Single sample prophet inequality for uniform matroids of rank 2","authors":"Kanstantsin Pashkovich,&nbsp;Alice Sayutina","doi":"10.1016/j.orl.2025.107257","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.orl.2025.107257","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the prophet inequality when the gambler has an access only to a single sample from each distribution. Rubinstein, Wang and Weinberg showed that an optimal guarantee of 1/2 can be achieved when the underlying matroid has rank 1, i.e. in the single choice case. We show that this guarantee can be achieved also for a uniform matroid of rank 2, and we show that this is best possible guarantee among deterministic mechanisms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":54682,"journal":{"name":"Operations Research Letters","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 107257"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2025-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143512326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Arrival timing game for future limited items and full capacity announcement 未来有限物品的到达时间游戏和满额公告
IF 0.8 4区 管理学
Operations Research Letters Pub Date : 2025-02-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2025.107265
Bara Kim , Geofferey Jiyun Kim
{"title":"Arrival timing game for future limited items and full capacity announcement","authors":"Bara Kim ,&nbsp;Geofferey Jiyun Kim","doi":"10.1016/j.orl.2025.107265","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.orl.2025.107265","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the arrival timing problem, where customers compete to arrive earlier in order to secure one of a limited number of items that will be sold in the future. We derive the formulas for the unique Nash equilibrium in each scenario, with and without a full-capacity announcement. With the full-capacity announcement alone, it is possible to enhance both the expected social benefit and the expected profit under optimal pricing to reach the ideal level achievable by centralized coordination.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":54682,"journal":{"name":"Operations Research Letters","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 107265"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2025-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143534506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal retail pricing, interest rate, and interest allocation ratio decisions in an online platform-assisted financing system 在线平台辅助融资系统的最优零售定价、利率和利率分配比例决策
IF 0.8 4区 管理学
Operations Research Letters Pub Date : 2025-02-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2025.107268
Dianyao Kang , Mingming Leng
{"title":"Optimal retail pricing, interest rate, and interest allocation ratio decisions in an online platform-assisted financing system","authors":"Dianyao Kang ,&nbsp;Mingming Leng","doi":"10.1016/j.orl.2025.107268","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.orl.2025.107268","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine an online financing system involving a platform, a bank, and a retailer, in which the bank makes the optimal interest rate decision before the bank-platform negotiation for the interest allocation ratio (scenario 1) or after the interest allocation ratio negotiation (scenario 2). We find that the retailer's sales and profits in scenario 1 are higher than those in scenario 2. Moreover, if the referral fee rate increases, the system-wide profit and the system efficiency for scenario 1 increase but those for scenario 2 decrease.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":54682,"journal":{"name":"Operations Research Letters","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 107268"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2025-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143510793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategyproof and budget-balanced mechanisms for assembly 无战略约束和预算平衡的装配机制
IF 0.8 4区 管理学
Operations Research Letters Pub Date : 2025-02-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2025.107256
Soumendu Sarkar
{"title":"Strategyproof and budget-balanced mechanisms for assembly","authors":"Soumendu Sarkar","doi":"10.1016/j.orl.2025.107256","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.orl.2025.107256","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Assembly problems involve exchange among a buyer and multiple sellers. The buyer wants to purchase possibly multiple items and sellers own one item each. We characterize the class of strategyproof, individually rational and budget balanced mechanisms for this problem when agents have private valuations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":54682,"journal":{"name":"Operations Research Letters","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 107256"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2025-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143477991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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