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Making Sense of Shame – ADDENDUM 理解羞耻——附录
IF 1 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-03-09 DOI: 10.1017/s0031819122000031
James Laing
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引用次数: 0
Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by Brad Inwood and James Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020). 《希腊化哲学中的身体与灵魂》,Brad Inwood和James Warren主编(剑桥:剑桥大学出版社,2020)。
IF 1 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-03-07 DOI: 10.1017/s0031819122000055
J. Sellars
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引用次数: 0
Spinoza on the Distinction Between Substance and Attribute 斯宾诺莎论物质与属性的区别
IF 1 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0031819122000043
Antonio Salgado Borge
{"title":"Spinoza on the Distinction Between Substance and Attribute","authors":"Antonio Salgado Borge","doi":"10.1017/S0031819122000043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819122000043","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I examine Spinoza's claim in the Metaphysical Thoughts (CM) that the attributes of God are only distinguished by a distinction of reason. I contend that for Spinoza essential attributes, such as Thought or Extension, cannot be distinguished by Francisco Suarez's distinction of reasoning reason, as Martin Lin (2019) suggests, nor can he be using Suárez’ distinction of reasoned reason for this purpose, as Yitzhak Melamed (2017) believes. Since reasoning reason and the distinction of reasoned reason are the only two kinds of rational distinction available to Spinoza, it follows that for him the distinction between God's essential attributes in the CM cannot be a distinction of reason. But I show that Spinoza is not mistakenly using Suarez's distinction in the CM. Rather, I argue, Spinoza consistently follows Suárez and uses reasoned reason to distinguish between God's necessary properties and not between God's essential attributes.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"97 1","pages":"207 - 231"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47778843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
‘Labour’, A Brief History of a Modern Concept “劳动”,现代概念简史
IF 1 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-02-17 DOI: 10.1017/S003181912100036X
A. Honneth
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引用次数: 1
The Parmenidean Ascent by Michael Della Rocca (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2020). 迈克尔·德拉·罗卡的《巴门尼德的崛起》(牛津大学出版社:牛津,2020)。
IF 1 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-02-15 DOI: 10.1017/s003181912200002x
Emanuele Costa
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引用次数: 0
Good, Actually: Aristotelian Metaphysics and the ‘Guise of the Good’ 善,其实是善:亚里士多德形而上学与“善的伪装”
IF 1 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-02-02 DOI: 10.1017/S0031819121000425
Adam M. Willows
{"title":"Good, Actually: Aristotelian Metaphysics and the ‘Guise of the Good’","authors":"Adam M. Willows","doi":"10.1017/S0031819121000425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819121000425","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper I argue that both defence and criticism of the claim that humans act ‘under the guise of the good’ neglects the metaphysical roots of the theory. I begin with an overview of the theory and its modern commentators, with critics noting the apparent possibility of acting against the good, and supporters claiming that such actions are instances of error. These debates reduce the ‘guise of the good’ to a claim about intention and moral action, and in so doing have become divorced from the theory's roots in classical and medieval philosophy. Aristotle and Aquinas’ ‘guise of the good’ is primarily a metaphysical claim resting on the equivalence between actuality and goodness, from which conclusions about moral action are derived. I show the reasoning behind their theory and how it forms the basis for the claims about intention and action at the centre of the modern debate. Finally, I argue that the absence of its original foundation is apparent in recent attacks on the ‘guise of the good’. It is unsurprising that modern action theory and ethics have not always been able to comfortably accommodate the ‘guise of the good’; they are only telling half of the story.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"97 1","pages":"187 - 205"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44160235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
PHI volume 97 issue 1 Cover and Back matter PHI卷97期1封面和背面问题
IF 1 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-12-17 DOI: 10.1017/s0031819121000413
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引用次数: 0
PHI volume 97 issue 1 Cover and Front matter PHI第97卷第1期封面和封面
IF 1 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-12-17 DOI: 10.1017/s0031819121000401
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引用次数: 0
The Relationship Between Conscious and Unconscious Intentionality 有意识和无意识意向性之间的关系
IF 1 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-12-10 DOI: 10.1017/S0031819121000383
Raamy Majeed
{"title":"The Relationship Between Conscious and Unconscious Intentionality","authors":"Raamy Majeed","doi":"10.1017/S0031819121000383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819121000383","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The contemporary view of the relationship between conscious and unconscious intentionality consists in two claims: (i) unconscious propositional attitudes represent the world the same way conscious ones do, and (ii) both sets of attitudes represent by having determinate propositional content. Crane (2017) has challenged both claims, proposing instead that unconscious propositional attitudes differ from conscious ones in being less determinate in nature. This paper aims to evaluate Crane's proposal. In particular, I make explicit and critique certain assumptions Crane makes in support of his asymmetry, and argue for a conditional claim: if Crane is right that unconscious intentional states are (relatively) indeterminate, this suggests that conscious intentional states are indeterminate in a similar fashion as well.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"97 1","pages":"169 - 185"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46383657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Making Sense of Shame 理解羞耻
IF 1 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-12-10 DOI: 10.1017/S0031819121000395
J. Laing
{"title":"Making Sense of Shame","authors":"J. Laing","doi":"10.1017/S0031819121000395","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819121000395","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I argue that we face a challenge in understanding the relationship between the ‘value-oriented’ and ‘other-oriented’ dimensions of shame. On the one hand, an emphasis on shame's value-oriented dimension leads naturally to ‘The Self-Evaluation View’, an account which faces a challenge in explaining shame's other-oriented dimension. This is liable to push us towards ‘The Social Evaluation View’. However The Social Evaluation View faces the opposite challenge of convincingly accommodating shame's ‘value-oriented’ dimension. After rejecting one attempt to chart a middle course between these extremes, I argue that progress can be made if we reject the widespread assumption that the other-oriented dimension of shame is best understood primarily terms of our concern with the way we appear to others. Instead, I outline an account which treats shame as manifesting our desire primarily for interpersonal connection and which elucidates the property of shamefulness in terms of merited avoidance (or rejection).","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"97 1","pages":"233 - 255"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43438971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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