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The Psychologist’s Green Thumb 心理学家的绿拇指
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-09-08 DOI: 10.1017/psa.2023.111
Sophia Crüwell
{"title":"The Psychologist’s Green Thumb","authors":"Sophia Crüwell","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.111","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The ‘psychologist’s green thumb’ refers to the argument that an experimenter needs an indeterminate set of skills to successfully replicate an effect. This argument is sometimes invoked by psychological researchers to explain away failures of independent replication attempts of their work. In this paper, I assess the psychologist’s green thumb as a candidate explanation for individual replication failure and argue that it is potentially costly for psychology as a field. I also present other, more likely reasons for these replication failures. I conclude that appealing to a psychologist’s green thumb is not a convincing explanation for replication failure.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81170470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Concepts of Actionability in Precision Oncology 精准肿瘤学中可操作性的概念
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-09-08 DOI: 10.1017/psa.2023.115
Benjamin Chin-Yee, A. Plutynski
{"title":"Concepts of Actionability in Precision Oncology","authors":"Benjamin Chin-Yee, A. Plutynski","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.115","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 “Actionability” is a key concept in precision oncology. Its precise definition, however, remains contested. This paper undertakes a philosophical analysis of “actionability” to aid in conceptual clarification. We map distinct concepts of actionability, arguing that each is best understood as a contextually objective category articulated to mitigate risk of “conceptual slippage.” We defend “interactive pluralism,” acknowledging the need for distinct concepts but also for conceptual interaction in practice. This paper thus offers insights for both practitioners and philosophers, clarifying approaches to actionability for scientists and clinicians and also serving as a case study to test competing views on scientific pluralism.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"92 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83854442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the Role of Erotetic Constraints in Non-causal Explanations 论情色约束在非因果解释中的作用
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-09-08 DOI: 10.1017/psa.2023.114
Marc Lange, Jared Millson, C. Pincock
{"title":"On the Role of Erotetic Constraints in Non-causal Explanations","authors":"Marc Lange, Jared Millson, C. Pincock","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.114","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In non-causal explanations, some non-causal facts (such as mathematical, modal or metaphysical) are used to explain some physical facts. However, precisely because these explanations abstract away from causal facts, they face two challenges: 1) it is not clear why would one rather than the other non-causal explanantia be relevant for the explanandum; and 2) why would standing in a particular explanatory relation (e.g., “counterfactual dependence”, “constraint”, “entailment”, “constitution”, “grounding”, and so on), and not in some other, be explanatory. I develop an explanatory relevance account which is based on erotetic constraints and show how it addresses these two challenges.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78373149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Models as Dogwhistles 模型如狗哨
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-09-08 DOI: 10.1017/psa.2023.100
Marina DiMarco
{"title":"Models as Dogwhistles","authors":"Marina DiMarco","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.100","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Some scientific models and some claims about model-target relations are fruitfully diagnosed as dogwhistles. Dogwhistles, broadly speaking, are speech acts which send different, conflicting, and often differentially inflammatory messages to listeners. I distinguish two ways scientific models can be dogwhistles: representational dogwhistling and fit-for-purpose dogwhistling. I illustrate both kinds of dogwhistling using an example from computational social science, the Diversity Trumps Ability theorem. I argue that dogwhistling threatens the objectivity of science, and propose some ameliorative strategies.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"90 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79475722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Merely Means Paternalist? Prospect Theory and ‘Debiased’ Welfare Analysis 仅仅意味着家长主义?前景理论与“去偏见”福利分析
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-09-04 DOI: 10.1017/psa.2023.106
Johanna Thoma
{"title":"Merely Means Paternalist? Prospect Theory and ‘Debiased’ Welfare Analysis","authors":"Johanna Thoma","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.106","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Behavioural welfare economics usually aims at mere means paternalism, helping agents better pursue their own goals. This paper discusses one initially promising way to inform policies addressed at agents who violate expected utility theory (EUT), namely what I call ‘CPT debiasing’. I argue that this approach is problematic even if we grant the normative authority of EUT, the descriptive adequacy of CPT (cumulative prospect theory), and the general acceptability of means paternalism. First, it is doubtful whether the CPT utility function measures what its proponents intend. Second, by imposing risk neutrality on agents the approach involves a more problematic paternalism.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75781865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
The Epistemic Projection Approach to Values in Science 科学价值的认知投射方法
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-08-23 DOI: 10.1017/psa.2023.107
W. Parker
{"title":"The Epistemic Projection Approach to Values in Science","authors":"W. Parker","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.107","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I develop a novel account of how non-epistemic aims and values can appropriately influence scientific investigation. At its heart is a process of epistemic projection, in which a non-epistemic aim or value is mapped to an epistemic research problem that aligns with that aim or value. Choices in research are then justified as a means of solving that research problem. This epistemic projection approach makes research responsive to non-epistemic aims and values yet remains consistent with the value-free ideal; it could be acceptable to parties on both sides of the values-in-science debate. It also promises to be useful in practice.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79171898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Review of Slobodan Perović From Data to Quanta – Niels Bohr’s Vision of Physics The University of Chicago Press (2021), 280 pp., $45 USD (cloth) 从数据到量子——尼尔斯·玻尔的物理学愿景芝加哥大学出版社(2021)，280页，45美元(布)
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-08-23 DOI: 10.1017/psa.2023.108
Michael E. Cuffaro
{"title":"Review of Slobodan Perović From Data to Quanta – Niels Bohr’s Vision of Physics The University of Chicago Press (2021), 280 pp., $45 USD (cloth)","authors":"Michael E. Cuffaro","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.108","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82249736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hasty Generalizations Are Pervasive in Experimental Philosophy: A Systematic Analysis 草率概括在实验哲学中普遍存在:一个系统的分析
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-08-23 DOI: 10.1017/psa.2023.109
U. Peters, Olivier Lemeire
{"title":"Hasty Generalizations Are Pervasive in Experimental Philosophy: A Systematic Analysis","authors":"U. Peters, Olivier Lemeire","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.109","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Scientists may sometimes generalize from their samples to broader populations when they have not yet sufficiently supported this generalization. Do such hasty generalizations also occur in experimental philosophy? To check, we analyzed 171 experimental philosophy studies published between 2017 and 2023. We found that most studies tested only Western populations but generalized beyond them without justification. There was also no evidence that studies with broader conclusions had larger, more diverse samples, but they nonetheless had higher citation impact. Our analyses reveal important methodological limitations of many experimental philosophy studies and suggest that philosophical training may not protect against hasty generalizations.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82695093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Epistemic markers in the scientific discourse 科学话语中的认知标记
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-08-22 DOI: 10.1017/psa.2023.97
C. Malaterre, Martin Léonard
{"title":"Epistemic markers in the scientific discourse","authors":"C. Malaterre, Martin Léonard","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.97","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.97","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The central role of such epistemic concepts as theory, explanation, model, or mechanism is rarely questioned in philosophy of science. Yet, what is their actual use in the practice of science? Here we deploy text-mining methods to investigate the usage of 61 epistemic notions in a corpus of full-text articles from the biological and biomedical sciences (N=73,771). The influence of disciplinary context is also examined by splitting the corpus into sub-disciplinary clusters. The results reveal the intricate semantic networks that these concepts actually form in the scientific discourse, not always following our intuitions, at least in some parts of science.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91344880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An Evolutionary Account of Guilt? 内疚的进化解释?
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-08-11 DOI: 10.1017/psa.2023.105
Charlie Kurth
{"title":"An Evolutionary Account of Guilt?","authors":"Charlie Kurth","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.105","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Grant Ramsey and Michael Deem argue that appreciating the role that empathy plays in posttransgression guilt leads to a more promising account of the emotion’s evolutionary origins. But because their proposal fails to adequately distinguish guilt from shame, we cannot say which of the two emotions we are actually getting an evolutionary account of. Moreover, a closer look at the details suggests both that empathy may be more relevant for our understanding of shame’s evolutionary origins than guilt’s, and that guilt is unlikely to be an adaptation.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"125 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79509838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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